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SILENCED MANIFESTO: AN AUTOETHNOGRAPHY OF LIVING 
WITH SCHIZOAFFECTIVE DISORDER 
 
7 LESIONS: 7 VOICES: 7 DRUGS: 7 STORIES: 7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
I have been living with schizoaffective disorder for over twenty years. In that time, I have had 
periods of relative wellness and relative illness. I fight each battle as it comes.  I am trying to win 
my latest battle through my Doctor of Philosophy studies.   
 
This thesis takes the form of an anthropological study of mental health.  Specifically, an 
autoethnography of living with schizoaffective disorder, looking at the ways I have been labelled 
as a lesser human, and understanding that labelling is part of the culture which encompasses it.  
While the thesis devolves from my unique viewpoint, the autoethnographic methodology that 
underpins its hypothesis, research, analysis and conclusions bear witness to the common 
experience of the mental health community.    
 
I have seven lesions in my brain.  It is ironic because these lesions have no function or purpose.  




or cause the schizoaffective disorder that has plagued me for so long.  My neurologist states that 
the lesions would not have been discovered if not for a continuing growing medical culture of 
measurement, which seems to justify an ethos which disempowers those with a major psychotic 
illness. 
 
By coincidence, I hear seven voices; often discordant voices.  As a person living with 
schizoaffective disorder, I am aware of at least seven voices in my own head, all which conflict 
with the person I am now and the person I want to be.  In this thesis, I extend my study of the 
poly vocal world of my disorder, to position myself within an extension of the multiple voices of 
the health and medical systems that now control my life.   
 
In homage to this accidental theme, other chapters follow the ‘seven’ edicts.  I take seven drugs 
that deal with the side effects of the other three therapeutic drugs.  I have also included a chapter 
of seven stories, as artefacts, furthering my autoethnography of what life is like living with 
schizoaffective disorder.  To finish, the conclusion of the thesis is written in seven subsections, 
following on and expanding from statements posed in the thesis introduction.  
 
My autoethnography of living with a major psychotic illness is a journey through diagnosis, 
institutionalisation and attempts at reintegration.  Ultimately, it is a story of transformation in a 
profoundly negative sense of the word; how my life has been stripped bare by my illness and the 
institutions which now control it.  I explore how the biomedical lens of psychiatry views me and 
how it positions what I can and cannot do and be.  I explore the experience of being tested and 




with mental health conditions, but also how difficult it is to resist the definitions and labels 
imposed upon me.  In a sense biomedicine tries to measure the unmeasurable, and use crafted 
measurements to define and confine subjects, as in the mentally ill, often inappropriately and 
over-zealously.   
 
By looking at the ways I have been labelled, and by understanding that labelling as a function of 
the scientific culture that crafts it and the social culture that validates it, I examine this hypothesis: 
that psychiatric science rests on a self-vindicating ethos of clinical measurement and consequent 
labelling which perpetuates mental illness.  From this, this thesis sets out to break through the 
glass ceiling and straight jacket of the labelling, to enable the silenced to be heard, better 







CHAPTER ONE  
 
INTRODUCTION TO THESIS 
 
7 LESIONS: 7 VOICES: 7 DRUGS: 7 STORIES: 7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
“I am now convinced I am disabled.  I am coming to believe that I am all the labels people 
are bestowing on me.  I am lacking.  I am stupid.  I am powerless.  I am silenced.” (Field 
notes 24th March 2012) 
 
In this chapter I will be hypothesising my thesis. 
 
I have seven lesions on my brain.  Apparently, they are there but they do not do anything, nor 
have done anything in the past.  The neurologist calls the condition ‘functional neurological 
symptoms’.  I get spasms, mostly in my arms and legs.  I especially have trouble standing up and 
getting out of cars.  I have a 30% chance of developing multiple sclerosis with my condition.  
This upsets me somewhat because I was hoping to have an answer and gain some relief from my 
mental health prison.   
 
I hear about seven voices.  They are both male and female, all ages, different tones.  The voices, 
or ‘noises’ as I call them, are quiet when I am well, and not so when I am unwell. When I am 
unwell, they shout at me.  They say things like, “You are so bloody stupid!”; “You are hopeless 




bitch die!”; “You good for nothing sap on society!”; “I will find the slowest way to kill 
you…bitch!”;  “You mother fucking waste of space!”; “You’re not even worth the energy that I 
am spending to talk to you…. Fuck you…!!”   
 
The seven stories, to be detailed at the end of the thesis, describe seven experiences I have had 
in recent times.  They are all harrowing accounts of my life with schizoaffective disorder.  It 
seems that the label of schizoaffective disorder, like other mental health conditions, cannot be 
shaken.  The culture I am embedded in has perpetuated and endorsed my labelling.  I find that I 
am in fact, lacking.     
 
   
I have adopted an anthropological study of mental health.  Specifically, an autoethnography of 
my living with schizoaffective disorder, looking at the ways I have been labelled as a lesser 
human, and understanding that labelling is part of the culture which encompasses it. 
 
There are five statements underpinning this thesis:  
1. I live with schizoaffective disorder.  I am labelled as such, as per medical science.  I have 
been measured to affirm this label.   
2. I am defined by Westernised biomedical and psychiatric values, and indeed the values of 
the broader community who have faith in science, perpetuating my labelling.   
3. This labelling and culture perpetuating defines me as a sub-human, sub-citizen, and/or 
social misfit. I am stigmatised. 
4. I will always be lacking… in the context of the disempowered and perpetual role of 




5. There is the need to put together a strong theoretical framework to move forward.  Critical 
theory will be explored, to destabilise the dominant biomedical model. 
 
Schizoaffective disorder is basically having schizophrenia with an additional affective side.  That 
is, having issues with reality and perceptions of reality, including hearing things such as voices, 




Throughout this thesis, I banter with the term ‘crazy’.  I also use the terms ‘madness’ and ‘sick’ 
interchangeably, and in jest.  The reason why I rely on terms, particularly ‘craziness’, is to 
introduce and provoke and request another level of understanding of what it is like living with a 
major psychotic disorder.  By encouraging a different and another level of understanding, through 
jest and a black sense of humour, I hope to relate to others, both the sane and insane.  The liberty 
of using poetic licence through humour, as permitted with the methodology of autoethnography, 
provides a more complex and multifaceted understanding of the experience of living with 
schizoaffective disorder.  Indeed, by using the term ‘crazy’, I am also challenging the labelling 
of the mentally ill with the terms sub-human, sub-citizen and social misfit.   
 
A premise of this autoethnography is that it is a reappropriation.  A reappropriation is the cultural 
process by which a group reclaims terms or artefacts that were previously used in a way 
disparaging of that group. (Reappropriation n.d.) Reappropriation is assumed throughout this 




have developed a unique insight and profound understanding into the strange alternate world of 
the ‘crazy’, as labelled by me.   
 
I must emphasise the significance of my fragmented writing.  It is a style that is a side effect, as 
it were, of my chaotic and broken and divided mind.  It is difficult enough to describe a reality 
coherently in a single language, yet I am translating the realities of seven noises yelling at me.  
My fragmented writing reflects my craziness.  There is not one filter siphoning my thought 
processes.  My mind does not operate unilaterally.  It operates multilaterally, a multiplicity that 
screams at me, assaulting my mind at the same time.  And this fragmentation is not always 
explained well by me.  In order to reduce confusion, both for my readers and for myself, I try 
and take small steps in my explanations, trying to unpack as I go, carefully, to try and make my 
thought processes clear for everyone.  Without these attempts of clarity, this thesis would be an 
untranscribable mess.  All I can hope for is the readers’ patience with my transcribing.  The 
existence of fragmentation in this autoethnography is data in itself.  It is a method of thinking, an 
expression, a logic.  Fragmented writing is an expression of a fragmented mind.  It is a reflection 
of trying to understand a way of thinking that can give a voice to the silenced.  Let this be called 
a paradigmatic method for which to better understand my crazy head.   
 
Whilst in psychiatric wards, I’ve known a man in his 50s claiming to be seven months pregnant 
with Jesus Christ.  There was also a senior officer in the armed forces cowering behind a cubby 
house he built out of a coffee table, magazines, dolls and teddies, claiming to be a king in the 
kingdom he built, and the dolls and teddies were his minions.  Though what really broke my 
heart was when I was in hospital the first time.  My brother and his wife were trying to get me to 




uncontrollably.  I wish I could have held the dear little one and expressed my love.  I really regret 
that.  I was powerless from the psychosis.  It is times like this that I hate my illness; times which 
starve me of the love I have for my friends and family.  The process of reappropriation unpacked 
in this autoethnography empowers me to be heard; empowers the birth of the language of the 
Silenced Manifesto  
 
I have written an autoethnography 
 
Central and pivotal to this thesis is its methodology.  I have written an autoethnography.  The 
fundamental story and reflection of my lived experience is depicted in the details of what it is 
like to see what I see and to hear what I hear.  What I must tell is vital in the understanding of 
living with a major psychotic illness.  Developing an autoethnography brings together the worlds 
of science, culture, art and emotion.  Not a melting pot, or an act of assimilation, rather an 
autoethnography tries to make commensurable what has previously and possibly been 
incommensurable.  I bring together language and discourse to be transferable and translatable.   I 
attempt to cut through the powerful colonial hegemony and empower the silenced. 
 
Exploring theoretical underpinnings – critical theory and (post)colonialism 
 
The term (post)colonialism is phrased as such, with parenthesis, because some theorists question 
whether there has been an end to colonialism the first time around. Aboriginal activist Bobbi 




they left” (Smith 1999: 25)?  As such, in this thesis, postcolonialism will be termed 
(post)colonialism (Smith 1999).   
 
Science may be a tool of colonialism, and the concept of mental illness can be likened to 
(post)colonialism.  It is directly related to my experience of living with a major psychotic illness.  
I am controlled, defined and silenced by the politics of the colonisers, in this case and for example 
the realm of biomedical science.  Thus, the Silenced Manifesto.   
 
The Silenced Manifesto is a fluid cultural concept.  Using the method of autoethnography, culture 
is essentially a malleable tool for defining and understanding the self, and the self in comparison 
to the Other.  The fluidity of culture allows for the production of knowledge in a world where 
there is no absolute truth.  The fluidity of culture disallows the traditionalist older view of a static 
culture which is limited by boundedness, timelessness, and homogeneity – such a static view of 
culture is quickly adopted by hegemony, which of course is a tool of colonialism  (Abu-Lughod 
1991: 143)  
 
Cultural interpretation and understanding are the fundamental purpose of anthropology.  Culture 
depicts a certain sense of identity construct which is constantly under definitional duress.  This 
duress becomes the fight of the Silenced Manifesto, where culture and identity are forever 
changing; forever negotiating; forever struggling to find a voice, a voice that can be heard.   
 
It is at this early point in my study that I need to identify and position myself definitionally; in 




question, “Who am I?”, especially “Who am I, despite my mental illness?”.  I go into detail about 
my life history and life before craziness in chapters four and five, but here I can say that, drawing 
on feminist theory and queer theory, and the poetic and artistic cues that such critical theory 
allows, I can situate myself within an identity and history.  I am from English/Irish Catholic 
descent – from the third fleet to Australia in 1791.  I had a Catholic education, was one of seven 
children, from a single income family where my father earnt the family’s wage.  I have a 
commitment to social justice issues, thus my valuing human rights and the essential importance 
of cultural wealth. Although I have a family history of association with Australia’s first 
colonisers, I feel as if I have been colonised myself.   
 
I feel like I have been disempowered by the colonising government where my voice is not heard 
despite my yelling and screaming.  I am silenced.  So when I am describing the Silenced 
Manifesto throughout this thesis, I am not only influenced by the cultural power play of living 
with schizoaffective disorder, I am also situated within the creation and dynamics of other 
cultures I am socialised into, for example, from being a cis woman, Caucasian, 46 years of age, 
post graduate anthropology student, Catholic, heterosexual, and monolingual.   My experience 
of living with schizoaffective disorder can be better placed with an understanding of these 
sub/cultures I am socialised into. 
 
I am a part of the Silenced Manifesto; defined by and hidden behind a dominant and 
discriminating discourse.  The discourse is punitive as it does not allow for the language or 
expression of those living with a psychotic illness.  The discourse disallows and disempowers 
agency for the marginalised, supporting a form of punitive discourse that promotes the 
subjugation of the sub-humans, sub-citizens and social misfits, and promotes inequality, both 





The term, ‘subaltern’, considered by Spivak (1988) to be the colonised, can be likened to the 
culturally crafted identities of sub-human, sub-citizen and social misfit discussed in this thesis.    
The subaltern has been colonised and suffocated by the colonisers’ dominant ideologies.  
(Post)colonialism is strongly represented in this thesis as a theoretical tool of analysis because, 
as part of critical theory, it significantly represents the space of the marginalised group.   
 
Within a space for commensurability comes a message from the marginalised, those living with 
mental illness; where there is a site of creativity and power; where the mentally ill recover; where 
we meet in solidarity to erase the categories of colonized/colonizer. As hooks (1990: 152) states, 
“Marginality is the space [site] of resistance. Enter that space. Let us meet there. Enter that space. 
We greet you as liberators”.  Forms of possible disempowerment for the colonised subordinated 
subject is to give up their knowledge for the use of the Western academic.  Forms of possible 
empowerment and remittance for the colonised include using the coloniser's tools of language 
and discourse (hooks 1984). 
 
Labels perpetuated by culture 
 
I aim in this thesis, firstly, to unpack my experience of living with schizoaffective disorder.  I 
will pull apart, excruciate, examine, study, analyse, extrapolate and compile my experience of 
living with schizoaffective disorder, and how my being labelled within the science of mental 





When considering the cultural identities of sub-human, sub-citizen and social misfit, I cannot 
ignore the importance of labelling theory.  Durkheim was the first social theorist to discuss 
labelling theory in Suicide (1897).  Labelling theory came into its own in the 1960s and 1970s, 
around the same time that critical theory (including (post)colonisation) became more significant 
in the social science vernacular.  Goffman (1963) also contributed to labelling theory in his 
discussion of stigma.  Scheff introduced labelling theory to the construct of mental illness in 
1966.  Scheff (1974) also discussed the stigma of the mentally ill and how identifying as mentally 
ill is a self-fulfilling prophecy.  If you are labelled as lacking, you will be treated as lacking, and 
identify yourself as lacking, and become lacking.  
 
The essence of labelling theory is that individuals are crafted by society and given identity by 
society.  This is done via the labels that individuals are given by society.  Some labels result in 
harmful effects, such as the conformity of deviance and the reappropriation and perpetuation of 
stigma.  These labels are enabled, empowered and perpetuated by society.  The negative effects 
of labelling, the naming and assumptions, are internalised by the individual so that they adopt 
the negative influence of the labelling.  Importantly, in this case, the individuals self-actualise 
and learn to accept and identify as a sub-human, sub-citizen, social misfit.   
 
In this autoethnography, I will explore what it is like to be labelled and categorised and 
stigmatised as sub-human, sub-citizen and/or a social misfit, culturally crafted identities which 
have been applied to the mentally ill.  These terms are very close in definition and should be 
understood as supporting each other.  And they need to be defined first.  Sub-humans are defined 
as those not granted full human status in society in that they are deemed to lack the capacity to 
participate in society.  Aristotle claimed that to be human is to be social (Colaner 2012).  Indeed, 




fundamental social nature of humankind.  They display behaviour that is going against what is 
the norm of social and cultural behaviour (Scheff 1974). 
 
“Human beings are social creatures. We are social not just in the trivial sense that we like 
company, and not just in the obvious sense that we each depend on others. We are social in 
a more elemental way: simply to exist as a normal human being requires interaction with 
other people”.  
Atul Gawande (2014) 
 
Sub-citizens, very similar to subhumans, do not participate fully as citizens of the state, not from 
their own choice.  For example, sub-citizens do not fully contribute to society, politically or 
economically.  Sub-citizens do not always vote or play an active role in the governance of society.  
Nor does the sub-citizen participate in the economy, by having a job or actively seeking work.  
The concept of sub-citizen is in relation to the State or nation (Matute 2018). 
 
A social misfit is a person who does not fit into society.  There is no room for them.  They do not 
adhere to the public values and behaviour of the socially kept and powerful.  They are rejected 
and not tolerated.  Their behaviour is labelled as anti-social.  They are outcasts of society (Allman 
2013). It is not uncommon that people living with a mental illness with their anti-social behaviour 
are homeless – and in being so rather public.  Those who do not want to have their space 
infiltrated by anti-social behaviour do not want to see the mentally ill homeless person in their 
public space.  They label such people as social misfits, and commonly the social misfits are 
admitted to psychiatric wards.  They are silenced and hidden by the mental health system.  Where 





Measurement is a tool that labels. In considering measurement and diagnosis as cultural 
phenomena, and considering measurement as a labelling tool, one asks, what do these 
measurements represent and how does measurement act to label mental illness?  There is a magic 
of representation displayed in measurement – and at the same time a violence of writing, and a 
violence of measurement (Said 1978; Smith 1999).  As such, mental health measurements 
perpetuate a culture which ultimately leads to a crisis of representation (Smith 1999).   
 
Measurement can be both liberating and/or disempowering.  Measurement, for me, has defined 
and confined me, for example, through my diagnosis.  What are the tools of diagnosis, the tools 




myself, through measurement, being associated with a certain type of categorisation.  Some 
perspectives on these are addressed in my medical notes (see chapters five through nine).   
 
Diagnoses via scientific magical evaluation (Lea 2008) may be defined as and perpetuated by the 
culture/s of madness, and/or vice versa.   An analysis of diagnosis is somewhat legitimised by 
the banter and negotiation between the mentally ill and mental health professionals.  Diagnosis 
is the ultimate in labelling and categorisation.  It is reliant on measurement and categories that 
perpetuates culture and stigma.   
 
The psychological measurements in these testings have significance to anthropology.  According 
to Lea (2008), they come to life as a series of numbers, cultural artefacts and ‘factoids’.  Lea 
(2008) defines a factoid as a fact negotiated and influenced by the socio-cultural, economic and 
political context from which it was derived—definably subjective rather than objective.  A 
generator of factoids is rather controversial, not least because researchers treat factoids as if they 
are objective measures. Some advocates of the psychometric tools explored in this thesis hold 
great hope of them being a useful measure for representing the needs and possible treatment of 
the mentally ill (Lea 2008).  (See chapter ten.)  
 
Measurement is a cultural phenomenon, including the cultural phenomenon of a somewhat 
universal application of maths and science, for example, how far one metre is and how many four 
is.  Socially crafted facts are measurements of culture which are used to validate and demonstrate 
the success of measurable activities, such as sporting events or government elections.  And 
measurements can be essential in evaluating more esoteric phenomena, such as measuring and 




come wrapped up in an enchanting and captivating consequence of numbers.  The cultural 
practice of measurement is quite profound and enticing for those who respect and adhere to an 
ultimate scientific, measurement mandate – a mandate entwined in the rational, governing 
society, and its culture (Lea 2008).  Ultimately, however, despite the persistence of and respect 
of science, one is left to ponder, can we really measure the seemingly unmeasurable?  
 
“To some people original thought is a medical condition that leads to migraines”  
Rassool Jibraeel Snyman (c. 2017) 
 
Culture perpetuating labels 
 
The second part of the thesis focuses on an analysis of the culture/s which perpetuates these 
aforementioned categories and labels.  The significance of stigma and all the issues addressed in 
this thesis is supported by autoethnographic data.  In this way, I will examine the significance of 
culture, politics and economics.  I will investigate cultural analysis and measurement in 
psychiatry.  I will also theorise how measurement relates to the colonisation (or 
(post)colonisation) of the mentally ill, much like colonialism being associated with racism. 
 
Culture may be defined as the dynamics of values, norms, beliefs, boundaries, meanings, and 
importantly power negotiations bestowed on a social structure.  Within the culture that sets 
boundaries of values and norms from which structured society is confined, culture defines those 





Culture is fundamental to power. In fact, culture is fundamentally about power. Culture tells the 
story of the most influential and how they became so formidable. Then how they use their 
strength and effectiveness to keep them in significant positions through which they can continue 
to dominate others.  When the discourses of culture are in the hands of the underdog, the power 
distribution shifts, even if only briefly (Richard 2008: 1724). It is because of this relationship 
between culture and power that the sub-humans/sub-citizens/social misfits are excluded, 
marginalised and rejected because of the part of the robustness of the dominant culture. 
 
Considering the purpose of psychiatry, as a form of medical science, it is to gain a scientific grasp 
of mental illness and of healing the mentally ill.  Psychiatry also plays a cultural role, defining 
those with mental health disorders as a type of social class, a class that is defined as lacking.  
Similar treatment was assigned to women, homosexuals and Indigenous peoples, who were 
hunted and imprisoned and some were killed like vermin (Smith 1999: 28).  The psycho-metric 
assessment tools measuring me are socio-political technology fact-creating tools which aid in the 
governmentality of the unwell and the social misfits.  
 
Some psycho-metric testing measurements have proven to be highly significant 
anthropologically, that is, in the cultural context of (dis)empowerment of the mentally ill.  
Today’s mental health institutions and hospitals are all about measuring and judging and 
surveillance.  The mental health assessment tools and medical observations, cultural tools of 
modern psychiatry, are all about measuring and judging deviance (Foucault 1961).  This 
measurement leads me to say that I am in servitude to medical science and will be for as long as 






The mentally ill are stigmatised as a form of outcasts. They are not full humans nor full citizens 
– they are people who don’t belong and are unwanted. This disdain is precipitated and justified 
by various policies of cultural significances and control, in the name of managing ‘anti-social 
behaviour’ and with people classed as ‘stigmatised’ (McMahon 2017). 
 
There is an assumed a priori knowledge that psychiatric inpatients and/or community patients 
are lacking or in deficit in some way and need intervention and support.  There is currently a 
political commitment to deal with the ‘mental health issue’ in Australia, more so due to Professor 
Patrick McGorry, a mental health advocate, being declared Australian of the Year in 2010.  
McGorry campaigned for the government and community to address complex socio-cultural 
issues of the mentally ill to lessen the degree of stigma related to this marginalised group.  The 
political issue of mental health is made more perplexing by considering mental health policy and 
government bureaucracy.  Mental health political and bureaucratic infrastructure is complex and 





The utilisation of measurement results in knowledge production.  Measurement tools, for 
example cognitive functioning tests (discussed at length in later chapters), become an objective 
instrument of governance, producing practices of knowability and justifying the expenditure for 
program continuance and policy valuation and implementation.  The assessment process creates 
a space for knowledge production, a formation of political technology where the act of 
‘measurement’ forms a type of discovery which has political and governmental significance.  
Which brings one to question, who owns the knowledge of the crazy?   
  
These cultural spaces in all their facets have affected me, defined me, and labelled me.  In this 
culture I don’t seem to have a choice. As a young woman (when I was diagnosed), it was through 
the culture of medical science that my identity was set.  This identity construct, being defined for 
me, has disempowered me and brought me great shame as a sub-human.   
 
A cultural space of the State is exemplified by my dependence on the State for the supply of a 
drug called Clozapine.  Clozapine is an anti-psychotic drug that treats to some degree those who 
have been non-responsive to treatment with other anti-psychotic drugs.  To be eligible for 
Clozapine, I needed to have a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder or schizophrenia.  As part of 
taking Clozapine, I must consent to being measured and ‘poked and prodded’ monthly.  Also, at 
least every two months, I must see a psychiatrist.  Seeing a psychiatrist so often, and more if 
needed, is free of charge.  This is an absolute luxury.  Clozapine is very expensive, but the public 
system covers the cost, for now.  The cost of taking Clozapine in addition to all the other 
medications I must take comes to approximately 12% of my total wages.  This is medication 
alone, not including important services such as primary health care and allied health 




the treatment.  So, ultimately, at the whim of government policy, my health can be taken away 
at any minute.  And it will, so the gossip at the Clozapine clinic tells me.   
 
The alternate to taking Clozapine is frightful.  I may still be in the throes of psychosis.  I am 
highly dependent on the drug.  I don’t know what I would do without it.  The possibility of not 
taking it due to cost is appalling.  There are undercurrents of fear and terribleness in a highly 
dependent community.  Despite the horrific side effects, I am tied, glued, attached and entwined 
to biomedicine.        
     
How is my thesis different? 
 
Mental illness is a highly stigmatised phenomenon. In Australia, as with many developed 
countries, people may be sectioned, or civilly committed, against their will because an 
appropriate public servant, medical officer, such as a General Practitioner GP) or senior mental 
health professional, judges and perceives an individual to be a danger to themselves and/or to 
others (Testa & West 2010).  Although many authors have attempted to explore the world of the 
mentally ill, their ‘voices’ are external, and in many cases (see Biehl 2005) they struggle to enter 
the worlds of the people they are working with. In this thesis I am attempting something different.  
I am presenting an autoethnography of my own mental health experience.  This is my own 
account of the struggles that I have trying to make sense of my world.  The experiences of my 
day-to-day life living with schizoaffective order include negotiating with multiple and conflicting 
noises, heightened paranoia, disassociation and negotiating with the here and now, extreme 





This thesis explores areas of mental health in a way that no one else has done.  Others have 
authored autoethnographies on aspects of health (Ellis 2004; DiaGiacomo 1999), yet, no one has 
written an autoethnography before with such insight into the depths as experienced by the person 
living with schizoaffective disorder.  This thesis is unique in that it illustrates life through the 
eyes of someone with insight.  With the gift of insight - that is the ability to be significantly self-
reflective - I can give a rare and raw perspective of what it is like to live with a major psychotic 
illness and be suffocated with the disability it bestows upon me.  Perhaps others can relate.  
Perhaps others can learn and benefit from my study and sharing of this. 
 
My autoethnography is important as it gives a voice to those living with schizoaffective disorder, 
through the lens of one.  Previously, such an insight into the patients’ experience and perspective 
did not exist.  Previously, the only voices being heard in the culture concerning mental health 
were those employed and engaged with the bio-medical model.  The mental health 
participants/participants are those who are silenced and disempowered.  This thesis gives a voice 
to the silenced, through me.  With due diligence, through my inception of the conception of the 
Silenced Manifesto, I have aided the silenced to now be heard, better understood and empowered.   
 
Filling in the gaps 
 
The phenomena of mental illness are categorised.  How am I, living with schizoaffective disorder, 
understood and defined and labelled, by the broader cultural space?  How is this explored through 




schizoaffective disorder and the labels that are bestowed upon me. These are the labels of sub-
human, sub-citizen, and social misfit.  Labelling theory allows for a greater understanding of how 
labels are perpetuated by culture. 
 
 Other people living with a major psychotic illness could share my experience.  As this study is 
an autoethnography, the sample size is one, me.  Through my experiences, I can provide a lens 
through which to examine and realise the culture that enculturates me.  As this is an 
anthropological study, I will focus on the analysis of the culture/s which perpetuates how it is to 
live with a major psychotic disorder. 
 
What are the culture/s that perpetuate this labelling?  How is the experience of culture negotiated?  
What are my experiences of the culture/s being perpetuated and negotiated?  I have been stuck 
and oppressed within my diagnosis and the perceived appropriate treatment I need to have, as 
per mental health professionals’ decree.   
 
The suffocation of my expression, my thoughts, my essence is perhaps the most disabling 
experience of my life.  And I wish I could say that it happened only once.  Rather, such stifling 
and suppression is embedded in psychiatry, for everyone.  Further, and a highly significant issue, 
is the added marginalisation and subjugation that mental health participants receive when they 
are an already marginalised and subjugated group.  To extrapolate, mental ill health is over-





I delineate the cultural as defining the importance of what is social, and at the same time I would 
delineate the social as structuring what is cultural.  Only a systemic analysis can come to terms 
with this quality of culture that escapes the individual’s control (Hacking 1999: 15).  I am 
interested in the exercise of power within culture and the social body (Foucault 1982; Kleinman 
1988: 25) 
 
Outline of thesis 
 
This thesis begins with a synopsis.  Then this introduction, chapter one.  Here I begin by depicting 
a hypothesis and address for the thesis in the form of five statements. Chapter two sets the 
approach of the thesis which aligns the methodological and theoretical scene.  I also explain why 
I chose the methodological tool of autoethnography, and how this tool best fits a study that places 
the researcher in the middle of the query.   As this thesis relies considerably on Foucauldian 
concepts, a historical discussion is essential.  There are two chapters based on history.   Chapter 
three situates the discussion as part of a history of madness.  The fourth chapter concentrates and 
situates the historical discussion from an individual perspective, my perspective.  This chapter, 
more specifically, displays my own history of madness and my own experience of living with 
schizoaffective disorder.   
 
Chapters five through nine are five specific autoethnographic chapters.  Chapter five focuses on 
my life up until the first of the three psychiatric ward admissions – ‘Life before’.  The three 
admissions focussed on here are dated from 2012 to 2014.  Chapter six gives an autoethnographic 




A (public)– in 2012.  Chapter seven gives an autoethnographic account of my admission and stay 
in Ward B (public)– in 2013. Chapter eight gives an autoethnographic account of my admission 
and stay in Ward C (private)– in 2014.  Chapter nine, ‘Life after’, unpacks how I now manage 
my mental health, utilising skills and techniques I have picked up over the twenty plus years of 
living with a major psychotic illness.   
 
The analysis chapters are in three parts.  The first, chapter ten, concentrates on measurement.  It 
describes how psychiatry, and consequent psychiatric diagnoses can be legitimised through the 
art of measurement.  Chapter eleven describes and emphasises the stigmatised position that I 
continue to face; the irony and injustice of trying to live a normal life in a culture that labels me 
as sub-human and a sub-citizen, as seemingly incompetent and not fitting in the hegemonic ‘sane’ 
world.  Chapter twelve follows on with an analysis of labelling and the culture that perpetuates 
it.  This involves a study of stigma, history, governmentality and theory.  Here the concept of the 
Silenced Manifesto, a concept I discovered, continues to be discussed and examined.   
 
The conclusion, chapter thirteen, summarises and reviews the findings of my autoethnography, 
as completely as such a thing can be done. 
 
The glossary, chapter fourteen, concludes the autoethnography.   
 
These fourteen chapters (plus the synopsis) represent for me both an intellectual searching and 




Rauch.  The use of Rauch’s drawings represents my intention here is to change society not just 
interpret or write about it.  Only an autoethnographic methodology can assist me with this.  
 









SETTING THE SCENE – METHODOLOGY AND THEORY 
  
“Honest autoethnographic exploration generates a lot of fears and self-doubt and 
emotional pain. Just when you think you can't stand the pain anymore that's when the 
real work begins. Then there is the vulnerability of revealing yourself, not being able to 
take back what you 've written or having any control over how readers interpret your 
story.”  
          Carolyn Ellis (2004)  
 
When considering autoethnography, there is a sample size of one. One subject to explore, 
explain, extrapolate, and to exhaust.  One subject to unpack and repack, deconstruct and 
reconstruct, and to understand and be confused by. Through the one the many are understood; as 
through an autoethnography a culture is enlightened.  Neither a simple narrative nor an 
autobiography, the one ethnographer, who has been immersed in a culture, illuminates the socio- 
cultural phenomena in all its complicated complexities and seemly simplicities (Ellis 2004). 
 
I am sitting in my room, freezing, even though it is summer in my hometown, staring at my 




piles on my floor, trying to devise some sense of intellectual order, so I at least have some hope 
of ordering the chaos that is inside my head.  It took me days to arrange the piles, first in 
chronological order, then order by methodologies, and finally in order of topic: a process that 
was complicated by my persistent psychotic madness and the shifting multiple realities that 
plague me.  My favourite books include Tess Lea’s Bureaucracies and Bleeding Hearts (2008), 
because I think it is a shrewd account of how public health policy, as an entity, empowers itself 
by developing and utilising tools. These tools are called cultural artefacts, and they measure and 
then validate the policy makers and service provider’s existence, as well as their inherent power.  
Other books range from Fanon’s Black Skin White Masks (1952) to a couple of astute books from 
LaTour, one of which is We Have Never Been Modern. I also have the obligatory texts for 
anthropology students such as Geertz (1973) and Said (1978).  Then there are the texts which are 
deemed necessary and very topical reading in critical theory, such as Smith’s Decolonising 
Methodologies (1999).  Some topics have larger piles on the floor than their neighbours.  For 
instance, various social theorists make up four large piles, anthropology of emotion has a 
substantial pile, whilst specific studies and analyses of the anthropology of madness have a lowly 
twelve books in their pile. (Moyer & Nguyen: 2014)  This represents not a lack of desire to 
engage with such material, but a substantial gap in the anthropological lexicon  (Hale 1975).    
 
Well-known Australian based academics who have experience in mental health research include 
Foster, who has worked in and has experience from being a child of a parent with mental illness 
(2012; 2016).  Another academic, Broadbent completed an ethnography about triaging people 
with a mental illness in the emergency department (Marynowski-Traczyk, & Broadbent 2011). 
Then there is Muir-Cochrane, who is a consumer advocate and qualitative researcher.  Salvador-




also been involved in much research in mental health in Australia including the topics of lived 
experience and mental health policy.  Senior (2006; 2009) has also influenced this body of 
research with her support of the autoethnography method used in this thesis.  
 
In addition to the lack of studies on madness, there is a poverty of anthropological studies on 
self-experience, or autoethnographic analysis, of madness.  I have read autobiographic works 
such as Sylvia Plath’s The Bell Jar (1963) and Janet Frame’s An Angel at My Table (1984).  
Although amazing pieces of writing, with excruciating and discomforting detail, they still left 
some questions unanswered for me.  Firstly, these narratives do not show how the individual 
experiences their illness within the context of their public historic-socio-cultural order, that has 
structured, engulfed and created the definition of the phenomena of what is today called ‘mental 
illness’.  The public historic-socio-cultural order which bounds ‘mental illness’ in this thesis is 
today’s modern Australian culture.  (As per the development and formation of autoethnography, 
modern Australian culture ranges from the 1960s till the present.)  Secondly, these narratives 
lack a comprehensive description and analysis of the individual’s experience of having a mental 
illness, more specifically, that of having a major psychotic illness.  Thirdly, how does the 
psychotic individual experience the phenomena of hospitalisation, both voluntary and 
involuntary, and what does this means for both the individual and the social context from which 
it was developed.   
 
Following on from Plath and Frame, and according to Neumann (1996) an autoethnography is 
“text [that] democratises the representational sphere of culture by locating the particular 




description and analysis of the lived experience of the mentally ill individual seen as within the 
structure of the mental health system in this instance, contributes to an alternate view, perhaps 
postmodernist or poststructuralist in form, which unpacks and reveals the multiplicity and 
kaleidoscopic phenomena which is mental health.  To expand, poststructuralism, closely aligned 
to postmodernism, but perhaps also reactive to it by negating the importance of all social 
theorising, not limiting social analysis just to multiple truths.  In reaction to exploring and 
negating, the nature of structuralism is known by deconstructing it.  There are no macro-universal 
truths, nor micro nor nano truths.  Social power play is rife, which brings to light the nuances of 
the social in practice and the social in theory, if there is an actual difference between the two.  
For a short time, Foucault claimed to be a poststructuralist (Foucault in O’Farrell 2007) (Note: 
to some theorists, postmodernism is much of a muchness with poststructuralism.  See glossary 
chapter for definitions of postmodernism and poststructuralism).   
 
I intend to use this dialogue – to explore and analyse through the lens of my mental health 
experience, that which includes an analysis of the biomedical labelling of schizoaffective 
disorder.  It is of interest to note that the social labelling of schizoaffective disorder is not 
necessarily at odds with the biomedical labelling of such.  From this focus flows my personal 
story and an exploration of the societal issues of mental health labelling.  This autoethnography 
is about understanding the mental health culture that I belong to, seen through my lens, telling 
my enculturated stories. 
 
The reason why I focus on a Euro-Western-centric account is because it is the culture which 




foundation of my understanding of Australian social science, Australian psychiatry, and the 
histories of such.  I am also able to situate my personal enculturation into the mental health 
system, namely an understanding of the empowerment and disempowerment what it is like to 
live with schizoaffective disorder.   
  
A significant theme evidenced in this analysis is measurement.  How am I measured?  What tools 
are used?  What artefacts are employed, that is which measurement tools used have cultural 
meaning (Lea 2008)? The different types of measurement may turn out to (mis)represent the 
subject being measured, thus measuring the unmeasurable, or perhaps measuring nothing in fact.  
Of significance to measurement is the realm of diagnosis – measurement is often seen as an end, 
serving only to legitimise the diagnosis process, and the role of the mental health professionals 
involved.  As well, legitimising diagnostic power can be seen through the art of measurement.   
The power of measurements and consequent numbers and pie graphs are quite profound (Lea 
2008).  The purpose of this chapter is to define and build upon the knowledge produced by the 
chosen methodology of this thesis, that is autoethnography. 
 
I hope this dialogue scrutinises an account of how evidence is manufactured and negotiated, by 
the policies perpetuated by public health and bureaucracy.  There is a visible gap in the literature, 
thus the need to add this thesis to the scholarship of medical anthropology and/or socialised 
medicine (Moyer & Nguyen: 2014).  Tess Lea’s Bureaucracies and Bleeding Hearts (2008) asks 
the pertinent questions: what are the power dynamics involved in evaluation, measurement and 
accountability?  What are the social constructions of facts – ’factoids’, and the cultural/statistical 
artefacts geared to justify reproduction of cultural institutions/phenomena, such as 




voices and discourse of the marginalised are suffocated and muffled by those in power, the 
‘colonisers’ as such of knowledge.     
 
“Where there is power, there is resistance.”    
Michel Foucault (1976) 
 
Diagnosis and prognosis 
 
I was 23 when I was first hospitalised into a psychiatric unit.  I was there for 39 days inclusive, 
from April until May 1997, as per my medical notes.  It wasn’t until the end of my stay that I 
received a diagnosis of bipolar disorder – which type I do not know.  Seeing as diagnoses are 
complex and multifaceted, it is not surprising that my actual diagnosis wasn’t discovered for 
many years after that first hospital visit.  I don’t know whether this absence of a full diagnosis is 
because the medical professionals involved didn’t know, didn’t think it is important or that they 
wanted to protect me - all reasons I declare to be unsatisfactory.  This shows that psychiatry is 
an inexact science, much is unknown, and how medical professionals try to paternalistically 
protect me and others.  Protection, an inappropriate and well-intentioned means to a 
misappropriated end.  The need to diagnose is interesting: to define and confine, to measure and 
to label apparently improves and guides treatment.  For those scientists and mental health 
professionals for whom it matters, psychiatry is a science where treatment can be calculated, 




with mental illness. It gives them somewhat of a tangential explanation of their position, no 
matter how oblique (Szasz 2008).   
 
So, I am diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder.  Schizoaffective disorder can affect anyone, 
but generally more women than men suffer from the disorder.  Schizoaffective disorder often 
begins in late adolescence or early adulthood, with a typical age of onset of between 16 and 30 
years of age (De Hert et al 2011).  Schizoaffective disorder is a condition that many people have 
never heard of, and yet it affects as many as one in every two hundred people, that's 0.5% of the 
population.  The mental health experience for those living with schizoaffective disorder is little 
known, and this is not surprisingly due to its complex and multifaceted components.  (Benabarre 
et al 2001)  
 
Let me discuss the currently accepted definition of schizoaffective disorder.  "Schizoaffective 
disorder can easily be confused with bipolar disorder and schizophrenia because the symptoms 
are very similar. Someone living with schizoaffective disorder will generally experience the 
hallucinations and delusions that are commonly associated with schizophrenia at the same time 
as, or within a few days of, experiencing the mood disturbances of and depression that are usually 
associated with bipolar disorder" (Daniel 2011: 19; DSM V 2013).  There are a couple of different 
types of schizoaffective disorder - bipolar type and depressive type. I do not know which type I 
am.  Thus, is the chaos of mental health care.  This definition is directed by the fifth diagnostic 
and statistical manual of mental disorders – DSM V. The DSM V is the bible for psychiatric 
diagnosis, mostly used in the colonial West.  People diagnosed with bipolar disorder can also 




disorder will experience the psychotic symptoms outside of the mood episode as well as during 
the mood episode, whereas someone with bipolar disorder will experience hallucinations and 
delusions only during a mood episode. Schizoaffective disorder affective/mood symptoms 
include hypomania, mania, depression and mixed states.  Affective symptoms can simply be 
described as symptoms with an emotional component (Daniel 2011: 20).  Psychotic symptoms 
of schizoaffective disorder include paranoia, hallucinations, delusions, all showing a diminished 
capacity to decipher what is real and what is not real.  My main psychotic symptoms are caused 
by anxiety.  
 
I find anxiety a massive cross to bear.  It is always with me in varying degrees.  I am disabled by 
it.  Anxiety limits freedom, agency and autonomy.  It suffocates me.  Yet, anxiety is a normal 
human feeling that is linked to the sensation of fear that people experience when they are faced 
with situations that are either threatening or difficult.  Anxiety, therefore, can be a positive 
experience because it is designed to protect people from danger.   Anxiety is connected to the 
famous ‘fight or flight’ response (Daniel 2011: 62-3).  However, feelings of massive anxiety 
have been diagnosed as panic attacks. Some of the symptoms of the attacks as I feel them, 
include: a desperate gasping for air, rapid short breaths, fast pulse from my heart crushing the 
inside of my chest, numbness and loss of control of my limbs; and being plagued by sweat, terror 
and panic.  I have panic attacks often. In these days of relative wellness, I have about one panic 
attack every second day.   
 
Depression is also part of the experience of people with schizoaffective disorder however, it does 
not plague me as much as anxiety.  I do experience depression, chronically, but I feel most 




years, the powerful underlying anxiety has become a major contributor to my major psychotic 
disorder.  Many mental health professionals have said that my anxiety is a cause of my psychotic 
symptoms.  That may not have been the case years ago, but it is now (Kaplan 2003: 509).  My 
disorder needs to be managed well.  To emphasise, anxiety causes psychosis and psychosis 
causes a loss of cognitive functioning and poor cognitive functioning causes poor quality of life. 
 
There is much emphasis put on the diagnosis of a mental illness.  As mentioned before, the 
universal and ultimate publication defining mental illnesses is the DSM V.  Mental health 
professionals depend on this resource to diagnose and prescribe the most appropriate treatment.  
It is a cultural artefact in mental health service delivery, attempting to describe and confine the 
biomedical phenomena of the elusive obscurity of mental health.  Developing an exact diagnosis 
is a very subjective and difficult thing to do.  Both clinicians and health participants argue for 
and against a diagnostic determination.  Again, even many mental health professionals believe 
that diagnosing someone with a mental illness limits and marginalises them too much.  A 
diagnosis can be disempowering for the individual as it categorises and assumes an a priori 
assumption of identity.  Once categorised, many prescribed, expected and somewhat predicative 
behaviours are assumed, or can be, regardless of the actuality of the individual and their 
experiences.  Yet at the same time, some people find that they are empowered by diagnostic 
labelling because they can research and come to understand better the nature of their illness 
(DiGiacomo in Elliot & Ray 2002). 
 
Despite the plethora of mental health professionals I have dealt with over the last 23 years, not 




assumed that my life will be shorter than the average healthy person.  What with the numerous 
co-morbidities that come with mental health disorders, such as alcohol and drug misuse, diabetes 
and obesity and thyroid disease (my hypothyroidism was brought on by years of taking 
Quilonum.  Quilonum is a mood stabiliser commonly called Lithium and is commonly prescribed 
for people with bipolar disorder.)  I have taken for granted that I will just not live as long as the 
‘average Jo’.  Between 30% and 40% of people with schizoaffective disorder attempt suicide at 
some point during the disorder.  Approximately ten percent of this number will succeed in their 
attempt (De Hert et al 2011) 
 
Disability and mental illness 
 
Those living with a mental health disability can access a poor wage from the Australian 
Government, called the disability support pension (DSP).  It is extremely arduous to apply for 
the DSP.  I remember applying for it and feeling disabled by the process.  The bureaucracy had 
disabled me and disempowered me.  The DSP, however, was my only option to gain monies to 
live.  I was dependent on the government to live my own life.  Although it wasn’t my own life 
that I was living.  I was tied down, economically too.  I was hidden and silenced, having to talk 
the talk and walk the walk of the State.  I had become part of the Silenced Manifesto.               
 
The type of disability commonly associated with mental illness is called ‘psychosocial disability’.  
It is a term used to describe what is often the outcome for a person with a mental health condition 
attempting to interact with a social environment that presents barriers to their equality with others 




medical science is also branching out within the realms of the social sciences.  So, mental health 
disability is called a psychosocial disability which fundamentally defines sociality as imperative 
to disability (NDIS 2020a). This is my position as an anthropologist.     
 
When comparing mental illness with other forms of disability, a few questions come to light.  
Can mental illness be compared equally with physical illnesses?  The World Health Organization 
(WHO) estimated in 2012 that about a quarter of all time lost to disability was due to mental 
illness (WHO & Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation 2014).  According to the National Disability 
Insurance Scheme (NDIS), we have some idea around racism, there are a lot of surveys looking 
at racism and racist attitudes, sexism too. But we don’t really know that about disability.  We 
must know what we’re actually dealing with. What are the misconceptions? What are the myths 
(NDIS 2020a)?  Another query, are the mentally ill underestimated?  We know, though it would 
seem likely that some people living with a mental illness disability do not identify as such, 
possible due to stigma.   
 
Furthermore, according to WHO, and speaking from an international perspective, mental health 
is primarily focussed on social health.  Mental health and many common mental disorders are 
shaped to a great extent by the social, economic, and physical environments in which people live, 
while social inequalities are associated with increased risk of many common mental disorders.  





Disability and Otherhood 
 
Because of my diagnosis and my resultant labelling and categorisation, I am immediately placed 
in the position of sub-citizen, subhuman, and/or social misfit.  The function of the mentally ill in 
the stratification of society is that of the ’Other’. ‘Otherness’ can also be likened to the status of 
Indigenous people, LGBTIQA+, women, the disabled, the colonised, and any other marginalised 
group of people who do not fit in with the social norm.   
 
Australian women first won the vote in South Australia in 1895.  Australian Indigenous peoples 
only won citizenship right across Australia in 1965 (Australian Electoral Commission 2020).  
LGBTIQA+ people are still often seen as social misfits, only recently awarded the right to marry 
in Australia.  The disabled are not classed as being in full control of their capacities, in other 
words the disabled are classed as subhuman.  People living with a mental illness who are known 
to the police during times of being unwell, are commonly referred to as social misfits.  It is not 
uncommon for Indigenous peoples to be labelled as social misfits, especially if they also have a 
mental illness (National Strategic Framework for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’ 
Mental Health and Social and Emotional Wellbeing c. 2017: 2017). This social misfit identity of 
the mentally ill is significant, on par with criminals, and classed as outsiders and unwanted in 
general society; a.k.a. Othered. 
 
The disability movement has been central in reminding us that there is a long history of people 
living with illness or disability, who are already Othered by society.  As Said (1978) argued, 




we study are ‘not us’.  The expert on the lived experience of disability or illness is not the 
clinician, but the person experiencing disability (Richards 2008: 1717). 
 
I am an Other, a lesser human, a deviant and a misfit. Living with a mental illness I have 
discovered that the mental health professionals are the powerful Us and the mentally ill are the 
Other.  The Other are an identity I belong to and have insight into the ramifications of this 
identity, part of a fundamental and phenomenal assumption of lacking.  The prevailing Us is 
defined in opposition to Other.  The two are hierarchised with Us being commanding.  This leads 
to the need to unpack the politics of the medical realism.  Here the relationship between 
psychiatry and colonisation is introduced.    
 
The disabled are squashed into a medicalised narrative.  People living with disabilities or illnesses 
are objects of study and not agents of study.    There seems to be an underlying assumption that 
such people need to be talked about but should themselves remain silent as if they do not have 
anything useful to contribute.  “Even if I cannot speak, it does not mean I have nothing to say” 
(Interviewee with an intellectual disability in a “European Union for Fundamental Rights – FRA 
study.  The WHO (2011) attempts to treat these issues in its Disability Report.    
 
They are also frequently the recipients of other people’s expertise not contributors.  Disability 
seems, often, to exist beyond the barriers of thinking, leaving disabled people in silence and 
obscurity (McDougall, Swartz & Van der Merve 2006: ix).  Not all disabilities and illnesses are 




them (Richards 2008: 1719).  If disabilities are generalised too far, they can dehumanise the 
subjects, and then because of being labelled people turn into patients (Richards 2008: 1720).   
 
This is the case historically, however these days the vernacular is spreading to give those living 
with a disability a louder voice, or at least some voice.  With the NDIS (2016) being implemented 
in Australia, the power dynamic is changing, aiming to empower the ‘disabled’ as the main player 
in the dialogue. Here is the government’s intent to relocate the focus of care to the grass roots, 
and to empower the individual.  The NDIS is about empowering the individual living with a 
disability, that is, those living with a disability will decide how their care will be delivered.  In 
Australia, it will take some time for this policy change to settle and for the ramifications to 
resolve.  There is no doubt that for now, those living with a disability remain social misfit and 
deranged, and that a change in mindset could take decades.   
 
Social sciences and health 
 
There is a rift between the social sciences and health, in this case, mental health.  Medical 
scientists place all their faith in science.  Social scientists place all their faith in the social 
sciences.  The Silenced Manifesto can help to explain the social science/mental health rift.  Social 
science, in this case through the gaze of critical theory (see chapter one), significantly represents 
(or misrepresents) the space of the marginalised group. Here, the marginalised group is the 
mentally ill - the sub-citizens, subhumans and social misfits.   There exists the hidden, the 
silenced voices of the sub-citizens, subhumans and social misfits.  As an anthropologist, abiding 




knowledge is socially constructed.  Herein lies tension.  Social scientists’ value most highly 
social phenomena, such as power dynamics and culture.  In comparison, medical scientists’ value 




There is always an element of risk in defining something so ambiguous and hazy as a major 
psychotic disorder.  As I have found, labelling someone and defining them as having 
schizoaffective disorder can pathologise them and limit them to a constrictive medical identity.   
It affects what could be a healthy sense of self and contributes with an assumed identity of less 
than human, as unable to contribute equally to society, and enforce a belittling construction of 
social identity.  Defining a major psychotic disorder goes hand in hand with precipitating and 
endorsing stigma.    
 
Erving Goffman (1959) suggested there are socially agreed upon behaviours that are appropriate 
to certain people as they engage with the context of Otherhood.  According to Goffman (1959), 
life is scripted; our interactions with others are highly routinised.  An individual’s social 
performance, then, is judged by others to be either in line or out of line with culturally expected 
behaviour (Goffman 1967).  Goffman (1959) argues that people behave in ritualised ways in 
public contexts.  There is scripted behaviour that occurs in social interaction with others because 
people who deviate from expected social performance face stigmatisation, or the spoiling of their 
identity.  Here issues of stigma, identity and power play come into effect.  Having a mental 




characteristic, in this case of mental health, a biomedical label (1987: 319).  It is a stigma, an 
attitude borne from society that reduces the afflicted person “in our minds from a whole and 
usual person to a tainted, discounted one” (Goffman 1963: 3).  Stigma brings in the whole range 
of social deviance, social injustice and political corruption.   
 
In this thesis I intend to look at the theories of Goffman in relation to my own experiences by 
way of a person living with a disability in my society, an individual that has been biomedically 
labelled.  I start from the premise that I agree with Goffman.  Goffman’s theories go a substantial 
way to explain my situation.  I would like to explore the relationship between self and society 
regarding experiencing a major psychotic illness, and how self relates to society on a micro 
versus macro level.  I will also explore the interrelationships of power play between self and 
society.    
 
There is not a linear relationship between self and society.   As Bourdieu (1991; 1998) and 
Bourdieu & Wacquant (1992) stated, the self and its relationship to society is fragmented.  
Society emerges from and is constituted by the interaction of selves.  The self and society are 
crafted and defined by social interconnectedness.  In a constant state of flux, the self and society 
are mutually intertwined to the extent that the boundaries of each are blurred into one.   
 
I hope that my insight into schizoaffective disorder can analyse, assess and appraise the 
phenomena of the pathologised psychotic experience.  It seems paradoxical to try and describe 
the labelling of schizoaffective disorder when I hate to be labelled.  I resent how my day-to-day 




the day to day world, so they know what perspectives of mine need to be mediated and medicated; 
to define which of my realities are objective realities. I believe that I can add substantial value to 
the current body of work around the lived experience having schizoaffective disorder.  I hope to 
fill the gap with an understanding and insight of what it is like to live on the fringe of medicine 
and society.  I must state, however, that close medical monitoring over my illness has saved my 
sanity many times, in many ways.  It’s a double-edged sword.  I hate what I need.  Ironic. 
 
Traditional ethnography versus autoethnography 
 
Inspired by the postmodern ‘crisis of representation’ in the late 1970s/early 1980s, and the 
poststructuralist paradigm from the same time, the term ‘autoethnography’ was first used by 
Hayaro in 1979 to describe studies in which the researcher is a member of the group being studied 
(Ellis & Bochner 2000).  Autoethnography has evolved to have many different names and forms, 
but all have in common the overt inclusion of the self in an investigation, of cultural process 
albeit with varying emphasis on each component.  Autoethnography overtly breaches the 
traditional separation between researched and researcher challenging and effectively dismissing 
(along with various other qualitative approaches), the notion of the mutual, objective researcher. 
 
 There are many similarities between traditional ethnography and autoethnography.  The essential 
difference is the autoethnography’s sample size of one. With this the autoethnographer is enabled 
and empowered to analyse utilising less traditional means.  Like traditional ethnography, an 
autoethnography typically depicts a great depth, detail and richness of the subject, as does 




understanding of the social micro-relations, including micro power relations.  An essential and 
pivotal part of autoethnography (and traditional ethnography) is the analysis of self to the relation 
to the Other.  By focussing on the self, autoethnography, brings out a depth and intensity of data 
that a traditional ethnography does not so well.  It is a textual exploration of the raptness and 
breadth of individual experience, demonstrating the various facets that make the cultural dynamic 
setting what it is.  An autoethnography is not a single voice but an advocate, amplification, 
interpreter and vehicle for many (Liamputttong & Ezzy 2005: 33).  Note that the relationship 
between Us and Other is different to the relationship between self and other.  In my definition, 
Us and Other refers to the relationship between the socialised groups of colonised and coloniser.  
Whereas, also in my definition, self and other refers to how the individual entity is defined by 
the greater society.  
 
Autoethnography brings in several very sharp foci.  It is different from traditional ethnography.  
Differences include: an autoethnography gives the perspective of culture based on an analysis of 
the minutia and how it is layered within the broader social structure; the dynamics within micro 
power relations are studied and their place in macro social power relations; the identity 
formations and perceived role of the autoethnographer; the involvement in micro-politics and 
personal contexts; and the functions of personal phenomena in the research process, such as 







Mental health services have long been influenced within landscapes of power.  
Autoethnographers are also confronting geographies of power within the acute care experience 
(Ellis & Bochner 1999).  Autoethnography can allow a deeper human investigation and 
potentially a healing place in mental health care. For example, my insight of living with 
schizoaffective disorder will address the deep emotional affects that I have carried over the last 
twenty-three years of my life.  These include a great sense of shame and fear.  Up to the time of 
writing I have tried and failed to find a place in mental health care that can be wholly therapeutic 
for me with no or little luck.     
 
There are many definitions of autoethnography.  Autoethnography (auto - told from the first 
person, and ethno – focused on culture) is grounded loosely between postmodern, 
poststructuralism, and critical approaches to research.  Storytelling is used as a method for 
obtaining and interpreting emotional and social data and presenting findings to the research 
audience that evoke a desire to effect change (Ellis 1997; 2004; Ellis & Bochner 2000; 2006).  
The overt inclusion of emotion is a unique feature of this approach, rendering it particularly 
relevant for me in the mental health arena (Foster, McAllister & O’Brien 2005; 2006; White 
2003).  Autoethnography, according to Kidd and Finlayson (2010), focuses primarily on personal 
and interpersonal interrelations.  While Marks (1999 in Richards 2008: 1724) points out that the 
political is embodied in the personal, and vice versa. 
 
Autoethnography has, as a term, been in circulation for about five decades and is defined as “an 
autobiographical genre of writing and research that displays multiple layers of consciousness, 




written in the first person, comes in a variety of creative, expressive and analytic forms, from art 
to science – ranging from short stories, poetry, fiction, novels, photographic essays, personal 
essays, journals, fragmented and layered writing and social science prose.  These 
autoethnographic texts delve into concrete action, dialogue, emotion, embodiment, spirituality 
and self-consciousness so that the function of the autoethnography is to unearth the stories of the 
autoethnographer and the stories of science and society as a whole.  The stories told in an 
autoethnography add to the growing mass of descriptive, destabilising, testimonial and 
emancipatory work associated with the culture at hand, and how these stories are dialectically 
revealed through actions, feelings, thoughts and language.  Here the personal relates to the 
cultural which relates to the personal (Ellis 1999: 673; Ellis & Bochner 2000: 201, 739; Richards 
2008 ).   
 
According to Richards (2008), there are four types of autoethnography.  The first three stemming 
from Richards are testimony, emancipatory discourse and destabilised narrative.  This 
autoethnography dabbles in all its types.  As in a testimony I will explore how my life has been 
dismembered and damaged.  Through an emancipatory discourse, I will describe a multifaceted 
understanding of disability which recognises the importance of examining interrelationships 
between embodied subjects, and complex social psychological relationships. Here, 
autoethnography is a form of emancipatory discourse because those being emancipated are 
representing themselves, instead of being colonised by others, subjected to their agendas or 
relegated to the role of second-class citizen.  However, there is a continual threat in representing 
themselves, those writing about themselves could replicate the very structures they seek to 
destroy, reverting to inauthentic identities that others have bequeathed them (Marks 1999 in 





With a destabilised narrative, I will describe how I have been interrupted by illness (Richards 
2008: 1722-1723), and how I have been disrupted by the dominant bio-medicine paradigm.  In 
short, this study is about unloading my experiences to gain a depth of understanding.  This will 
be done with the help of my insight into my mental health illness and insight into potent 
individual interrelations.   Also, I will use my skills as an anthropologist to explore knowledge 
of the literature and knowledge of the socio-cultural phenomena which embeds mental health 
services within it (Liggins, Kearns & Adams 2013: 108).  
 
This autoethnography seeks to explore and analyse the lived experience of a mental health service 
participant (me).  The rich, vigorous and powerful explanation of my experiences will be 
explored through the culture, politics, economics, and the environment of mental health service 
delivery.  An analysis of my medical notes and mental health policy and bureaucracy will be 
utilised.   
 
Autoethnography uses all senses of humanity and these are expressed through emotions and 
intentions.  Social life is messy, uncertain, and emotional.  If our desire is to research social life, 
then we must embrace a research method that, to the best of its/our ability, acknowledges and 
accommodates mess in chaos, uncertainty and emotion (Adams, Jones & Ellis 2015).  






According to Wall (2008: 39), autoethnography offers a way of giving a voice to personal 
experience to advance sociological understanding. Brooks (2010: 2) states that autoethnography 
is academic and artful storytelling that is at once personal and intellectual.  It is both method and 
a text (Reed-Danahay 1997), and it is cultural, introspective, and reflective (Ellis & Bochner 
2000).  The autoethnographic text delves into the experiences and emotions of the researcher, 
keeping his or her voice and perspectives on to and through the context of enquiry (de Freitas & 
Patos 2009: 983).  These texts, therefore, convey the interactional textures occurring between 
self, Other and contexts in ethnographic research (Spry 2001: 708).  Not only can we write about 
ourselves through autoethnography, but we can write about our contextualised interactions with 
others, mixing those lived moments with what we find in literature, theory, and analytical 
discussion.  Autoethnographic text is an important site for both academic understanding and 
social connection because we can carve out an intellectual space thick with shared awareness, 
one that goes far “beyond the self of the author” (Sparkes 2001: 222).   
 
Here lies a comparison between positivism and relativism: the science of medicine versus the 
individual ‘crazy’ perspective. Science aims to contain via measurement and analysis.  As 
someone living with a major psychotic disorder, I defy the deification of measurement and 
analysis.  I cannot emphasise this enough - psychiatry is an inexact science.  There is not a 
generalised blanket definition of schizoaffective disorder.  However, it would be remiss of me 
not to explore the phenomena of medical science in a description of the disorder.    
 
The autoethnographic way of writing has been critiqued as inappropriately emotional, personal, 




allows researchers to show how they are part of a larger context and to document the details of 
the lived experiences of individual people (Ellis & Bochner 2000 in Richards 2008: 1720).  
Emotions play a powerful role in the interaction between individuals, often transcending societal 
roles and structures.  Further, it is essential to recognise that, emotions and emotional well-being 
can be and often are attenuated by dominant social role playing and imposed social hierarchies.  
Emotions are a social entity, both developed from and maintained by social construction.  There 
are several universal emotions.  For example: happiness, sadness, surprise, fear, disgust, and 
anger (Lutz & White 1986; Wierzbicka 1986).  I would have thought that more socially 
constructed emotions would be included such as shame, guilt, love, jealousy and hate.  Emotions 
can be used as power play and a communication tool in the negotiation between self and culture 
(Kelly & Kaminskiene 2016).  
 
According to Liggins, Kearns & Adams (2013: 106, 108), autoethnography is a methodology 
that seeks to connect personal experience to cultural process and understanding. Perhaps, as 
Gadamer said, “it is not truth we are seeking, but understanding” (in Liggins, Kearns & Adams 
2013: 108).  It is important in this process to tease out the many hats we wear, to be overtly and 
reflectively aware that this autoethnography is shaped to a greater or lesser extent by the multiple 
positions we hold, so we develop over time to have a multilayered perspective (Liggins, Kearns 
& Adams 2013: 108).   
 
According to Ellis (1999: 669), the autoethnographic author seeks to develop an ethnography 
that includes the researcher’s whole and vulnerable/able self.  Stemming from this are evocative 




at how human experience features multiple voices.  Not unlike my seven voices.  As Heron 
(2001) says, “You are partially blown by the winds of reality and partly an artist creating a 
composite out of the inner and outer events”.  The goal is to use your life experiences to 
generalise to a larger group or culture; the practices of social science with the living of life (Ellis 
1999: 671).  Construction and validation of reality involves an analysis of social action, how this 
is described in the social text and then how the text is cast.  Social action is communicated 
through “ordered clusters of significant symbols” that individuals and groups of individuals use 
to employ and orient themselves in a world otherwise opaque (Geertz 1973: 363).  The cultural 
anthropologist reads their structures of meanings out of the social text.  Then the text is cast in 
terms of the anthropological universe of discourse.  For my autoethnographical story, I am 
dependent on the communication tools of the anthropological universe of discourse for me to 
make sense of my world.  
 
Often the aim of such writing is to win back some power to a certain group of people.  Although, 
it is distracting attention from the bigger issues, and might result in self-subjection, voyeurism 
and pathologism.  It might reduce the narrator to a generalisable patient example, instead of 
bringing about change.  If it is too individualising it might create a dualism of individual/culture.  
This could lead to the individual being seen out of context and the dynamic of the individual and 
society being overlooked (Marks 1999 in Richards 2008: 1724).   
 





Autoethnography is a relatively new and burgeoning methodology.  Of note, regarding ethics, is 
that an autoethnographer has ethical precedence over their own work.  The autoethnographer 
authorises his/her own ethics, through its own authority, clarity and certainty from the voice of 
one.  The eyes of one provide the insight of the many.   
 
According to Bochner (2000), two of the significant ways of gathering autoethnographic data 
include memory work and storytelling.  These methods, strengthened and entwined, depict the 
marvellousness and rawness of the past, and how that influences the present; displaying the purity 
and essentiality of the narrative; in the dynamics and relations between the self, and society and 
culture.  Memories are personal, political and relational.     
 
Ethical consideration of an autoethnography will always be incomplete.  ‘Data’ (for want of a 
better term) gathered from retrospection and memory work and storytelling will always be 
piecemeal and wanting.  It is difficult to show how these methods are ethical, especially when 
the foundations are so fragmented.  The main ethical issue related to retrospective and memory 
data is that the reflective data may display a crisis of representation.  There can never be a 
uniquely true, correct or completely, faithful autoethnography.  According to Hacking (1999), 
we are simply stuck with the reality that there is no life apart from the stories told about it, and 
there are no stories apart from the ethical realm.      
 
There are many reasons for undertaking an autoethnography.  One of these is emancipation.  That 
is the purpose of this work.  An autoethnographer has a moral responsibility to be honest and 




At times it would be unethical not to tell a story. There are consequences of not telling a story, 
and to not tell the story truthfully.  Essentially, not telling an honest story would be avoiding the 
truth and would not be vigorous and reliable.  Part of being transparent and honest in an 
autoethnography is about being true to your motive for undertaking such a study.  This thesis is 
a part of an emancipatory practice, reflecting the truth of power dynamics and unpacking the 
complexities of power negotiations   My emancipation is realised, paving the way for more to be 
emancipated.   My story illustrates, “I am the voice, the object, the focus” (Field notes December 
10th, 2014).  Other purposes of autoethnography include being therapeutic and ethical (Ellis 
1999).  It is about giving a voice to the silenced. 
 
Using personal experience methods, such as autoethnography, there is little guidance in the 
literature about how to understand ethics.   Autoethnographers justify themselves by observing 
that individuals do not exist apart from the social context, and for this reason, personal experience 
can be the foundation for further sociological understanding (Wall 2008: 49).  Parker-Jenkins 
(2018) states that the autoethnographer is the appropriate authority, giving permission by the 
academy or otherwise to write their own story.  Autoethnography as such is an avenue to explore 
self-understanding and social identity.    
 
There are some basic guides/questions for autoethnographical ethical research that help to 
deconstruct what it means to experience the rawness of the basic grassroots of a culture, a rawness 
seen through autoethnographical consideration.  Namely, the rawness is defined by the 
relationships experienced at the grassroots.  Relationships are pivotal to all things socio-cultural.  




Family, friends, partners, colleagues, medical staff, and of course myself.  If they will potentially 
be offended, they will be excluded from the research, representation and experience.  Regarding 
my medical professionals, they are deidentified in every way, given a pseudonym and changed 
location and other de-identifiable factors.  And me?  Am I okay with the portrayal of myself?  I 
have been so extensively and falsely defined by everyone else that now, here I am, empowered 
to define myself.  It is ethical for me to finally define myself.   
 
There are ways to demonstrate and determine an ethical autoethnography.  For example, the 
ownership of the story and the ownership of the knowledge generated from the story, and the 
power and empowerment that comes from representing this story.  Indeed, representation of 
knowledge can be very political.  The autoethnographer, that is me, is the authority, giving my 
own permission to write my own story.  The autoethnographer has an ethical responsibility to 
represent their own story in the truest way possible, that is to be as transparent as possible.  The 
transparency of autoethnography strengthens the rigour, validity and reliability of the study.    
Furthermore, Tolich questioned (2010: 1599), “Do I own a story just because I tell it?...Do I have 
the right to tell a story that is not mine?”  
 
Autoethnography aims to be transparent and honest, and to unpack the most complicated as well 
as the most basic purpose of research.  Autoethnography paints the rawest picture of the rawest 
subject.  The individual: the culture, the politics, the perceived truth, the power displayed, the 
purity of autoethnography, in all its honesty, exhibits strong validity and reliability as it 




transparent and honest.  In my case, “Telling an autoethnography, my story is my own” (Field 
notes February 27th, 2014).    
 
The ethics of writing and representing through an autoethnography, gives me an opportunity to 
have a voice and to break through the barriers of research and research outcomes.  The aim of an 
autoethnography is to critique and criticise the experience of one, and in doing so help to address 
issues of the many.  As my story illustrates, “I am the voice, the object, the focus” (Field notes 
December 10th, 2014).   My emancipation is realised, paving the way for more to be emancipated.      
 
The researcher is empowered by an independent individual voice.  The responsibilities of the 
researcher include avoiding a crisis of representation and a crisis of truth or facts, or socially 
determined facts, that are ‘factoids’ (Lea 2008).  Essentially, the responsibilities of the researcher 
need to consider the utilitarian greater good.  This includes being mindful of (post)colonialism 
which can completely derail and absolutely remove any autonomy or agency, precipitating 
another crisis of representation and precipitation of askew power negotiation.  Autoethnography, 
a modern methodology of anthropology, aims to represent culture and self in its purest form.    
 
An autoethnography is very sensitive to researching vulnerable people. Such a methodology 
benefits the vulnerable in the community.  Through being careful of the rights of vulnerable 
peoples (Tolich 2010: 1601), an autoethnography underpins what we see, believe and hold 
important.  I have sound experience in practising research with vulnerable peoples in the 
Northern Territory of Australia.  The methodology and tools used were approved by the Menzies 




participants ranged from youth gang members, to students and to palliative care patients all living 
in remote areas in the Northern Territory.  As part of having an emancipatory purpose, this 
autoethnography exposes the crisis of representation under the realms of (post)colonialism.  
 
There are several further issues relevant to autoethnography and academic ethics.  These include 
the essential issues of autoethnography’s apparent lesser place in academia.  There is also the 
issue of autoethnography not having the academic respect that is offered to more traditional 
methodologies in the social sciences (Allen-Collinson & Hockey 2008; Wall 2016).  Those who 
can be called traditional ethnographers, do not believe in the more poststructuralist 
autoethnographer’s social creation of reality. Furthermore, there is the issue of autoethnography 
being too artistic, emotional, personal and essentially unscientific.  These more so non-academic 
qualities add to the worth and richness of the study as situated and based in the culture.  Some 
discord and disparity between autoethnographers and traditional ethnographers is still rife.              
 
And so, my autoethnography, being an intensely personal research piece, and being told solely 
through my own eyes and perception, does not require formal ethics approval from my university.  
The authority of note for my research is myself.  I represent myself.  I am my own authority.  I 
have produced my own knowledge – as much as my socialisation and culturalization will let me.  
The most unethical thing I can do in this case is not tell my story; to not be emancipatory for 
myself and other peoples living with a major psychotic illness.  There is not an institution that 
has authority over my autoethnography.  I do not seek ethics approval from such an institution.  
I am most mindful about the ethical and moral responsibilities that working with vulnerable 




card” from my state of residence, in my country of Australia, granting government approval for 




Ellis (1999) suggests the following pointers when writing an autoethnography.  First, start 
structuring your story with chronological events, then fill it out with memories.  If memories are 
lacking, rely on your feelings.  Use emotional recall.  Emotional recall is embedded in 
sociological introspection, a process accomplished in dialogue with the self and represented in 
the form of narratives (Ellis 1991).  Reflecting between chronology and feelings, the thoughts 
will come.  You may start the dissertation with a short story and then build to be a large chapter.  
An explanation of each step in the flow of the autoethnography must be acknowledged and 
structured to eliminate unexplained conceptual leaps in the thesis and to describe the logical, 
accountable and sound allegation.  The creation of autoethnography become ideas, self-reflective 
in nature.  This internal reflectivity is essential in any autoethnography.   
 
Another perspective of understanding autoethnography comes from Pinchon (2003), who 
outlines an understanding of autoethnographical analysis.  First, themes and interpretations in a 
text are not interpreted in isolation but with reference to Other in the text.  Second, these methods 
typically explore themes omitted or repressed and hidden behind other themes.  Third, these 
methods often analyse the social and political context of text.  To deconstruct or decode is to 





The autoethnographic method, the gaze, is used in medicine.  It is important to consider and 
define the subject under investigation as thoroughly as possible, to limit the gaze of the researcher 
and the gaze of the medical officer (Foucault 1965).  Describing the autoethnographic method, 
the autoethnographers’ gaze goes back and forth, first through an ethnographic wide-angle lens, 
focusing outwards on social and cultural aspects of their personal experience; then, they look 
inward, exposing a vulnerable self that is moved by and moved through, refracted and somewhat 
resistant cultural interpretations.  As the autoethnographic gaze zooms backward and forward, 
inward and outward, distinctions between the personal and cultural become blurred sometimes, 
beyond distinct recognition.  “If thou gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will also gaze into thee” 
(Nietzsche 1886).   
 
Importantly is the tool of memory recollection, where the autoethnographer is reliant on memory 
to add substance and depth and richness to the story telling.   Obviously, an autoethnographer 
cannot rely solely on memory, but memory cannot be negated.  Memory work adds to the 
complexity of the autoethnography.  It is a part of the intense and dense form of data collection 
that is innately mine.  As such, memory is an essential tool in an autoethnography.  As well as 
relying on memory, I am aided by texts such as my medical records.  The result is a sound 
autoethnography, a textual encounter of the experienced culture, and an analysis of self and other 
in text.  
 





There are many ways of ensuring rigour in qualitative research.  Liamputtong and Ezzy (2005) 
describe a number of these.  The first, as mentioned above, is theoretical and conceptual rigour.  
A study has theoretical and conceptual rigour if the theory and concepts are appropriately chosen 
so that the research strategy is consistent with the research goals.  The second is methodological 
and/or procedural rigour.  This involves maintaining and reporting an audit trail of 
methodological and analytical decisions which have allowed us to assess the significance of the 
research.  Third is interpretive rigour and interrater reliability where an account accurately 
represents the understandings of events and actions within the framework and world view of the 
people engaged in them.  While postmodernists have argued that there are no final grounds for 
accepting interpretations as ‘accurate’, this does not mean that such interpretations are more valid 
than others or will equally be acceptable to participants in the study.  Fourth, is the method of 
triangulation.  And fifth and pivotal in regard in autoethnography is reflectivity, as mentioned 
previously but worth repeating.  Reflectivity is essential as it is the auto ethnographic main gauge 
of interpretation.  This list is not exhaustive but cements the rigour and is most relevant to this 
thesis.   
 
Autoethnography, being such a new methodology at times needs to prove itself as a method.  An 
autoethnography, done well, is a robust and rigorous qualitative method that uses text as an 
avenue of formal expression.  The text brings together various data collated in various ways.  
These methods, the ones I use include participant observation, unobtrusive methods, case studies, 
and narratives.  Analytical tools used in autoethnography include memory work, gaze, discourse 





This eclectic relationship between a textualized experience of culture and a personified text is 
well appreciated through Foucauldian method and analyses.  An important methodology for 
Foucault is historical analysis and situatedness. No social phenomena can be understood without 
an understanding of its philosophical and historical journey.  History is used by Foucault as a 
conceptual tool which defines the progression of all meaning and representation of knowledge.  
History is used as a pivotal tool looking at preconceptions of power as a base for interpretation.  
Historical analysis, explores meaning and representation through history, including politics, 
economics, environment, culture.   One of the main purposes of using history as a methodology 
is to concentrate on power dynamics and tracing and mapping ideologies and their development 
over time (Grbich 2007: 146). 
 
It is extremely important to note that when undertaking any Foucauldian analysis, the data is 
collected, the analysis is undertaken, and the text that is written are not the only truth but a 
reflection of the political reality of the social and the self.  These have been situated and 
developed over time.  There is no one narrative truth but a multitude of narratives and a multitude 
of institutions which house and nurture these narratives. 
 
Regarding validity, language is not transparent, and there is no single standard truth.  Our work 
is verisimilitude (Ellis 1999: 674).  Regarding reliability - since we always create our personal 
narrative and situated location, we try to ascertain our present and imagined future; there’s no 
such thing as orthodox reliability in autoethnographic research. (Ellis 1999: 674).  Regarding 





Part of the validity of an autoethnography is dependent on the researcher’s motivation behind the 
research.  The researcher needs to be completely honest in their writing and analysis. This is at 
the epicentre of the autoethnographic methodology. The connections made within the writing 
and within the analysis needs to be transparent so that the reader may clearly see the logical 
connections made (Ellis 2004). 
 
Reliability refers to “the consistency or dependability of the instrument or measurement strategy” 
(Liamputtong & Ezzy 2005: 33-34).  Regarding autoethnography, reliability is ascertained by 
self-reflective practices and data saturation, that is ensuring there are no questions left to be asked 
or doubts or gaps in the data collated. Theoretical rigour, as with data saturation, then follows.  
The rigorous methodology of this autoethnography aids in the study being more transparent, 
honest, accountable, legitimate, and ensuring responsibility and respectful attention to those 




My goal in life is to prove to myself that I am smart, or at least not stupid.  For much of my living 
memory I have been mentally ill, and have in turn had competing, confusing, baffling and 
bewildering ’voices’ in my head.  Again, I prefer to call them ’noises’.  I think that this term 
takes away the agency and power that the ‘voices’ try to claim.  With these noises, I have limited 
capacity to decipher rival knowledge.  I cannot trust the version of reality my mind gives me.  
Yet, I want to trust and feel that my thoughts and perceptions are valid and true.  I want to be 




need for reassurance and validation.  With psychosis, I hear things that (I hope) are not true.   I 
am constantly in a state of distrust and confusion about the version of truth in my head, my 
version of reality.   
 
It seems ironic to try and describe the labelling of schizoaffective disorder when I hate to be 
labelled.  I hate that my day-to-day experiences are scrutinised enough by the medical profession, 
so they know what perspectives of mine need to be mediated and medicated; to define what of 
my realities are objective realities.  
 
A good autoethnography unpacks the observable fact and experience of the construction of 
reality.  When examining questions about reality, I cannot escape nor negate the probability that 
I could just be making this argument up.  After all, reality is relative (Hacking 1999).  
 
When examining rigour and validity within autoethnography the questions can be asked: Does 
the instrument measure what the evaluator purports to measure? or Does the measurement 
strategy yield data that accurately represents reality?  I have not come across any research which 
does not want to define its subject, even if it is to define what it is not.  Some sort of comparison, 
or could it be called ‘measurement’ is involved, even in the most minute way.  Similarly, even 
when arguing that one ‘reality’ doesn’t exist, it is still acknowledged as theoretically existing, 
even if only in a dichotomous relationship.  I would probably add a slight twist to the analysis, 
by noting what hermeneutic realists argue, that there is a real world and our experiences of it are 




world as it is experienced and interpreted through the observer’s senses.  This is a real world and 
our experiences of it are always and already interpreted (Ezzy 1998).   
 
There is no ‘standard’ methodological formula when conducting autoethnographic research 
(Moore 2012: 201). Through telling our stories, we make and remake ourselves.  We validate our 
identities.  We give meaning to our suffering.  Our stories shape and structure our experience 
rather than simply presenting them to a reader.  They tell others who we are, but they also tell us 
how they can and do make us who we are (Richards 2008: 1722).  Sociological introspection 
through autoethnography allows me to study my lived experiences not just as an internal state 
but also as an affective process which I recognise internally and construct externally (Ellis 1999).  
By exploring social theory with the methodology of autoethnography, I will analyse my lived 
experience of being labelled as disabled with a major psychotic illness.  This work may bring 
light to the complexities and dynamics of the lived experience of the sub-human.   
 
According to poststructuralist and postmodernist understandings, one must either reject the idea 
of rigour or reconceptualise it involving the demonstration of the absence of a clear relationship 
between ‘reality’ and the study’s findings (Lather 1993 in Liamputting & Ezzy 2005: 36).  Here 
there is the issue of a politically infused nature of all interpretation (Denzin 1997).  To expand, 
rigour may also be reconceptualised as a moral and ethical task focused on emancipation and 
political action, particularly when postmodernism/poststructuralism are combined with critical 
theorists (Denzin & Giardina 2007; Le Roux 2017).  Poststructuralist authors fundamentally 
challenge the epistemology, ontology and methods of traditional research.  This is done in part 





According to poststructuralist understandings there is no independent knowable phenomenal 
reality.  All knowledge is based on a priori assumptions and interpretations that do not just 
confine what is seen but also define what is seen.  Tyler (1986 in Lincoln & Ellis 2011: 36), for 
example, argues for an autoethnography to create its own objects in its unfolding, and the reader 
supplies the rest.   Hammersley (1992 in Lincoln & Ellis 2011: 36) suggests, we form a relativism 
where all accounts are equal.  Similar from poststructuralism, social power play is rife, which 
brings to light the nuances of the social in practice and the social in theory if there is an actual 
difference between the two. 
 
Foucault was particularly interested in the socio-cultural dynamics of the underdog.  These 
subcultures included prisoners, homosexuals and the mentally ill.  Foucault was particularly 
interested in studying the ways in which power has been developed and exercised through the 
control of knowledge.  In creating and maintaining discourses powerful interests obscured the 
voices, protests or challenges put up by others with an interest in a piece of knowledge.  Foucault 
exposed the way the State had created the powerful discourses, for example of ‘madness’, and 
how through sovereignty and disciplinary power these ideas had filtered down to the (largely 
unresisting) population and had become the basis of their understandings and explanations 
(Grbich 2007: 147). 
 
Amongst all of Foucault’s research is the common thread of an exploration and analysis of power.  
Power is the meaning of what we do, how we keep doing it, and why.  In this case can power be 




is at all possible?  Power manifests itself in many and extreme ways in the social worlds.  
Foucault not only studied institutions like the prison, factory, hospital and school, but also 
strategies of power which embody themselves and adapt in relation to the institutions they are 
engulfed and acculturated by.  This power is not exercised simply as an obligation or a prohibition 
on those who ‘do not have it’.   It invests in them, is transmitted by them and through them. It 
places pressure upon them, and they resist the grip it has on them (Horrocks & Jevtic 2004: 112).  
No power is exercised without extraction, appropriation, distribution or retention of knowledge 
(Foucault 1965 in Porter 1990; 1982).   
 
“The genesis of the manufacturing of truth is also the genesis of the knowledge of truth” 







Reality – medical realism 
 
Derrida (2001) argues that we must consider the meta-narrative.  The meta-narrative in this case 
is medical science with its associated political and cultural foundations.  The doctors and other 
health professionals are the powerful Us and the mentally ill are the Other.  The two are 
hierarchised with the medical practitioners having power over the mentally ill deviant. 
 
My own construction of reality, and my experience of it in my own social world, is a constant 
source of perplexity for me.  How can I trust my senses?  How can I trust the workings of my 
mind?  Do I trust those around me?  Can I trust my closest friends and family?  Without any trust, 
how do I judge what is real and what is not?  I do it many times every day.  I ask my family and 
friends and my partner: Is that real?  Did I understand correctly what that person just said to me?  
What about the construction of madness?  And what about the construction of institutions of 
madness, including psychiatric wards?  How does madness function as a socio-cultural 
phenomenon?  How is madness a construct of reality and social phenomena?  (Foucault 1961; 
Douglas 1992).  
 
Reality can be defined in many ways.  For example, there is reality as defined by our senses, and 
reality as defined by our thinking: empiricism versus rationalism (Markie 2017).  Then again, 
how does a philosophical perception of reality differ from an individual perspective of reality 
(Mead 1927; Hurrelmann 1988)?  As an anthropologist, I am consumed by the cultural and social 
construction of reality.  Neither can I separate reality from other cultural/social phenomena like 





How is reality constructed, albeit socially constructed, by someone with a psychotic illness that 
fundamentally skews all perceptions of reality?  Is psychosis a social construction or a biological 
construction?  Or perhaps psychosis is a social and biological construction?  Is it a biological 
construction in the sense that the hallucinations and delusions experienced as part of psychosis 
are somewhat alleviated with medical therapy?  Then again psychosis is also a social construction 
in the sense that its ramifications and true meaning are very much defined in social phenomena 
(Cooke 2017).  If psychosis was not the stigma as it is, those suffering from this mental illness 
may not be so ostracised, demoralised and stereotyped as subhuman, sub-citizens and social 




The social theories considered to be most relevant to this discussion are structural-functionalism, 
Marxism, postmodernism, poststructuralism and critical theory including feminism, queer theory 
and (post)colonialism.  The most significant theories discussed here are critical theory and 
(post)colonialism.  Foucault’s perspective is also very important.  (For an expansion of Marxism 
and its relevance to this discussion please see glossary.)   
 
These theories best define the role of the mentally ill and deconstruct their role and their position 
in the historical and social construction of reality.  “Social rituals create a reality which would be 




thought” (Douglas 1966).  These theories stand out because it has been my experience of having 
a mental illness, especially a major psychotic illness without concrete known and measurable 
boundaries.   
 
The phenomena of mental illness and mental health service delivery seem to perform a certain 
function in the structured Australian society.  Douglas (1966) argued that societal order 
encompasses and contains mental health wants to keep a close reign on something that is 
potentially harmful to its otherwise clean functioning.  By ’clean’ I mean that society generally 
wants the mentally ill to be invisible and silenced.  I would also argue that the mentally ill and 
mental health service delivery play a role in the societal order and are expected to function in 
accordance.  Parsons, a structural-functionalist, talks about the functional theory of stratification, 
and the idea that hierarchical class systems and orders are necessary for society to function.  
Inequality is expected to keep society progressing by motivating individuals to live a full life 
(Douglas 1992).   
   
The structural-functionalist position argues somewhat that society is an organism where society 
is held together by its culture, that is commonly held belief and values (Durkheim in The 
Sociology Book 2015 p. 34-7).  Culture, as a common group of individuals, maintains and 
supports the structure of a society (Culture and Society n.d.).  According to Durkheim (in The 
Sociology Book 2015 p. 34-7), in simple terms, everyone has a role to play or a function to 
perform, and they perform it to support the structure of their society, hence the name 'structural-
functionalism’ (or perhaps an extrapolation to “structuralism’).  Once a society adapts, has goals 




2015 p. 42-3 ), it must figure out a way to maintain these goals.   So, what are the goals of the 
sub-citizen, subhuman, and social misfit?  What function to they serve in society?  Is their 
function nothing but to be Othered?     
 
Foucault has given great insight into the concept of stigma and power play (1965).  Any  
undertaking of Foucauldian analysis, as with most poststructuralist theory, includes data 
collection, analysis, and the text that is written. This is not the only truth but a reflection of the 
political reality of the social and the self.  These have been situated and developed over time.  
There is no one narrative truth but a multitude of narratives and a multitude of institutions which 
house and nurture these narratives.  As Foucault has described, by studying a major psychotic 
disorder from an etic and emic perspective, the two views could possibly be incommensurable.  
Speaking from my own perspective, someone living with a major psychotic disorder, the realities 
between medical science and the person experiencing the disorder are often unmeasurable, 
undefinable and incommensurable.  
 
The use of clinical language is one way that medical professionals alienate and ascertain power 
over the ill.  Other disciplines dominate in their own way with language.  Language is an avenue 
through which cultural difference and values are perpetuated.  Language draws connections 
between the powerful and the powerless.  Ultimately it is a form of communication, but it is also 
a template and mandate of who has power.  The powerful, such as medical professionals, 
ultimately have control over the symbols of communication in biomedicine and the sense of 




professionals, their control of biomedical knowledge makes them supreme in the social hierarchy 
(Lindenbaum & Lock 1993). 
 
As per critical theory, I abide by the belief that there is no single truth, no knowledge absolute or 
independent, and all knowledge is socially constructed.  Everything underlying Foucauldian 
understanding and analysis is the subject and object of power: power in beliefs and values, power 
and social order, macro and micro social order, power in symbolism and language and power in 
economics and politics.  How do we gauge this complex phenomenon of power?  Foucault argued 
that the real political task in a society such as ours is to criticise the workings of institutions that 
appear to be both neutral and independent, to criticise and attack them in such a manner that the 
political violence that has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so 
that one can fight against them (Taylor 1984; Foucault 1982). 
 
In Foucault’s book, Madness and Civilisation (1967), he discussed the way that our identities are 
historically produced.  In the Middles Ages, the mentally ill were part of public life.  In the 
eighteenth century, the mentally ill were classed as abnormal and removed from society.  Then 
in the twentieth century, the mentally ill became medicalised, pathologised and subservient to 
medical science.  The terms of what have defined mental illness and its association with deviancy 
could have changed, yet the prejudice and the stigma remain.   
 
In modern times, according to Foucault, the mentally ill are subject to more measuring and 
surveillance and judgement as is relative to the recent legacy of medical science.  Today’s mental 




mental health assessment tools and medical observations, cultural artefacts of modern psychiatry, 
are all about measuring and judging deviance.  The mentally ill are not empowered by their 
institutionalisation into psychiatric wards, rather their function in society is to provide an Other 
to define in opposition to the Us.  In the same way, the deviant and subhuman Other has a role 
in society as the underling.  The Other is defined in opposition of the powerful Us (Said 1978).   
 
Foucault spoke about the ’genealogy of subjectivity’ where we think we are free agents in our 
society but are defined by our historical development over time.   This historical definition 
process is covert.  It has meant that over time power negotiations between the Other and Us on 
all levels and facets, have become embedded in the social fabric and cultural values of the 
importance of science.  Over the last few centuries, the pillar of science has been naturalised 
(Foucault 1963), that is science as supreme was considered an assumption before any other 
knowledge or perspective.  Scientific fact is an a priori assumption.   This version of reality is 
the version of reality.  All analyses come after this fact.   
 
Postmodernism is essentially a movement that is anti-modern.  Modernism, born from the 
Enlightenment, bequeathed its supremacy to the new deities of science, technology, 
measurement, democracy, industrialism and capitalism.  Religion and the autocratic State no 
longer ruled supreme.  Postmodernism began the path of query and questioned the sanctity and 
presumptive reign of medical science of years earlier, and then introduced the notion of cultural 





Another analytical tool used in critical theory is the perspective of Marxism.  Utilising Marxism, 
the role of the mentally ill is defined in the economic order, as one of a non-contributor.  Foucault 
(1967) used the comparison of a mental health inpatient and a prisoner.  The prisoner spends 
his/her days making number plates, whereas the mentally ill inpatient does not participate in any 




In the last 50 years or so, there has been a paradoxical shift – a decentring involving the authority, 
autonomy, stability of institutions, subjectivities and texts.  Out of this shift has emerged an 
emphasis on the personal narrative as fluid, emotionally and intellectually charged (Miller 1995: 
49 in Denzin and Lincoln 2011: 773).  The overarching construct of this shift, giving meaning 
and purpose, was the culture of society.     
 
It is vitally important to consider the position of the individual in culture.  Power dynamics 
function and outline the negotiation and method of interaction between citizens.  And the function 
of the self is the mobile unit or pawn in the game.  The self is a social construct - as are all 
phenomena in society.   
 
The autoethnographical singular sample size enriches the study and analysis by depicting a 
different and alternative viewpoint – amplifying the whisper of the disabled.  The individual 





In these autoethnographic texts, including discourse, dialogue, emotion, embodiment, spirituality 
and self-consciousness are all featured, appearing as rational and institutional stories impacted 
by science and social structure.  Indeed, there is the social construction of phenomena like 
emotion. These are dialectically revealed through actions, feelings, thoughts and language (Ellis 
1999: 673; Ellis & Bochner 2000; Kirmayer 1989).  Jones (2005 in Richards 2008: 1725) notes 
the liminal nature of autoethnographic writing, describing it as being “between story and context, 
writer and reader, and prices and denouncement”.  She also points to “the power of the in 
between”, of occupying the space between theory and practice, analysis and action. 
 
The social world is structured, at times covertly, by our means of understanding and 
communicating in the world, which is through the prism of language.  Narratives and discourses, 
directed by language, control us but we are not overtly aware as we are so engulfed in them - we 
are blinded by this power play.  There exist differences between the Other and the Us, and these 
differences are reflected in the roles that the Other and Us have in the social order.  The Other, 
in this case are the mentally ill, the lesser humans, the deviants, the misfits.   
 
My experience of living with schizoaffective disorder has included repeated negotiating and 
struggling with multiple intersubjectivities of power play both within myself and outside in the 
broader societal contexts, determining multiple truths and multiple realities.  As well, I am 
constantly in a state of cultural exasperation and epistemological and existential influx.  My 




influenced by structural-functionalism, Marxism, postmodernism, and poststructuralism – in 
order of influence. 
 
There are many blocks of time over the last twenty years that are a loss to me.  I have some 
periods of my life, years and years, of being unwell where I remember only snippets.  I have been 
lucky enough to have journals, letters, medical notes, personal accounts from friends and family, 
and my own emotions that have helped greatly with my recall.  The whole process is rather 
humiliating, and damaging. 
 
In this chapter, I have discussed methods and methodologies that I am using as part of writing 
this autoethnography.  Through writing this autoethnography, I will explore and delve into the 
culture of my lived experience of what it is like to survive living with a major psychotic illness, 
as well as the experience of hospitalisation in three different psychiatric wards.  For me, 
autoethnography allows for the most honest way of describing the most complex phenomena.  
Autoethnography produces not only academic texts, but in depth, rich and thick accounts (Geertz 
1973), depicting many facets of the human experience, including emotional, intellectual, 
spiritual, psychological and existential.  The depth of experience, through an absolute 
engagement and commitment with the culture of the mentally ill, adds to the unique position of 
a ‘real’ knowing of the social phenomena, best deciphered here via the individual perspective.  













HISTORY OF MADNESS 
 
“People tend to say, ‘I like independent thinkers, but they must think what I want them to 
think independently’”  
Rassool Jibraeel Snyman (2017) 
 
“Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are but to refuse what we are.”  
(Foucault  1982) 
 
Throughout history, the mentally ill have been deemed as lacking. They are viewed as not fully 
human, not full citizens.  They are most often deemed as social misfits.  They are people who do 
not belong and are unwanted.  This disdain is precipitated and justified by various policies of 
social control, policies developed by governments, in the name of managing ‘anti-social 
behaviour and those classed as ’stigmatised’.  Throughout history similar treatment has been 
assigned to women, homosexuals, indigenous peoples and marginalised historical and falsely 
accused groups such as witches.  Not seen as fully human or full citizens, some were hunted, 
imprisoned and some were killed like annoyances.  Others were rounded up and put in 
concentration camps, reserves or institutions like creatures to be broken and branded and put to 




goals of scientific measurement and healing, psychiatry plays a social role, again in classification, 
of a type of social class, a class that is defined as lacking. 
 
It is imperative that I situate an analysis of subhumans/sub-citizens/social misfits, and the 
culture/s that perpetuate such labelling through my autoethnographic lens (Ellis 2004: 2014).  
The discourse below will explain the history of madness and why ‘social misfits’ are defined as 
such.  To help in the understanding of madness and its social foundations, Foucault’s focus on 
history is paramount. 
   
A critique of Western history argues that history is a modernist project which has developed 
alongside imperial beliefs about the Other (Said 1978; Smith 1999). The idea is that history is a 
self-actualising human subject.  In this view, humans have the potential to reach a stage in their 
development where they can be in total control of their faculties.  Have the mentally ill the 
potential to self-actualise considering their history and socialisation into the modern society, 
especially considering the self-actualisation achieved stemming from labelling theory (Smith 
1999: 31-32)? How can those living with a major psychotic disorder be empowered when 
historically they have been starved of power? 
 
History is fundamental to power.  In fact, like culture, history is fundamentally about power.  It 
is the story of the powerful and how they became powerful.  And then, how they use their power 
to keep and entrench supremacy and continue to dominate.  It is because of this relationship 
between history and power that the subhumans/sub-citizens/social misfits have been excluded, 




thousand accounts of the truth will not alter the fact that the mentally ill are still marginalised 
and do not possess the power to transform history into justice (Smith 1999: 35).  Power is not a 
thing but a relation.  It is something enacted rather than possessed (McHoul, McHoul & Grace 
2015). 
 
A history of madness, or more precisely, a history of evidence of treating madness suggests 
treatment began around 5000 BC.  Archaeologists have unearthed skulls which have been 
trephined or trepanned; small round holes have been bored in them with flint tools.  The subject 
was probably thought to be possessed by devils which the holes would allow to escape (Joseph 
2015). 
 
Madness has been used as fate or punishment in early religious myths and heroic fables.  There 
have also been many references to madness in the Old Testament of the Bible, such as stories of 
possession by devils, and how the Lord punished Nebuchadnezzar by reducing him to bestial 
madness (Szasz 1970).  In Deuteronomy (6:5) it is written, “The Lord will smite thee with 
madness.” 
 
Early civilisation, in Ancient Greece, saw madness as supernaturally inflicted.  The philosophers 
who emerged in the Greek speaking city-states from the sixth century BC onward viewed the 
cosmos and the human condition naturalistically.  Socrates (470-399 BC) notoriously slighted 
the gods and, with his pupil Plato (428-348 BC), analysed the psyche’s constituents: reason, 
spirit, the passions, and the soul.  In due course Aristotle (384-322 BC), Plato’s pupil, defined 





“From a Christian point of view, human reason is madness compared to the reason of 
God, but divine reason appears as madness to human reason”  
                                                                 Foucault (1964)  
 
Before Christ, the concept of madness focused on a back and forth, however bloody, between 
faith and religion.  Then, after Christ, Christianity gained strength and credence as social currency 
and the vernacular when the Emperor Constantine recognised Christianity in the Roman Empire 
in 313 AD.  Knowledge was decreed acceptable if the governing body declared it as such.  Unlike 
Greek philosophy, Christianity denied that reason was the essence of man: what counted were 
sin, divine will, love and a believer’s faith (Massey & Denton 1985). 
 
The rise of the institutions 
 
By the 11th century, leprosy became epidemic in England.  Those suffering from leprosy became 
the deviants of magic and witchery. Some people believed it was a punishment for sin, but others 
saw the suffering of lepers as like the suffering of Christ.  As lepers were enduring purgatory on 
earth, they would go directly to heaven when they died, and were therefore closer to God than 
other people. Those who cared for them or made charitable donations believed that such good 
works would reduce their own time in purgatory and accelerate their journey to heaven  (Brown 





The outbreak of leprosy didn’t develop and heighten until the Middle Ages (500-1500).  Yet, 
the official disease of leprosy was not scientifically identified until 1874 and the cause for the 
disease was not proven until the 1960s.  It is difficult to diagnose even today, therefore there 
must have been much confusion surrounding the disease during the Middle Ages.  Those 
diagnosed and labelled with leprosy did not necessarily exhibit any of the common symptoms. 
The classification ’leper’ was given to many social deviants (Moore 1994).  In the fourteenth 
century, after the last of the lepers exited the last of the institutions (Arnold 2008), political 
sway stepped in and the institutions became safe places where the mad could be hidden.  The 
subhumans/sub-citizens/social misfits became an identity to themselves; they were labelled; 
this was the new stigma. 
 
In London the religious house of St Mary of Bethlehem (founded in 1247 and lastingly known 
as ‘Bedlam’) was catering for lunatics from the late fourteenth century (Arnold 2008).  Other 
cities in Europe soon followed suit and provided institutions for their mad.  These were mostly 
charitable and religious based asylums.  They were staffed by nuns and brothers.  These 
institutions lodged the mad right up in to the twentieth century (de Young 2010).  Since Bedlam 
was open to visitors, the sane and the mad were brought tantalisingly face-to-face: who could tell 
the difference?  For its many critics, the fact that Bedlam allowed itself to be included among the 
‘shows of London’, like the menagerie in the Tower, was central to its scandal.  Having the Other 





Foucault famously argued in the 1960s that the rise of Absolutism (1550-1800), typified by Louis 
XIV in France, inaugurated a Europe-wide ‘Great Confinement’ of the mad and poor, a 
movement of ‘blind repression’.  Scandalous by law and order all those ne’er-do-wells tainted 
by ‘unreason’ became targets for appropriation in a vast street-sweeping operation.  Paupers, 
petty criminals, layabouts, streetwalkers, vagabonds and beggars formed the bulk of this 
monstrous army of the unreasonable, but symbolically their leads were the insane and the idiotic 
(Foucault 1961).  This demonising process may be regarded as psychologically and 
anthropologically driven and from the deep-seated and perhaps unconscious need to order the 
world.  Demarcating the self from the Other (not the Us and the Other), we polarised distinctions.  
For example, black and white, sane and insane (Szasz 1970).  The culture of madness ‘reality’ 
and ‘representations’ endlessly played off each other (Porter 2002: 64). 
 
This ‘Great Confinement’, argued Foucault (1961), amounted to more than physical 




exercised a force and fascination, be it as a holy fool, witch, or a man possessed.  Half-wits and 
zanies had enjoyed the licence of free speech and the privilege of mocking their betters.  
Institutionalisation however, maintained Foucault, robbed madness of all such empowering 
features and reduced it to mere negation, an absence of humanity.  Small wonder, he concluded, 
that madhouse inmates were likened to and treated as wild beasts in a cage: denied reason, that 
quintessential human attribute. What were they but brutes? (Foucault 1961). 
 
Foucault (1961) claimed that the Great Confinement essentially involved the requisitioning of 
the poor.  There is little trace of organised labour in early asylums – indeed, critics accused them 
of being dens of idleness.  Enterprising madhouse proprietors naturally sought rich and genteel 
patients, who would not be expected to work. 
 
The time of the persecution of witches is a significant time for the history of madness.  Madness 
noted within the Catholic Church was treated by institutionalism, spiritual means, or burnings at 
the stake for witches.  Spiritual means included the performance of masses, exorcism, 
pilgrimages, and/or worshipping to a shrine.  From the late 1400s, peaking around 1650, madness 
was associated with magic and witchery.  The witch craze gathered momentum across Europe.  
It was believed that the witches were possessed and had compacted with the Devil.  The craze of 
hunting for heretics, namely hunting for witches, led to the execution of 40,000 to 60,000 of the 
so-called heretics, which were mainly women (Szasz 1970).  
 
The conflagration of heresy-accusations and burnings stoked by the Reformation (beginning with 




Civil Wars in Britain (1642-1651) stirred strong reactions against religico-political extremism, 
condemned as ruinous to public order and personal safety alike.  After 1650, elites washed their 
hands off witchcraft: now it was not a Satanic plot but individual sickness or collective hysteria.  
Eighteenth century magistrates similarly deemed converts who shrieked and swooned in a 
response to a belief in the supernatural.  This was turned into a matter of psychopathology (Szasz 
1970). 
 
In due course this Lockean thinking, so highly esteemed in the Enlightenment, formed the basis 
of the new secular and psychological approaches to understanding insanity.  Amongst 
seventeenth-century philosophers madness was increasingly identified not with demons, 
humours, or even passions, but with irrationality.  Irrationality is associated with madness, 
whereas rationality is associated with sanity (Szasz 1970).  Thus, did Rene Descartes’ (1594-
1650) decree, “I think therefore I am”. 
 
Following Locke and Descartes, madness was seen to be not only about irrationality.  All 
societies judge some of their own as mad (any strict clinical justification aside). This is part of 
the business of marking out the different, deviant, and perhaps dangerous.  Such ‘stigma’, 
according to the American sociologist Erving Goffman (1961), is the situation of the individual 
who is disqualified from the full social acceptance.  Stigmatising – the creation of spoiled identity 








The sensibilities of the Enlightenment (1685-1815) brought about the medicalisation of insanity 
and the move to lock up mad people (Foucault 1961; Goffman 1961).  To support this political 
and intellectual movement, John Locke wrote and insisted upon The Reasonableness of 
Christianity (1694 in Nuovo 2012).  Even religion had to be rational. The new scapegoats 
included beggars, criminals and vagrants.  This pathologisation of ‘religious madness’ led 
Enlightenment free-thinkers to pathologise religiosity at large.  As it were, the subject of power 
was now in the realms of the universities not the churches.  Religion had become rationalised 
and made part of medical science – pathologised. 
 
Except in France, the seventeenth century did not bring with it any spectacular surge in 
institutionalisation – and it certainly did not become the automatic solution.  Different nations 
and jurisdictions acted dissimilarly.  Indeed, madness engulfed in its stigma had become a sort 
of entertainment.  Jokes about the mad monarchs came home to roost remarkably rapidly: George 
III’s delirious descent in 1788 provided a golden opportunity for satirists and cartoonists.   It was 
fashionable to be struck with melancholy or hysteria, mostly afflicted to women. (Tasca et al 
2012; Malcalpine & Hunter 1968) There was now a glamorisation of the gloomy genius. The 
movement for female emancipation was gathering momentum from the mid nineteenth century.  
Women were moving against a domination of cultural stereotyping of mental disorder.  For 
example, hysterics and young working-class women, far from being objective phenomena ripe 
for scientific investigation, were instead being viewed as cultural artefacts justifying for female 





Absolutist France indeed centralised its responses to ‘unreason’ (Foucault 1961; Goffman 1961).  
In England around 1800, the confined mad were largely housed in private asylums, operating for 
profit within the market economy in what was frankly termed the ‘trade in lunacy’ (Szasz 1970).  
In England, not until 1808 was an Act of Parliament passed even permitting the use of public 
funds for asylums.  Not until 1845, and against those who denounced it as a waste of money or 
an infringement of freedom, was the provision of such county asylums made mandatory (Porter 
2002: 94).  In urbanised Europe, and in Northern America, the rise of the asylum is better seen 
not as an act of State but as a side effect of commercial and professional society.  Growing surplus 
wealth encouraged the affluent to buy services – cultural, educational, medical – which once had 
been provided at home. 
 
The early history of such private asylums is obscure, for they prized secrecy: families would wish 
to avoid publicity, and only from 1774 were they required even to be legally licensed in England.  
Such receptacles go back, however, to the seventeenth century (Szasz 1970; Goffman 1961).  
Early asylums came in all shapes and sizes, some well run, and others atrociously run.  In no 
country before 1800 was medical supervision a legal requirement, nor did medical overlordship 
automatically ensure good care (Goffman 1961). 
 
The science of asylum management 
 
Philippe Pinel (1745-1826) embraced the progressive thinking of the Enlightenment.  He is 




mentally ill.  The term used to describe an ethical way to treat patients in mental institutions was 
coined ‘moral treatment’ or ‘moral therapy’.  Pinel is credited with helping new ways of treatment 
including talking with each individual patient.  Physical restraints were at best an irrelevance, at 
worst a lazy impediment and a lazy expedient and an irritant.  For Pinel, treatment must penetrate 
to the psyche.  Pinel instigated the argument that if insanity was a mental disorder, it had to be 
relieved through mental approaches (Bynum 2012). 
 
William Tuke (1732-1822) was born into a leading Quaker family.  Like Pinel, with a vision for 
the treatment and care of the mentally ill, ahead of his time, he had thoughts of moral treatment.  
Tuke established the Retreat in 1796 based on the concept of ‘moral therapy’, like Pinel.  Tuke’s 
version was modelled on the ideal of the bourgeois family life, and restraint was minimised.  
Moral therapy, incorporated by Tuke, was a therapeutic and preventive philosophy for managing 
mental disorders.  Treatment consisted of removing the afflicted from their homes and placing 
them in a surrogate ‘family’ of 250 members or less, often under the guidance of a physician. It 
emphasised religious morals, benevolence and clean living, in contrast to the somatic therapies 
of the day (such as bloodletting or purging) (Bynum 2012).   
 
William Tuke modelled care with the idea that the mentally ill were equal human beings and they 
were to be treated with gentleness, humanity and respect.  Physical restraints were removed from 
the patients, they were accorded humane and kindly care and were required to perform useful 
tasks in the hospital (Bowrey & Smark 2010).  Patients and staff lived, worked and dined together 
in an environment where recovery was encouraged through praise and blame, rewards and 
punishment, the goal being the restoration of self-control (Porter 2002: 104).  Ideas such as 
Tuke’s and Pinel’s were ground-breaking and the Retreat focused on healing of the mentally ill.  





Everywhere, the care and the cure of the mad became the subjects of the new ‘science’ of asylum 
management.  Alexandra Crichton (1798) argued that psychiatry should be based on the 
philosophy of the mind.  The close of the eighteenth century brought a remarkable marriage 
across enlightened Europe between new psychological and reformist practice in what has been 
called ‘moral therapy’, as per Pinel and Tuke (Bynum 2012).  In all the advanced nations, 
psychiatry gained a public face (if with little prestige and much distrust) after 1800 and 
psychiatrists found public employment in universities, especially in Germany, and in asylums.  
Psychiatry became a profession around the mid-century, when medical superintendents 
(‘alienists’) banded together to form specialised organisations (Harper 1997). 
 
As mentioned by Foucault (1961; 1963), State organised receptacles for the insane hardly 
appeared at all before 1850, those who were confined were generally kept in monasteries, and 
across great swathes of Europe, few were psychologically institutionalised.  Two lunatic asylums 
still sufficed for the whole of Portugal at the close of the nineteenth century, holding no more 
than about 600 inmates (Birmingham 2018). 
 
The asylum solution should be viewed less in terms of central policy than as the site of a myriad 
of negotiations of wants, rights, and responsibilities. These considerations should be assessed 
between diverse parties in a mixed consumer economy with a burgeoning service sector (Porter 
2002: 98).  St Luke’s Asylum and owner of a private asylum, Battie, conceded in the 1750s that 




incurable.  Yet far more common was ‘consequential insanity’ – that is insanity resulting from 
events – for which the prognosis was favourable (Szasz 1970). 
 
The links between the Industrial Revolution (approximately 1760-1840), the Protestant Ethic 
(1905), Imperialism (1870-1914) and the ongoing history of science can be discussed in terms of 
time and the organisation of social life.  Changes in the mode of production brought about by the 
Industrial Revolution meant there was an emerging middle class able to generate wealth and 
make distinctions in their lives.  However, the subhuman/sub-citizen/social misfit class remained 
without a productive and positive role in the economy, that is, they did not own or control any of 
the modes of production that affect their lives.  They will be forever in servitude to the middle 
class (Smith 1999: 56). 
 
Nineteenth century and the rise of the psychiatrist 
 
Throughout Europe, it was the nineteenth century which brought a skyrocketing in the number 
and scale of mental hospitals.  In England, patient numbers climbed from 10,000 in 1800 to ten 
times that number in 1900.  The jump in numbers was especially marked in new nation States.  
In Italy, no more than 8,000 had been confined as late as 1881; by 1907 that number had soared to 40,000 
(Porter 1999). 
 
Such increases are not hard to explain.  Positivistic, bureaucratic, utilitarianism and professional 




and mortar.  Schools, workhouses, prisons, hospitals, and asylums – would these not contain and 
solve the social problems spawned by demographic change, urbanisation, and industrialisation?  
As well, perhaps the increase resulted from more people identifying as mentally ill (SANE 
Australia 2013) 
 
In the late nineteenth century, many psychiatrists were now engaged in a career which was 
developing as a socially ‘well-to-do’ path, and as well, were now establishing their discipline as 
a truly scientific enterprise.  Psychiatry could now take its rightful place in the pantheon of the 
‘hard’ biomedical sciences, alongside neurology and pathology. As well as being utterly distinct 
from such ‘quackish’ and ‘fringy’ embarrassments as mesmerism and spiritualism (Nobel 1992).  
Providing psychiatry with a sound scientific basis was particularly important at that time, because 
of its strong positivistic and Darwinian leanings (Foucault 1961; 1973).  The rigid segregation of 
the sane from the mad which the asylum had implemented no longer seemed to make 
epidemiological sense. 
 
Following and developing from the nineteenth century, for some, the twentieth century brought 
Freud’s (1856-1939) revelation of the true dynamics of the psyche.  For others, psychoanalysis 
proved a sterile interlude.  Still, psychiatry had developed with a neurophysiological and 
neurochemical understanding - the brain was finally more understood and advanced and bore 
fruit from effective medications (Holt 1989).  According to Szasz (1970), psycho-pharmaceutical 
developments certainly allowed psychiatry itself to function better, but pacifying patients with 
drugs hardly seemed the pinnacle of achievement and any claims as to the maturity of a science 




hospital psychiatry remained committed to the program of describing and taxonomizing the 
mental health disorders stemming from Kraepelin (who is claimed to be the founder of modern 
scientific psychiatry).     
 
“[Yet] the original or primary cause of madness is a mystery”  
William Pargeter (1792) 
 
Madness in the twentieth century 
 
Moving to the twentieth century, a politics of psychiatry was emerging in which it could soon 
be decided that the very lives of the mentally ill were ‘not worth living’.  In the 1930s Nazi led 
psychiatry deemed ‘schizophrenics’ as similar in class to Jews, ripe for elimination.  Between 
January 1940 and September 1942, in what might be a trial run for the ‘final solution’, 70,723 
mental patients were gassed (Strous 2007). 
 
Modern psychiatry, from the mid twentieth century, emerged from the conclusion that the 
greatest proportion of mental disorders were to be found not in the asylum, but in the community 
at large (Goffman 1961).  Thomas Szasz (1970) pioneered the ‘anti-psychiatry movement’, 
which won high acclaim in the 1960s and 1970s.  Mental illness was not an objective, behavioural 
or biomedical reality or a negative label of a strategy coping in a mad world.  Madness had a 




In 1843, Daniel M’Naghten was found to be not guilty on the grounds of insanity after murdering 
the Prime Minister’s private secretary (Porter 2002: 154-5). 
 
Psychosis could be a healing process and should not be pharmacologically suppressed.  Mainly 
associated with left-wing politics, anti-psychiatry thus urged de-institutionalisation.  At the same 
time, and from a wholly different angle, politicians of the radical right, included Ronald Reagan 
in the USA and Margaret Thatcher in the UK, lent their support to ‘community care’ (Szasz 
1970). 
 
Mental health had become labelled and socialised in the community, albeit negatively.  It had 
become part of the language, the culture.  It was more than a biomedical group of facts.  The 
term ‘mental health’ had become part of the vernacular at about the same time the term 
‘schizophrenia’ was introduced by Paul Eugen Bleuler in 1908 (Fusar-Poli & Politi 2008).  
 
To paraphrase Porter (2002: 206), those whose lives were worth living lived long enough to 
benefit from the upsurge of new psychoactive drugs.  The new drugs enjoyed phenomenal 
success.  In the 1960s, the tranquiliser Valium (diazepam) became the world’s most widely used 
medication.  In the 1970s, one American woman in five was using minor tranquilisers.  By 1980, 
American physicians were writing ten million prescriptions a year for antidepressants alone.  
Introduced in 1987, Prozac, which raises serotonin levels and thus enhances a ‘feel good’ sense 
of security and assertiveness was being prescribed almost ad lib for depression.  Within five 
years, eight million had taken this ‘designer’ antidepressant, said to make people feel ‘better than 




introduced in the last half of the twentieth century, organic psychiatry is arguably in danger of 
becoming drug driven.  By permitting treatment of the mentally disturbed on an outpatient basis, 
psycho-active drugs have substantially reduced the numbers of those institutionalised” (Oxford 
University Press 2012). 
 
“Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to refuse what we are.” 
(Foucault 1982) 
 
Australian experience of madness 
 
As per The Black Dog Institute (c. 2018), an Australian advocacy organisation supporting 




16-85 experience a mental illness in any year. The most common mental illnesses are 
depression, anxiety and substance use disorders.  Schizoaffective disorder is rarer.   
 
For some statistical background, in this instance, regarding suicide. The Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (2016) showed a total of 3,027 deaths by suicide (12.7 per 100,000), equating to an 
average of 8.3 deaths by suicide in Australia each day.  Of this total, 2,292 were males (19.4 
per 100,000) and 735 females (6.2 per 100,000).   
 
Considering young people, all causes of death, suicide accounted for 28.6% of deaths among 
15-19-year-old males, and 37.9% of deaths among 20-24-year-old males in 2015.  For females, 
it was 33.9% and 31.4% for these age groups respectively.  (Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
2016). 
 
Considering Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander peoples, suicide rates are substantially 
higher in Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander peoples, accounting for 5.2% of all 
Indigenous deaths, compared with non-Indigenous at 1.8%.  The standardised death rate from 
suicide for Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islanders was more than double the rate for non-
Indigenous people at 25.5 per 100,000 compared with 12.5 per 100,000 (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics. 2016).  Additionally, reports released by the Australian Institute of Health and 




psychological distress.  It also reported that Indigenous individuals are managed by GPs at a 
rate of 1.3 times in comparison with other Australian individuals (AIHW 2019).    
 
Australia is alike other developed countries with its institutionalisation of the mentally ill.  
Such institutionalisation has stemmed from the time of colonisation in 1788 (Dax 1989).  One 
of the key moments in Australia’s history with mental health, was its deinstitutionalisation of 
the mentally ill in 1992 (Burdekin & Guilfoyle 1993).  And the first mental health care plan, a 
primary health care intervention providing psychological treatment among other services, was 
also implemented nationwide in 1992.  In Australia today, those living with a mental health 
disability are managed under the NDIS.  It started July 1, 2013 (NDIS 2020a).  The scheme 
aims to support the mentally ill with an ethos where the individual receiving support has choice 
and control over their care (discussed in chapter two). 
    
Australia is ranked highly on the international stage on progressive mental health policy.  In fact, 
Australia has contributed to and helped to form powerful and negotiative relationships in 
collaboration with other progressive and powerful countries to support lesser resourced countries.  
This group is called LAMIC and aims at reducing the burden of untreated mental disorders in 
low- and middle-income countries (Milton & Lewis 2017).  “Of the 800 000 people who commit 
suicide each year, 75% are in low-income and middle-income countries” (Leeder 2015). 
 
With other States, specifically powerful developed States that have a history of colonisation, the 
mentally ill in Australia have been subjugated as sub-citizens and subhumans and social misfits.  
The colonised are subject to a concept which has a history of disempowerment for the under 




their future is determined in this case by Australia, the State and culture which controls them.  
There are economic dynamics within Australia which can be associated with the more educated 
and better positioned class, that is the bourgeois.  The bourgeois are better resourced to treat their 
mental illnesses.  As well, the history of mental health in Australia been closely associated with 
psychiatry’s connection with medical science.  This connection has disassociated with the 
development of the social sciences (Huxley & Evans 2009).           
 
The hidden mentally ill of developing countries 
 
The question remains whether labelling is precipitated by certain cultural dynamics.  Nora 
Mweemba (in Chambers 2010), who works for the WHO in Zambia, explains that many people 
suffering from mental health problems don't come forward for treatment because "communities 
still regard mental health as a misfortune in the family or some sort of punishment [from God]". 
What treatment is delivered tends to rely on traditional healers who often interpret mental illness 
in terms of possession or curse.”     
 
Nowhere is there more widespread a mental health stigma than in developing countries.  There 
are more layers upon layers of disempowerments and discriminations and human rights 
violations than those existent in developed countries.  The World Health Organisation states that 
we are "facing a global human rights emergency in mental health” Chambers (2010). 
 
People living with mental illness in developing countries are further stigmatised and 
disempowered if there is a history of colonisation.  Waves and strata and webs and connections 




complexity of power subjugation of the developing country citizens.  To emphasise, the mentally 
ill are not full citizens or fully human in society, further silencing them in the Silenced Manifesto.    
 
Nowhere is the Silenced Manifesto more prevailing than in developing countries.  “With so many 
health issues affecting developing countries, tackling mental health tends to be something of a 
luxury. Aid spending remains focused on the ‘big three’ communicable diseases of HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and tuberculosis, with many other health conditions receiving only a fraction of the 
attention and funding” (Chambers 2010).  So, the silenced living with mental illness are further 
gagged and smothered by disempowerment and a massive lack of resources – “half of all 
countries in the world have no more than one psychiatrist per 100,000 people and a third of all 
countries have no mental health programmes at all” (Chambers 2010).  And the stigmatised are 
hidden, hidden behind the more attractive and marketable health issues and illnesses.  Nowhere 
are mental health issues more perpetuated and disabled and proliferated than by economic 
poverty.  Further to Chamber’s narrative (2010), “Mental illness adversely affects people’s 





Today, mental health is encapsulated as embracing ‘wellness’.  More so, mental health rejects 
the pathologisation of the ill, the old production of stigma, the abuse of misrepresentation and 
the colonialism of the mind.  Wellness is a mix of influences for the human.  Including the hard 
sciences (biomedicine), the social sciences (society, culture), and the humanities (politics, 





“In the serene world of mental illness, modern man no longer communicates with the 
madman: on one hand, the man of reason delegates the physician to madness, thereby 
authorizing a relation only through the abstract universality of disease; on the other, the 
man of madness communicates with society only by the intermediary of an equally 
abstract reason which is order, physical and moral constraint, the anonymous pressure of 
the group, the requirements of conformity”  
Foucault (1961) 
 
Definitions of madness over time have been the result of a turbulent relationship between various 
views of religion and various views of science.  Religion and science and all knowledge thereof 
in fact, have oft been at war with each other.  The mad have been treated variously over time and 
generally have been labelled, never accepted as fully human or a full citizen.  A holistic approach 
– is being attempted and ‘talked up’ across the present deconstruction of mental illness profession 
and sector (Berg & Sarvimäki 2003).  However, labelling and categorisation prevails and remains 













7 LESIONS: 7 VOICES: 7 DRUGS: 7 STORIES: 7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
7 DRUGS I TAKE BECAUSE OF CLOZAPINE: MY EXPERIENCE 
LIVING WITH SCHIZOAFFECTIVE DISORDER 
 
“The expressions of those moving about a picture gallery show ill-concealed 
disappointment that they only find pictures there.”   
Walter Benjamin (1928) 
 
Living with schizoaffective disorder is inexplicable.  It is dangerous and impenetrable and 
enigmatic.  It’s like negotiating the unfathomable – conversing in absolute incommensurable 
languages.  You never know what you are going to get.   
 
I should be grateful.  This is because I am what they call in mental health service provision 
’highly functional’ and ‘insightful’.  This is a gift and seemingly not easy to find amongst the 
mentally unwell.  I am lucky to be equipped with the insight to be discerning, intuitive and 
perceptive about my mental health.  Being highly functional and insightful equips me for a state 




disassociate from being well and unwell through mindfulness.  This way of thinking comes 
through heightened awareness and sound understanding of my health.   
 
The highly functional are more likely to be able to appreciate, analyse and unload what it really 
means to have a health condition, in this case, a mental health condition.  I am highly functional, 
but sometimes I wish I wasn’t.  I consider myself in turmoil.  When I am unwell, I hear the seven 
noises banging around in my head.  They are an accusing, challenging and sometimes impugning 
noise.  
 
When I am more well, this space is quieter and the noises fade, but they are always there to some 
degree.  There is concern when the noises take a reality or personality of their own.  I then need 
to negotiate between my reality, the reality developed from my psychosis, and medical science.  
Managing my mental health involves navigating an incommensurable space between the realities 
of myself, my illness, and my treatment.   
 
Speaking from my perspective, that of someone living with psychosis, these various realities are 
often incommensurable.  The languages spoken in and around this space are not always easily 
translatable.  Medical science does not necessarily make room for the ontological and surreal 
experience of living with a major psychotic disorder.  Although medical definitions can be 
inadequate, it is still important to consider and define the subject under investigation as 
thoroughly as possible, to limit the gaze of the researcher.  What does this mean for me?  A bunch 
of interference with my own thinking and natural sense of self.  A bunch of doubt and diagnosis 





Often my appointments with the mental health professionals bring me into a state of anxiety.  I 
try not to think about the issues that come up in my appointments, for example, ‘Have you had 
any thought of psychosis recently?’  What about, ‘Have you felt the need to kill yourself or 
others?’ I know these are staple questions that mental health professionals are required to ask, 
however, these appointments can be quite difficult to endure, and I often feel dissatisfied 
afterwards.    I feel like I should be making the most out of these appointments.  It is as if I have 
not squeezed the juice out of my psychiatrist for all the knowledge he has.  Unless I am unwell, 
I won’t see my psychiatrist for two or three months.        
 
I’m sure that my psychiatrist could easily write this thesis in a fraction of the time than it would 
take me.  The difference would be that my perspective is personal, it is raw.  With his biomedical 
training, as well as his left-wing bias, my psychiatrist could bring an outstanding insight into 
mental health.  My version, however, is poignant.  It is an insider’s view of a horrific all-
encompassing experience that is schizoaffective disorder.   
 
There is  an autoethnographical gap in the literature about the lived experience of schizoaffective 
disorder.  My autoethnography is crude, authentic, and intense.   The inexact science of mental 
health is persistent.  Are the viewpoints of mental health science commensurable with my own?  
Is there a comparison of the macro powerful history of biomedicine with a micro powerful self-









The construction of identity for the marginalised, the Othered, can be dependent and explained 
in more ways than just its dependence on government and institutions.  The identity construction 
of the marginalised can be understood another way via the concept of the Silenced Manifesto.  
The agency of the marginalised Other, dependent on the State, and as per the Silenced Manifesto, 
is in turn dependent on the space of commensurability where the silenced is given a voice, armed 
with the language and discourse of freedom of their own.  Freedom from false labelling, for 
example the disabling label of disability or difference, untranslatable narrative, discriminatory 
stigmatisation, and measurement that measures only that which can used as ammunition to the 
colonisers, the creators of difference.  The marginalised, the different, the Other, are often 
stigmatised.                    
 
My own personal agency is again tied to others in governmentality and servitude to those with 
ownership of the modes of production, my employers (Marx in Rius 1994).  This can be 
understood via the perspective of Marxism.  Governance, politics and policy control the structure 
of identity for the marginalised, which in turn is cemented by the strong hold of bureaucracy and 
validated by measurement.  The Silenced Manifesto represents a way to cut through the red tape, 
to de-colonise the colonised.  The utility of identification with the Silenced Manifesto brings with 
it a resource that the marginalised can use to empower.  The Silenced Manifesto creates a space 
where the Othered can be heard, seen and accommodated.             
 
In defining a major psychotic disorder, or the identity of other marginalised groups, there is 




and defining them as having a disorder or Otherhood can pathologise and/or stigmatise them and 
limit them to a constrictive identity, or an identity impinged upon them rather than constructed 
themselves.  The marginalised person can be defined as having less than human status, as a person 
who, according to the coloniser is unable to contribute equally to society and thus a social identity 
is constructed and forced upon them.  Defining a major psychotic disorder goes hand in hand 
with precipitating and endorsing stigma  (Goffman 1963).   
 
As eluded to, marginalised groups can experience the same stigma as the mentally ill.  They are 
suffocated and hidden – silenced - subhumans.  The Silenced Manifesto explains how their stories 
and experience – their narrative - is shushed and not translatable to the dialect and narrative of 
the powerful.  The powerful are typically the white, male, middle-class, able-bodied, non 
LGBTIQA+ of society who in many ways are the colonisers.  The Other, for example women, 
non-white, low socio-economic grouping, disabled, and LGBTIQA+, are labelled by the 
powerful colonisers, labelled as lesser beings, where they live with a label of stigmatisation.  
 
To try to explain a little how identity is examined, I use two closely related examples, 
communication and language.  Communication and negotiation are significant ways that 
identities are developed.  When I try to communicate, I feel that people look at me coldly and 
with judgment, as if I do not make any sense.  I am paranoid that people think I am stupid, and I 
cannot communicate well.  For example, I feel like my colleagues look at me with blank faces, 
stupor and annoyance.  This could be my paranoia and oversensitivity, or it may be that my sense 
of self identity is deeply affected by stigmatisation.  I feel disabled, powerless, unable to 
communicate.  I would suggest that other marginalised groups would feel the same.  Their 
negotiation of communication and the powerplay that endures leads to miscommunication and 





To extrapolate, the uses of clinical language is one way that medical professionals alienate and 
ascertain authority over the ill, by precipitating and endorsing stigma.   Language is an avenue 
through which cultural difference and values are perpetuated.  Language draws connections 
between the powerful and the powerless.  Ultimately it is a form of communication, but it is also 
a template and mandate of who has supremacy.  Mental health professionals exert their command 
over the symbols of communication in medicine and from this they have privilege and influence 
that comes with that knowledge.  As Foucault argues, knowledge is power.  Creating an identity 
with schizoaffective disorder disempowers you as the language used between doctor and patient 
are governed ultimately by biomedicine.  Reflecting on this, perhaps schizoaffective disorder 
endures in an incommensurable world where there is little understanding between knowledge 
and power.  There are many ways that schizoaffective disorder comes to life. 
 
So, a fruitful and empowered identity construction of the Other exists in the commensurable 
space between coloniser and colonised, that is the Us and the Other.  This space exists despite 
governance and politics and policy, and the bureaucracy that holds it together and makes it tick.  
Identity construction for marginalised groups, or groups of difference and/or lesser power, relies 
on the negotiation and banter, be it possibly aggressive negotiation and banter.  This intercession 
is transferred via the representation of the marginalised group, for example through 
communication and language, with consideration of not misrepresenting the Other and 
perpetuating those which are in more of a position of powerlessness.   
 
Another example how the marginalised are identified is through measurement and labelling.  The 
language, symbols, and knowledge production of the Us is validated by the acts of measurement.  




of control of that socio-cultural entity.   The marginalised measured become identified as cultural 
outcasts.  The powerful rely on measurements to validate the power of the coloniser, the Us.  
Measurements inadvertently create a schism of (dis)empowerment and labelling between those 
who use the measurement tool and the Other (McMahon 2013). 
 
The essence of labelling theory is that individuals are crafted by society and given identity by 
society.  The Other learns to adopt, then actualise and accept, via self-fulfilling prophecy, the 
label of difference, disability and i from the participation of knowledge production.  The labelled 
internalise the identity bestowed upon them, and this could lead to a crisis of representation and 
false categorisation.  The identity construct that labelling creates is precipitated in the functioning 
of culture.  How can I break through this divide of cultural misrepresentation?  To break the 
development of the cultural divide from coming to life?          
 
It should be emphasised that the marginalised do not always identify as marginalised.  Some 
people who have a mental illness do not necessarily identify themselves as disabled.  In fact, by 
suggesting that they are disabled or marginalised, I am labelling them.  I am disempowering them 
by falsely identifying them as subhuman, sub-citizens, social misfits.  I have welcomed a false 
representation and bought into the crisis of representation that I have fought against.  Although 
not identifying as marginalised, some have adopted the identity in order to gain some government 
benefits.  For example, I presented my self as disabled in order to receive the disability support 
pension, even though I hate to call myself disabled.  In fact, I fought against identifying myself 
as such.  I use the Silenced Manifesto to demonstrate that I have a voice of my own, despite 
government and institutional decree.  I would hate to misrepresent those who do not represent 
themselves as Other.  They will have their own representation and their own voice in the Silenced 





Some statistics about mental health in the Australia context  
 
My life expectancy is less than someone else my age without living with schizoaffective disorder.  
Of interest, a study in the United Kingdom showed that life expectancy across all mental illnesses 
was well below the United Kingdom average of 77.4 years for men and 81.6 years for women.  
Specific to women with schizoaffective disorder, they have an average life expectancy reduced 
by 17.5 years, and men with schizophrenia whose lives were shortened by about 14.6 years.  Of 
those most affected by mental illness were women living with schizoaffective disorder (Hughes 
2011).  
 
In Australia, those from a lower socioeconomic background are more likely to live with a mental 
illness.  Approximately a quarter (26.4% or 2,277,210) of community mental health care contacts 
were for people living in areas classified as being in the lowest (most disadvantaged) 
socioeconomic status quintile.  People living in areas classified as being the highest (least 
disadvantaged) socioeconomic quintile had the lowest number of community mental health care 
contacts (1,297,305) and rate (273.0 per 1,000 population) (AIHW 2020b).  I may mention here 
that in Ward C (private), the private and most expensive ward that I have been admitted to, the 
severity of mental illness is tempered and minimised.  Wealth foreshadows the ugliness of mental 
health.  
  
Australia’s health system is complex — and so are its funding arrangements. It is funded by all levels of 




insurers; individuals when they pay out-of-pocket costs for products; and services that aren’t 
fully subsidised or reimbursed.   
 
In 2016–17, Australia spent nearly $181 billion on health: 
• 41% by the Australian Government 
• 27% by state and territory governments 
• 17% by individuals (for products and services that aren’t fully subsidised or reimbursed) 
• 9% by private health insurers 
• 6% by non-government organisations 
Health spending was about 10% of gross domestic product. This means $1 in every $10 spent 
in Australia went to health.  
(Department of Health 2019) 
 
 
The foundation of the Australian health system is Medicare, established in 1984.  Its three major 
parts are: medical services, public hospitals and medicines (Department of Health 2019).  Mental 
health services that are subsidised through Medicare include: primary health care for instance 
GPs, psychiatrists, psychologists, occupational therapists and social workers (Parliament of Australia 
2019).  Medicare also supports public hospitals.  State, territory and local government are responsible for 





The Federal Government also shares responsibility with the states and territories for other 
activities under national agreements, such as the Council of Australian Governments (COAG). 
These other activities include funding public hospital services and the national mental health 
reform (Parliament of Australia 2019) as well, the NDIS.  The NDIS is a ground-breaking, 
once-in-a-generation change to the way people with disability are supported in Australia.  It is a 
social reform on the same scale as the introduction of Medicare or compulsory superannuation 
(Every Australian Counts 2018).  In March 2013, the NDIS legislation was passed and the 
NDIS Act 2013 was created, along with the Scheme was the National Disability Insurance 
Agency (NDIA) (NDIS 2019).   
 
According to Knaus (2018), about 81.4% of those who requested NDIS support for 
psychosocial disability (a disability particular to those with a mental illness) were accepted, 
compared with more than 97% for people with cerebral palsy, autism or intellectual disability.  
The scheme, at full rollout, is designed to cover about 64,000 people with psychosocial 
disability. That is well below the total number of people who require ongoing support for 
severe mental illness in Australia, which the government estimates at 230,000. The report casts 
doubt on the government’s figure, saying its basis is unclear, given there are an estimated 
690,000 Australians with a severe mental illness (Knaus 2018).  
 
Regarding government mental health expenditure in Australia, the AIHW states: 
• $9.9 billion, or $400 per person, was spent on mental health-related services in 




• 1.1% annual average increase in the real per capita spending on mental health-
related services from 2013–14 to 2017–18. 
• 7.6% of government health expenditure was spent on mental health-related services 
in 2017–18. 
• $6.0 billion was spent on state/territory mental health services in 2017–18; $2.6b on 
public hospital services; $2.3b on community services. 
• $1.3 billion, or $51 per person, was spent by the Australian Government on benefits 
for Medicare-subsidised mental health-specific services in 2018–19. 
• $541 million, or $21 per person, was spent by the Australian Government on 
subsidised mental health-related prescriptions under the Pharmaceutical Benefit 
Scheme and Repatriation Schedule of Pharmaceutical Benefits during 2018–19. 
(AIHW 2020a) 
 
And so lies some knowledge of the governmental structural and costings of mental health in 
Australia.  Though this presents with little knowledge to causes - the exact causes of 
schizoaffective disorder are not known.  It is thought that the disorder is produced by a 
combination of genetic and environmental factors – nature and nurture.  There is some evidence 
of a biomedical cause simply because medication can work.  As well, the disorder tends to occur 
more in families where there is a history of schizoaffective disorder, schizophrenia or bipolar 
disorder (Kaplan 2003: 509; Daniel 2011: 20-22).  Mental health issues run riot in my family. 
Most of my siblings are living with mental health issues.  I have many cousins, aunts and uncles 






Seven drugs I take because: My experience living with schizoaffective disorder  
 
I was diagnosed at first as having bipolar disorder for about four years, although I never fitted 
that label very well.  I didn't have the definitive highs or lows that come with bipolar.  Later, I 
was diagnosed as having schizoaffective disorder, after a psychiatrist changed his mind and 
disregarded the bipolar diagnosis. I never really agreed with this classification either, although I 
never really agree with being pigeonholed in any way.  I can relate to some schizophrenia type 
symptoms: heightened senses, hearing noises (voices), hallucinations, paranoia, for example 
believing that people around me are able to read my soul by looking into my eyes or that I can 
sense what people are thinking about, experiencing strange sensations, and erratic thought 
patterns (demonstrated by inconsistent, illogical and changeable conversations)  
 
Mental health issues do not discriminate against sex, race, culture and class.  Their treatment, 
which involves taking medications and various therapies, are more complicated than what they 
may seem.  For example, mindfulness practices I do include fortnightly counselling, where I talk 
my way out of poor health and am given tools to reduce and manage the debilitating effects of 
anxiety.  I also practice meditation and yoga, eat well and exercise, all in my effort to manage 
anxiety.  There may indeed be variations to treatment related to social and cultural indicators of 
the individual.  My non-responsiveness to standard anti-psychotic medications has forced me to 
take a powerful anti-psychotic drug called Clozapine.   
 
Taking Clozapine commits me to having a relationship of dependence on the State.  It is an 
extremely highly regulated drug requiring regular tests: blood tests, blood sugars, blood pressure, 




others, all monitored by a team of mental health professionals.  I am constantly measured, 
prodded and assessed.  Clozapine can potentially be a dangerous drug.  It killed people in the 
early 1970s from a condition called agranulocytosis, a disorder involving a dangerous decrease 
in the number of white blood cells.  By the early 1980s, was back on the market and was shown 
to be very effective in reducing suicide and reducing instances of psychotic episodes (Sinha 
2020). 
 
There is an irony about 7 drugs I take.  I take three drugs a day which are not directly related to 
taking Clozapine, and seven drugs a day because of Clozapine and its side effects. Below is a list 
of my medications: 
 
• Quilonum (lithium carbonate) – a mood stabiliser 
• Thyroxine – a hormone I must take due to Quilonum affecting my thyroxine levels 
• Lamotrigine – to treat clinical depression  
• Oxybutynin hydrochloride– another anti-depressant that reduces bedwetting caused by 
Clozapine 
• Amitriptyline hydrochloride – for bedwetting caused by Clozapine 
• Betmiga – for bedwetting caused by Clozapine 
• Abilify – another anti-psychotic to aid the efficacy of Clozapine  
• Coloxyl with Senna – for constipation caused by Clozapine 






A side-effect of Clozapine is that I drool at night.  I wake up during the night over heated and 
saturated in my own saliva.  When the drooling first happened, the Clozapine nurse, who had 
become a friend as such, in a dependent sort of way, suggested I use a terry towelling waterproof 
pillowcase.  I remember feeling shocked at the suggestion of using such an item.  It was a 
suggestion down the path of humiliation.  Drooling – how undignified!  I was used to having a 
dry mouth for many years, which has brought its own problems such as decayed teeth.  Now, I 
produce too much saliva.  The amount of saliva I drooled at night felt as if I had wet myself.  
However, bedwetting is a side-effect of its own.   
 
After about eight months of taking Clozapine, I started wetting the bed at night.  At first, it was 
only small amounts, of which I tried to ignore.  Surely no one will notice, only small patches?  
Then it became more – more frequent and more of it.  I cannot tell you the great shame I felt 
when this started happening to me.  My boyfriend at the time didn’t take it very well.  Who could 
blame him?  He would wake up wet as well.  The ignominy of it all was astronomical.  Sometimes 
when my bed was wet and I was too oblivious to change the sheets in the middle of the night 
(having a very deep sleep was also a side effect of Clozapine), I would go and sleep on the couch.  
This didn’t solve the problem however, because I would wet the couch too.  My strategy to my 
bedwetting was to avoid the subject.  It was too obvious though once I started wetting the couch.  
My housemate brought the subject up with me.  It could no longer be ignored.  I remember 
negotiating with my housemate about what I should do.  First, I had to book a GP appointment.  
Second, I had to scrub clean the couch. Third, I needed to start wearing adult nappies. Fourth, I 
needed to purchase a mattress protector.  I felt absolutely gutted and mortified, like there was no 
way out of this putrid indignation and degradation.  I felt so disgraced, so much that I lost all 




am mortified due to Clozapine, despite its success and its efficacy in treating psychosis.  Medical 
science had ruined my strong sense of identity and self-worth in turn for which I had quieter 
noises in my head.  Which is better to keep?  My sanity or my dignity?  It seems that I did not 
have the freedom to choose.  Both are questionable spaces to be.   
 
I saw two urologists about my bedwetting.  The specialists admitted that usually their clientele 
is much older than me or had bladder cancer.  I had to go through a series of humiliating tests. 
Yet again I am embarrassed by medical science.  One of the urologists prescribed me some 
medication which worked (mostly).  My bedwetting had decreased remarkably but I still had the 
odd night of shame.  When I told the specialist that my bed wetting had reduced to seventy 
percent of the time, he was happy, as if it is still acceptable to be mildly incontinent.  I don’t 
seem to be able to shake my association with bedwetting.  I only recently took off my mattress 
protector because my boyfriend couldn’t deal with the crunching noise it made when you turn 
over in bed.  One ironic benefit of bedwetting in the public mental health system is that you have 
case managers that can take advantage of the situation.  It seems that I get about $500 every year 
to pay for the privilege of being incontinent.   
 
There are other shameful side-effects that are absolutely dehumanising in themselves.  There is 
the obvious side-effect of putting on a lot of weight.  I have put on 23 kilos over the period since 
my first diagnosis.  It is difficult for me to lose weight due to the medications.  In addition, I am 
at risk of developing Type II Diabetes.  I find this shameful.  Then there are other physical side 
effects from taking so much medication, such as drowsiness, heavy sleeping (probable cause of 




increased effects of alcohol, constipation, nausea, dizziness and light-headedness.  Other side 
effects include having an underactive thyroid, as a result of taking Quilonum for many years. I 
am now required to take thyroxine indefinitely.  Alternate therapies are often necessary because 
medication cannot treat the social problems such as isolation, unemployment, lack of education, 
and poverty that accompany schizoaffective disorder.  These therapies aim to address the 
multifaceted facets of social issues that affect someone with schizoaffective disorder.  However, 
this is a huge topic warranting another thesis.    
 
The noises (voices) are definitely quieter now I am on Clozapine.  However, am I now free?  This 
is a paradox for me, as a Clozapine patient.  The noises are softer, but my identification as a crazy 
sub-human, sub-citizen and a social outcast is cemented by association with the treatment.  I must 
give away my ultimate freedom, put my full trust in biomedicine.  It is true that I need monitoring 
with the other drugs I am taking, but that is nothing compared to the regime of taking Clozapine.   
 
I am forever labelled a Clozapine patient, not normal, not a fully contributing citizen, disabled 
and a cost to the State.  I am stuck in a dynamic between health professionals and myself, where 
measurement and assessment are tools of engagement and care.  I am in a measurement contract 
I am constantly being assessed and medicated accordingly.  The misuse and exploitation of a 
measurement can in some ways be likened to the effects of colonialism, likened to mind abuse 
and rationality bombing.  (Mistreatment and this association with colonialism is to be discussed 





 Clozapine belongs to a group of drugs called antipsychotics.  These medicines work on the 
balance of chemical substances in the brain.  Clozapine is only prescribed for people with 
resistance to other antipsychotics available.  It is necessary to closely monitor someone taking 
Clozapine.  The regulation when first given Clozapine involves staying at the mental health clinic 
for the first day, undergoing regular blood tests and being closely monitored.  Then there are 
blood tests, a Clozapine nurse and a psychiatrist visit every week for 18 weeks.  Now, the 
psychiatrist and Clozapine nurse visits are monthly.  The psychiatrist appointments then fall back 
to every couple of months, or when needed. 
 
A basket case? 
 
I cringe when I think about creative therapies.  All the psychiatric wards that I’ve been to have 
strongly advocated creative therapies.  Personally, colouring in and threading beads just doesn’t 
cut it for me.  There is the argument that craft puts you in the company of others, and I can 
understand doing craft in therapy is useful.  Creativity is also helpful in calming the mind, very 
helpful.  Creativity is therapeutic, and it should be nurtured.   Another way of understanding 
creativity is that in its demonstration it reinforces a child-like relationship with those who care 
for me, specifically hospital staff.   
 
Living with schizoaffective disorder requires constant awareness and mindfulness of the smallest 
signs and symptoms. I must be vigilant in my treatment and be compliant if I am to have any 
quality of life.  For my friends and family, living with someone with schizoaffective disorder is 
more than challenging.  However, I am living proof that you can be highly functioning and have 





As far as I know, schizoaffective disorder is mine to keep.  Not as a badge of honour, but a 
shackle that I constantly struggle with, a marriage made in purgatory - in a constant state of pain 
and dismay.  I have heard stories about people with hallucinations becoming friends with their 
voices.  Not me.  It just goes to show how potentially powerful psychiatrists can be.  People 
diagnosed with major psychotic disorders are in the lap of the psychiatry gods - diagnosis and 
treatment is predominantly controlled by these gods of (in)sanity.  There isn’t a blood test or an 
MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) or an x-ray which will absolutely diagnose everything.   
 
Assume that the mental health system is a clinical arm of the State.  And the State’s bureaucracy 
creates cultural artefacts/biofacts from various (culture associated) measurements of the mentally 
ill.  Bureaucracy has control over the knowledge generated, and the power it develops (Lea 2008).  
The mentally ill are dependent on the State and are as much a guinea pig for affordable health 
care and medicine.  When you’re in the system, getting your medication from the government as 
I do because I take Clozapine, you are totally a ward of the State (Kleinman 1980; DiGiacomo 
1987, 2013; Biehl 2005).  That is, a dependent of the State.   
 
I must admit that I cannot imagine life without schizoaffective disorder.  Through schizoaffective 
disorder I have experienced the worst times of my life, yet it has also given me the most poignant 
insight and understanding to the meaning imaginable in my life.   
 
To conclude, living with schizoaffective disorder, for me, is unreal: in the truest sense of the 




is real or not.  I am paranoid about losing my cognitive ability.  I am also paranoid that I am 
stupid and will be locked in a cage of stupidity for the rest of my life.  
 
I do feel the stigma from living with a major psychotic disorder.  Loved ones have questioned 
my attention span and memory in simple tasks such as ordering a few drinks at a bar. This all 
makes me quite sad.  I know all too well that there is an element of truth in the distrust of my 
loved ones. I loathe to admit it.  I hate to think that I will always be like this.   
 
Being highly functional, I have good insight into the paraphrenia that is schizoaffective disorder.  
This disorder, as with all medical conditions, has socio-cultural facets which need to be 
understood alongside biomedicine. The socio-cultural perspective of the disorder will always 
provide substantial depth and efficacy which needs to be a focus in the analysis of any mental 




















LIFE BEFORE INSANITY 
 
“Social life is messy, uncertain, and emotional.  If our desire is to research social life, then 
we must embrace a research method that, to the best of its/our ability, acknowledges and 
accommodates mess in chaos, uncertainty and emotion.”  
(Adams, Jones & Ellis 2015) 
 
I often try and remember what life was like before; before noises, paranoia, surrealism, anxiety 
and being fat; before being a subhuman, a less productive and valued member of society.  Was I 
an active, productive member of society before I was diagnosed as crazy?  What was I like before 
being diagnosed mentally ill?  Was there a definitive difference in my life before and after 
diagnosis?  The truth was that before being diagnosed with a mental illness, I had a full and 
wonderful life, heading towards a successful future.  After being diagnosed as having a major 





This chapter introduces the start of my mental health journey, in particular, experiences around 
early diagnosis and my first admissions into a mental health institution. I begin with some 
background to my early life prior to these.  It also works as a foundation chapter to the proceeding 
three ethnographies of my mental health hospital experiences (chapters six to eight).   
 
My narrative at times uses informal language – I employ the words that best communicate my 
feelings and my meaning, best portraying the history of me.  Today, my mind and the way it 
functions, or dysfunctions, is an enigma to me.  There is a weird effect on my line of thought 
which can confuse people as I jump back and forth in conversation, seeming like I have a short 
attention span.  So, I ask you for your patience with my erratics.  (See the introduction for an 
explanation of my fragmented thought processes and expression.)  I find it difficult to remember 
linear events leading up to my diagnosis in the preceding years.  My memory is sketchy and 
vague.  It bounces tangentially back and forth, between and around various recollections.  The 
result is a somewhat surreal, vague and dreamlike experience of what I think happened.  I tried 
asking my Mum about what I was like when I first became ill.  She said, “I can’t do it!  I can’t 
go back to that time.  You’ll have to ask your father about that.”  My mother’s reaction really 
worried me.  Surely those memories couldn’t be that horrible.  I certainly have little to no memory 
of that time, but I thought that was just from the sedatives and antipsychotic medication they 
ploughed me with.  The truth be told, I have few memories, even sketches of memories, of the 
times when I have been unwell, especially in the early years.  
 
I was one of six kids.  Such a large family was expected of devoted Catholics.  I spent my primary 




to try to be the first Saint Rachael.  My godmother, Aunty Helen, was a Dominican nun.  She 
encouraged me in my devotion to the Catholic Church.  Aunty Helen supplied me with many 
books on saints and prayers.  It was through reading these books that I noted that most of the 
‘good’ saints started their devotion to the Church during childhood.  What I classified as the ‘bad’ 
saints were mostly saints, canonised hundreds of years ago, with their Christian work centring 
on being part of royalty.   
 
I had a little shrine at the head of my bed, decorated with a crucifix and a palm leaf attached to it 
out of respect for Palm Sunday (a significant day in the Catholic Church), a picture of the Pope 
at the time and the prayers and pictures of my favourite saints.  I remember getting in big trouble 
from my Mum when I told my younger brother and sister the story of King Herod slaughtering 
babies.  I went to confession a few times over that one.  Mum and Dad encouraged my faith or, 
at least, tolerated it.   
 
Years later I wondered if my obsession with the Catholic faith as a child, and my planning on 
becoming a nun could have possibly contributed to the development of my schizoaffective 
disorder?  Was my faith within the realms of normalcy?  Did my devotion embody some form of 
mania?  Did I define myself as whole only though my commitment to Catholicism?    
 
Ireland, a country with strong Catholic heritage, has an unusual and significant history, 
relationship and over-representation with mental health illnesses.  A small town in the west of 
Ireland, on the Dingle Peninsula, has an especially unusual history, one where there are strong 




recorded history of this small town shows that on a given census day in 1971, two out of every 
hundred men were in a mental institution.  Nearly all those hospitalised men (89%) are lifelong 
celibates, most were between the ages of 35 and 50, and more than half were diagnosed as 
suffering from schizophrenia (Scheper-Hughes 2001). 
 
Is there a correlation between schizophrenia, age, celibacy, and gender?  Does spiritualty have 
anything to do with it?  Can I draw any correlation with my experience as a child and those Irish 
men living in a small Irish town?  Can my history and belief in God, and a faith in the Catholic 
Church, be associated with the social and cultural indicators from the small Irish town?  Either 
way, without my belief as I grew up, I felt incomplete. 
 
This is uncanny, because the discussion in this thesis involves debate over the mentally ill being 
‘sub-human’ and incomplete – as being set apart and detached from society.  Could my faith as 
a child have disconnected me from the normal social experiences of growing up?  I don’t know 
any other children who have committed themselves to religion in the same way.  I hold true to 
the faith I developed as a child, to the bible message in Mathew 18:3, “Truly, I can say to you, 
unless you turn and become like children, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven.” 
 
I remember wanting to belong, to someone or something, to feel loved and included.  As a child, 
I wanted to belong to the Church.  As I grew older, into my teens, I turned away from the Church 
and my faith as such.  I felt less a need to commit on a personal level to my faith and more a need 
to grasp hold of social inclusion.  My faith did not satisfy my developing need to be accepted and 




cultural connections.   As a teenager I wanted to belong to as many groups as possible, to feel 
wanted.   
 
My needs had changed.  I needed cultural inclusion, a connection with the broader and more 
worldly sociocultural experience.  Through this connection, I have been able to find meaning 
with my community.  My social identity wins over my personal faith.  My cultural identity wins 
over a relationship I have between myself and God. After many years, my relationship with God 
was overtaken in importance by my relationships within the society in which I lived. 
 
My secondary schooling showed that I was a joiner, joining any club, charity or society, any 
event, happening or occasion.  I was one of those annoying students promoting ‘school spirit’, 
receiving medals for it too, embarrassingly enough.  There were many times in my teens when I 
was anxious and depressed, often ending in tears.  I remember a strong sense of self-loathing.  
Still I was heavily committed to extra-curricular activities, feeling like I needed to belong 
somewhere.  Through social inclusion, I strived to become human and complete, rather than sub-
human and incomplete as I was too soon become.  I remember feeling alienated, despite my 
heavy commitments to social activities.  Similar to what Marx stated, “social potential has 
become the private power of the few...The less you are, the more you’ll have.  To have more, 
you must alienate yourself” (Marx in Rius 2012: 80-01).  I was desperate to be wanted by others.  
I put this down to teenage angst.  
 
The strong desire I had to belong and feel wanted carried through to the early years of adulthood.  




(third world development, as it was called at the time). I became unwell when I was halfway 
through my honours year in Development Studies.  I was heavily involved with social justice 
organisations and other clubs, living with two of my best friends, and going out with a fantastic 
guy.  I was one of those idealist types who believed one could make a career out of a degree 
majoring in Anthropology and Development Studies.  I planned to save the world!  I had my 
heart set on becoming an aid worker overseas, helping people with my (assumed) in depth 
knowledge of Foucault and Marx.   
 
I did do some aid work, when I had just turned twenty-one.  A friend and I decided we’d go to 
Calcutta and work hand in hand with Mother Teresa.  This we did.  Mother Theresa was to deliver 
to us, the group of admiring faithfuls attending early morning mass, a lesson of true charity.  She 
told all the volunteers that it was wonderful that we could do this valuable work in Calcutta, but 
we should be made aware that there are people close to us, in our own communities, that need us 
just as much.  It was time to wake up and take note.  My personal needs were overtaken by the 
needs of those in my community.  I realised that my cultural connections were the most important 
connections I had, and they also resonated with me personally.  The personal had become the 
political.  The personal had become the cultural. 
 
So, I did it.  I connected with my society and culture.  There were people amongst my family and 
friends who needed support, so I set about to support them.  However, this was not enough.  I 
kept working as much as I could with social justice organisations, as well as my part time/full 




me that at this time I was swaying towards mania, trying to organise myself and make the most 
of every minute, literally.   
 
I remember feeling desperation to fit everything in, along with a great sense of self-loathing, and 
confusion.  I remember trying to prepare for my honours thesis and panicking about it.  I didn’t 
feel that I was smart enough to do it.  I was left dumbfounded and bewildered.  I have never felt 
good enough, never smart enough.  I have tried over many years to compensate for these 
inadequacies.  I would try to fit as much in the day as possible.  I have never been good enough. 
 
I remember just before I became acutely ill, that I was organising all my time, awake and sleep, 
in ten-minute intervals.  I even allocated an exact time of just eighteen minutes to cook dinner 
for my housemates and allotted boyfriends.  I wasn’t really sleeping.  I felt desperate to make 
every minute of the day and night purposeful and fruitful.  I couldn’t miss out on any opportunity 
that came to me.  It all seemed quite okay and doable at the time.  This proved to be one of the 
first definable signs of my psychosis.  
 
I have been asked many, many times if I had any signs or symptoms of poor mental health before 
‘the diagnosis’.  With my shoddy memory, it is hard to say.  I remember one time coming home 
with my boyfriend I started crying inconsolably and for no apparent reason.  My arms also started 
to move spasmodically and involuntarily.  The tears and the arm movements stopped after a 
couple of hours.  A couple of months later, for no apparent reason, I started crying again, 




shops, being afraid to talk to my friends and hiding behind furniture.  These symptoms lasted a 
few days.   
 
My friends and boyfriend were now very worried about me and my strange behaviours– mania 
and psychosis – although these terms were new to them.  My boyfriend booked an appointment 
for me with a GP who was recommended to be sympathetic to people displaying such symptoms.   
 
My boyfriend and I met the GP.  When she saw me cowering behind a chair and showing signs 
of hallucinations and delusions, she said we had to go at once to the psychiatric ward.   
 
I don’t know how this all happened.  Was my hospitalisation related to my need to belong and 
feel wanted as in my younger years?  Was I a social misfit, a sub-human, not belonging 
anywhere?  I really have no idea!  I have always claimed that the onset of my illness was out of 
the blue.  There was no rhyme or reason.  My mental health is mandated by my own biomedical 
composition.  This would make sense looking at the massive over-representation of mental illness 
in my family.  I cannot negate that the biomedical model is completely obsolete.  Despite revision 
of psychiatric theory, it remains a strong force even after hundreds of years (Szasz 1970). 
 
While I strongly believe that my schizoaffective disorder is intimately related and dependent on 
my biomedical make-up, I cannot negate the myriad of other factors that also take precedence in 
relation to my mental health.  There is a strong argument that declares that mental illness is a 




declaration.  To paraphrase Kleinman (1980: xiii), the socio-cultural medical phenomenon is 
being taught in universities.  It is imperative to teach both undergraduate and postgraduate 
students in psychiatry social and cross-cultural psychiatrics, and as it is imperative to teach 
medical anthropology to anthropology undergraduates and graduate students.   
 
Let us go back to my story.  I will try to extrapolate the difference between the biomedical model 
and the socio-cultural model, recognising that they at times work together: a relationship that has 
been recognised sporadically over the centuries.   
 
So it happened.  I broke for the first time. 
 
This was the beginning of my hell on earth.  I was just 23 years of age.  My sense of self was 
fucked permanently.  I remember feeling that I had to find myself again, but I was lost as to how.  
Sadly, this has proved to be an ongoing and frustrating endeavour.  My agency and self-
determination were not my own.  My identity and my future were in the hands of the mental 
health professionals, revered ‘demi-gods’ of Western medical science.  These are the ones who 
utilised the tools of biomedicine to gain control: that is, achieving mental health as defined by 
the science of modern psychiatry. 
 
My boyfriend was holding it together well.  With instructions from the GP, he took me to the 




so that they were ready for me.  I didn’t have to wait.  Thinking about it in retrospect, waiting in 
the Emergency Department would have been a new-found hell for me.   
 
I was examined by who I think was a psychiatric registrar in the room allocated for mental health 
assessments.  I remember the doctor asking me all sorts of probing questions: 
‘“Do you know where you are?’ – Yes, I’m at the hospital 
“Are you hearing voices?” – There’s a lot of noise in my head   
“What are the noises saying?” – Bad stuff.  That I’m stupid and hopeless 
“Do you see things that aren’t there?” – Not usually, but there are bugs all over the floor 
 “Have you ever thought of ending your life?” – Sometimes 
 “Do you want to end your life now?” – No.  I couldn’t do that to my family and friends 
“Who is the Prime Minister of Australia?” – What the!  Really?  Funnily enough I couldn’t 
answer.  
 
Throughout all these questions, I was cowering behind a chair, tracing with my finger the lines 
of the tiles of the walls.  I remember the tiles were white, but a bit grey with dirt and age.  I think 
I was wearing a second hand top and skirt and old shoes - typical student uniform.  My clothes 
wouldn’t have been black.  I always thought that black was a depressing colour and I didn’t want 
to be perceived as depressed, ironically.  I had lost a bit of weight in the last couple of months, 
probably due to my manic activities.  My senses were terribly heightened.  I remember the smell 




The smell makes you realise that this is a cold clinical setting – it is the kind of smell that reminds 
you of getting vaccinated as a kid, and the related fear.  The hospital was not a place of nurturing 
or love.  It was a place that worshipped the science of medicine, of sterility and hygiene, of dead 
germs.  Mental health does not fit into such a germ focussed/disease focussed medical science 
paradigm.  Mental health, in today’s world, requires therapy centred on feelings and perceptions.  
Treatment involves talking therapies and medication and various other psychological tools. 
 
In the mental health examination room, I felt overwhelmed and suffocated, frightened.  I could 
not shut them up: the noises.  Terrified, I cowered further behind the standard and ‘safe’ hospital 
chair provided in the psychiatric assessment room.  By safe, I mean that there were no sharp 
corners on the chair that could be used for self-harm.  My boyfriend was trying to help me answer 
the questions.  By doing this I think he was trying to hasten the treatment process, telling the 
doctor the answers that he perceived were needed.  He wanted me to be well now. 
 
I read in my medical notes that my boyfriend declared that I had a history of nine months of 
paranoia.  That I was edgy, agitated, unable to focus or concentrate – and not getting any study 
done.  He stated that I had panicky episodes, poor sleep and poor appetite and that three weeks 
prior I had become more edgy, stifling easily, hiding behind lounges and doors and was “afraid 
to be here”.  The mental state examination on admission recorded that I was an acutely agitated, 
disturbed young woman; that I had severe psychomotor agitation; that I was tearful with dramatic 
gestures, that I was initially unable to speak much, but later able to give some history.  It was 




ideas.  I had no suicidal plans although I talked about it and thought about it.  I thoroughly blamed 
myself.   
 
And so, after what felt like a gruelling examination, I was admitted to a psychiatric ward, Ward 
A (public), for the first time. I could hardly believe it!  This was the beginning of a lifelong 
relationship - no, a war - with my insanity.  From then on, each day has been a battle.  My first 
admission was voluntary.  There is a thin line between being a voluntary and an involuntary 
patient.  Basically, if you are at risk to yourself or others, and non-compliant, you will be 
sectioned or given an involuntary treatment order under the Mental Health Act (for example, the 
Mental Health Act 2015; Mental Health (Treatment and Care) Amendment Act 2014; Mental 
Health Act 2015 (ACT); Northern Territory of Australia Mental Health and Related Services Act 
(2018).  Each Australian state and territory have their own version.)  Most of the times that I have 
been considered insane, I have been in enough control of my faculties to be admitted as a 
voluntary patient.  That first admission, despite being psychotic, I was deemed sensible enough 
to be a voluntary patient.   
 
I don’t remember how I got from the Emergency Department to the psychiatric ward.  I do 
remember that when I first arrived in the ward, I was given a dose of Neulactil – an old school 
anti-psychotic medicine and my first ever psychometric drug.  The first of what seems like 
thousands now.  After taking the drug, I remember saying, “Okay.  That’s all good now.  I’ll just 





In my first admission, I remember feeling overwhelmed and inundated.  It dawned on me that 
life would never be the same for me again. My dreamed of future was ruined.  At this stage, I 
didn’t have the cognitive capacity to complete my honours thesis.   
 
Of course, mental health professionals are interested in any mental health history in your family.  
And, as it would transpire, many of my siblings, cousins, aunts and uncles are afflicted with 
mental health disorders.  We cannot seem to escape it.  Is this a biomedical problem or a cultural 
problem?  Mental health disorders are still seen as biomedical in the first instance.  The doctors 
give you a physical examination, mainly so that they can rule out any biological causes. For 
instance, my hypothyroidism came about from side-effects from one of my medications.  
Hypothyroidism can cause depression.   Hyperthyroidism can cause psychosis. Quilonum makes 
your hands shaky, it makes your writing difficult to read.  So, we have to be mindful of that. 
 
In the early days I hid behind furniture.  I was full of self-deprecation and shame.  I also kept 
saying variations of the following:    
“Other people need the bed”  
“I’ll make the bed dirty” 
“I don’t want anyone to know”  
“I’m probably just putting this on to get out of doing my [honours] thesis.” 





In the early days in the ward the doctors struggled to find the correct medication.  I was very 
withdrawn, very suspicious and ultimately paranoid.  On the first day I was given the drugs 
Largactil and Valium after the Neulactil.  According to my medical notes, I settled after taking 
medication.  There was an incident on the first night of my admission when I fainted.  It so 
happened that I had not eaten for over 36 hours.  The nurses quickly laid me down, took my 
blood sugar level and gave me some juice.  And then I was able to eat dinner.   
 
I remember, on my first day in hospital, being extremely anxious about receiving a diagnosis.  I 
was desperate to understand what was happening to me.  The health professionals seemed 
hesitant to give a certain and confident diagnosis. A fixed diagnosis would pin them down and 
commit them to a definition which they were essentially unsure of themselves.  As has been 
emphasised so far in this thesis – psychiatry is an inexact science.   
 
After five days of being in this initial psychiatric ward I was given a more thorough interview 
with the psychiatrist.  Reading through the notes of my first hospital admission, the term ’acutely 
agitated and disturbed’ was repeated over and over again.  I also experienced severe psychomotor 
agitation, this involved involuntary arm and leg movements.  There was reference to my 
behaviour potentially stemming from psychosis or depression, beginning at the age of 15.   It was 
at this age, on reflection, that I noticed occasional but pronounced emotional lability: I would 
withdraw for days at a time, became agitated, and experienced feeling lost, confused and 
disorientated.  As well, there was the possibility that my symptoms were brought on as part of 
post-traumatic stress disorder caused by a rape at the age of 19.   I really didn’t want to bring that 





Some visual hallucinations I had during this time in hospital included hundreds of bugs crawling 
all over the floor, as well as animated faces in my blanket.  I was also paranoid, endlessly. I felt 
that the nurses talked to me (when they didn’t) and that they could read my mind.  This is a 
common symptom when I am unwell, I am afraid of looking in people’s eyes because they will 
be able to read my thoughts and feel what is in my soul. 
 
I experienced pretty much all the time a thing called thought blocking.  This is manifested by me 
losing comprehension and track of my thoughts midsentence.  My memory loss also started. I 
was devastated to lose some cognitive functioning.  I was mortified to start my life as a sub-
human.  It seems that the symptoms that I’ve had over the last twenty years will continue.  The 
major symptom is my mind going blank without warning, me losing track of the conversation I 
was just having.  My mind is just vacuous, nothing more.  
 
I remember something that was very upsetting to me during that first hospital admission.  I was 
afraid of quitting my honours year.  I felt a great sense of obligation and commitment to finishing 
my honours.  I felt shattered and broken about failing that year.  The fear has carried on until 
now, when I am writing a PhD, afraid that I will be a failure again.  
 
It is interesting to note what is considered therapeutic on the ward.  Groups and group activities 
are a priority (Frame 1984).  Group activities consist of several things such as reading the 




option of group discussions on anxiety and depression.  In this first admission, and consequent 
admissions over the next couple of years, I was deemed only suitable for doing craft.  I remember 
thinking it is quite a joke that making beaded necklaces, painting and sticking things together 
were considered the most therapeutic actions for me to be involved in.  I remember feeling quite 
insulted that sticking things together, in no particular way or inclination, was considered the 
upper limit of my capabilities.  I asked the nurse if I could go to the anxiety and depression 
groups, but she thought this was testing my capabilities.   
 
It is interesting to look at structure and compliance on the ward.  I was only starting to be labelled 
as improving when I started to comply with the ward structure.  For instance, my medical notes 
were more positive in their description of me and my symptoms after I had participated in some 
craft activities.  Needless to say, craft did not make me feel better.  I was permitted towards the 
end of my stay to attend the assertiveness group.  The best thing that the nurses could write about 
me attending these activities, was that I stayed the duration of the whole group.    
 
Perhaps the visits from my family, my boyfriend and my friends made me feel better because 
there is a cultural/relational facet entwined in positive mental health.  Nurturing and developing 
my relationships made me feel better.  The right drugs, at the right dose, at the right time also 
made me feel better.  A mixed approach between biomedicine and social connectedness is the 
most therapeutic treatment for me.  The powerful nexus between social connectedness, 





Another measure of assessing wellness is by examining a balance between feelings and thoughts, 
and how these are negotiated and managed off the ward.  By feelings and thoughts, I mean non-
psychotic feelings and thoughts - manageable anxiety and manageable paranoia for example.  I 
was deemed as dischargeable once my mood and my reasoning was considered more real and 
rational, as defined by the mental health professionals.   
 
A major factor in being well again is the ability to manage within society off the ward.  What 
does that mean?  To be competent in society?  I don’t think even the sane know.  We do seem to 
know what is not acceptable: a mentally ill social misfit.  It wasn’t until I had had a successful 
run of outings from the ward, showing that I displayed appropriate behaviour, that I was deemed 
well enough to be discharged.  In preparing for my discharge I was expected to manage my own 
drugs and talking therapies, while managing my socio-cultural needs, for example nurturing and 
relying on relationships. (Kleinman 1980)  
 
The medical staff were focused on the way I felt and the way I thought.  The notes say things 
like “thinking more clearly” and “feels less confused, lost, dislocated”.  It seems that throughout 
my stay I required constant reassurance from the staff, saying that “I’m not supposed to be here”.  
In these early days of my illness I lacked insight.  It wasn’t until I had my first hospital admission 
that I first started to gain insight.  I started saying to the nurses and doctors, “I’ve just realised 
something.  Maybe I’m sick”.  My admission at this time lasted a total of 39 days.  I was 





Later, being somewhat of a mystery for my psychiatrist, I was diagnosed as somewhere between 
bipolar disorder and schizoaffective disorder and schizophrenia.  I am currently thought to have 
schizoaffective disorder (for now).  I was also thought to have the symptoms of post-traumatic 
stress disorder, anxiety and depression.  Diagnostic labels are very haphazard.  There seems to 
be a myriad of tests, scientific and not so scientific, that assist in the labelling process.  Some 
mental health professionals are lost without their tests, while others are comfortable with things 
being vaguer.  I will discuss later the use of the term ‘scientific’ married with ‘mental health’.  
My second admission was 20 days long in 1998.  My third admission was 17 days long in 1999.   
 
Below are listed some of the tests that I was subjected to during each admission: 
• Advanced Clinical Solutions 
• Basic 23 
• Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, 4th edition 
• Mini Mental Examination 
• Wechsler Memory Scale, 4th edition 
• Test of Everyday Attention Version A 
• The Speed and Capacity of Language Processing Test Version A 
• Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System 




• Numerous blood tests measuring levels of medication, such as Quilonum, must be given 
within the therapeutic range so as not show any great effect on the grander biology of the 
body.  As I have mentioned my long term taking of Quilonum has caused my thyroid to 
be under active 
• Brain MRI - testing for physical causes of my mental health disorder 
 
During my third admission (11 May – 28 May 1999) I was given a nursing care plan.  The care 
plan went into detail about what I was supposed to be achieving by what date.  The plan, simply 
put, outlined my milestones to get well.  The initial plan, day one, was to have all pathology and 
planned physical tests.  Days one to three required assessing my individual needs.  Days three to 
seven involved learning to make decisions that increase a sense of control over the situation.  
Days seven to fourteen were about nurturing relationships and reconnecting with society.  The 
nursing care plan was not completed.  It missed out the allied health interventions, and feedback 
on my progression each week.  The nursing care plan was not completed due to lack of staff.  
The plan was not high up on the staff’s priorities, although it was valued and considered an 
important part of quality assurance and evaluation.   
 
The therapeutic group program involved:  
• 0600 - get up and shower and dress 
• 0730 - walk 




• 0900 - relaxation 
• 1000 - group work covering  
o self esteem 
o managing depression 
o anxiety management 
o assertion 
o quiz groups 
o education groups 
• living skills including 
o craft 
o self-development 
o healthy lifestyle 
o creative expression 
o current events 
o options 
• 1200 - lunch 
• 1330 - more activities as mentioned above 




• 1800 - dinner 
• 2100 - visitors leave 
• 2130 - bed 
 
As I have said, I believe that my memory was shaky for those first four to five years or so of my 
illness.  I think that is my minds way of protecting itself.  Psychosis is a terrifying experience.  
When I try to think about psychosis and what it felt like, I can only grasp at thin wisps of fleeting 
nothingness.  The thing that I remember the most clearly is the noises in my head.  Mental health 
professionals like to label them ‘voices’.  To hear ‘voices’ is an extremely tell-tale sign of 
schizophrenia and schizo related disorders.  I have called my voices ‘noises’ in my effort of de-
personalising them; to make them unreal and take some of the power away from them.  My 
‘noises’, are lessened these days due to Clozapine – a very effective anti-psychotic drug.  I do 
still, however, get snippets of the noises, just to remind me, it seems, that I am still nuts.  The 
noises frighten me.  They engulf my mind.  I cannot keep them away.  They entrap me.  Their 
whispers infiltrate my consciousness, and possess me with their messages:   
“You are profanely absolutely bloody stupid...You are completely loathed... unwanted by 
everyone and everything.... never to amount to anything... ugly... disgusting...pitiful.  No one 
cares about you in the slightest, even your family who are supposed to have unconditional love 
for you... You are not even deserving of that!  Dying would even be above you...you are not even 
worthy of the expense of a funeral, though no one would come to the funeral anyway... I hate 
you, I utterly hate you, I loathe you!   Just die.  Just melt away into nothingness where you 





All of these are spoken in different voices.  About seven voices.  They are shouting and hissing 
at me in total disgust.   
 
During a psychotic episode, while the noises are saying such things and they are getting louder 
and louder, my senses are extremely heightened.  I can feel the world caving in on me, crashing 
around me, I am asphyxiated and crippled.  I can hear people talking to me, such as doctors, 
nurses and loved ones, but what they are saying is muffled into silence so that the noises dominate 
my sense of the real.  The world has morphed into chaos.  All I can do is hide.  I hide behind 
chairs, tables, behind a cocoon I make with my arms.  I try to detach from the world, ironically, 
while it crushes me down.  
 
Just to make things perfect, I also live with extreme anxiety and depression.  My anxiety is related 
to my psychosis.  It is a battle to keep calm when your sense of reality threatens and demeans 
you. 
 
I had three hospital admissions in the same hospital in the first three years.  In those early years, 
my boyfriend who originally supported me broke up with me, I moved back home to live with 
my parents, I put on 23 kilograms, and I was put on the disability support pension.  I was then 
labelled by the government as ‘disabled’, a lesser citizen who is dependent on and in servitude 
to the State.  I tried to fight this derogative and patronising label, although in order to continue 
receiving the disability support pension, I had to keep convincing the State that I was sub-human 
and in need of their governance.  That is, in order to receive the funds, I needed to define and 




category of being an insipid ward of the State (See Smith 1999; Lupton 2013).  Fortunately, I 
always made sure that I was doing a course or volunteering so that my resume had no gaps in it.   
Apparently, employers are suspicious of gaps in resumes. 
 
I spent those early years, those times I remember, in varying states of anxiety, paranoia and 
depression.  I would try and exercise every day, when I wasn’t too crippled with anxiety or 
depression.   Frustratingly I was unable to read at times.  My cognitive functioning was adversely 
affected.  I usually had about three mental health professional appointments each week.  I have 
a healthy mistrust of mental health professionals.  I remember one psychiatrist telling me not to 
trust any man who had a beard.  My Dad has a beard.  
 
I’m now relying on information given to me by loved ones to explain those times to me.  The 
loved ones then are still my loved ones today, minus the boyfriend, who ultimately couldn’t cope 
with my illness anymore. 
 
I learnt quickly that mental health was stigmatised.  I decided not to disclose my illness to many, 
due to the shame associated with it.  I was made to feel incompetent, incapable and unreliable.  
It was at the very beginning of my illness that stigma raised its ugly head.  My illness was a secret 
kept hidden from friends and relatives.  It was a private thing and we couldn’t talk about it 





In 2000, I had not long before failed at working as a travel agent.  That job proved to be far too 
stressful.  I was in a constant state of panic.  I wasn’t coping. I was mortified, humiliated and 
defeated again.  It was when I started volunteering in aged care that things started to look better.  
I was about 26, three years after my first admission.  Aged care was familiar to me as I had 
worked in the field during my undergraduate degree.  I was soon asked to attend an interview for 
a paid job as a personal care assistant in the dementia unit.  It felt good to be employed at last, in 
a job that I could potentially do. 
 
With my new employment things were looking up, although I still suffered extreme anxiety.  
Soon after commencing my new employment I suffered another relapse.  I was 27 years of age.  
I had collapsed several times, semi-conscious, and was taken to hospital via ambulance on each 
occasion.  Once I was at the GP’s surgery when it happened.  She was very concerned about 
possible neurological causes.  The ambulance came that time too.  The collapsing experience was 
quite unique.  I would lose bodily control and just slouch in a chair, as if I was fainting.  I felt 
extremely weak and powerless.  Conversely, I remember feeling gratified that I didn’t have to 
worry about things, and I could just close my eyes and forget about everything.  I felt safe.  My 
anxiety levels decreased.  I was going to the hospital.  I felt validated; my symptoms must be real 
if I went to hospital by ambulance.  These were physical symptoms.  I was convinced that I was 
physically unwell.  They would look after me there.  By the time I reached the hospital, I was 
able to speak.  Each time, the Emergency staff couldn’t find anything wrong with me.  After my 
last collapsing episode, I think at number four, a doctor suggested that my condition seemed to 
be psychosomatic.  This was the worst news!  I was gutted!  I felt disempowered because what I 




yet another battle!  I felt like I needed to start all over again.  I was absolutely determined to beat 
this!   
 
I took some time off work.  My medications were adjusted, and I received counselling.  After 
this relapse (they never diagnosed my collapsing episodes as having a cause other than high 
levels of anxiety) and with some adjustments to my medication, I came back to work a new 
woman!  My anxiety had decreased, and my confidence and cognitive functioning had increased.  
I had lost weight.  Life was looking great!  
 
I was able to move onwards and upwards, more so than I had in years.  I decided to make the 
most of my strengths.  It was then that I started to study to be an enrolled nurse.  It took me two 
years to do the nursing course.  I studied part time whilst working at the dementia unit.  Once 
qualified, I began working at a residential mental health rehabilitation centre.  I loved working 
there and felt empathetic to the clients from my own experiences.  I felt comfortable working in 
this centre. 
 
By the time was twenty-nine, I was in a relatively good place.  I was working in an area I was 
good at.  I had moved out of home.  I started dating again.  My friendships were supportive.  I 






After moving interstate, I worked in the public hospital.  I spent some time working in the Ward 
B (public)– the psychiatric ward, mainly caring for one patient at a time when they were a suicide 
risk.  One patient that I took care of had to have her bra confiscated as she tried to hang herself 
with it.  I was a newly trained nurse in mental health, yet I could tell the difference between a 
well-run ward and one that was not.  As a nurse working on Ward B (public) I remembered the 
experience as unstructured and disordered.  The ward was so hectic that I wasn’t given an 
orientation of the emergency procedures.  The nurses seemed stressed and frenzied, working 
reactively – putting out spot fires as they arose.  It was obvious that they were under resourced 
to manage the high number of patients with mental health issues.  The entire ward was chaotic.   
 
I soon left nursing.  I was tired of dealing with the minutia.  I felt powerless.  What could I do?  
I started working in a mental health non-government organisation.  I was a support worker in a 
program that aimed to prevent hospital admissions to Ward B (public), or to reduce stays at the 
Ward B (public).  It was surreal being on another side – being the mental health worker.  
 
My own mental health needed maintaining and nurturing, requiring me to have some sick days.  
I had to tell my boss about my mental health status.  I didn’t want to disclose but was pressured 
to do so.  I have been pressured to disclose to all my employers over the years.  I don’t know 
which has the most precedence, the employer’s insistence and supposed ‘right’ to know, or my 
right to privacy and self-determination and the right to define my own self-identity.  My own 
personal agency is again tied to others in governmentality and servitude to those with ownership 





I tried to remove myself from anything related to mental health.  I was sick of being tied so 
thoroughly to the category of disabled.  I wanted to be free, in control of my own identity and 
governance.  I wanted to be a full citizen, in control of my own resources of production and my 
own voice.  I started to work in project management, then research.  My psychiatrist at the time 
was not happy with me working full time and studying part time (I had just commenced a Masters 
in Public Health).  She believed I only had the capacity and the ability to work part time.  I felt 
disempowered by her views but was determined to move forward! 
 
My relationship with George at this stage had ended, but I took it better than expected.  I began 
my doctorate.  For about eighteen months, I was stable and productive.  I was 36 years old and 
happy.  I was working hard, studying hard and enjoying myself. 
 
The next memory I have after this time of productivity is a vague one of my lying on my couch, 
hiding.  I had become delusional and paranoid again.  I remember my boss at the door, knocking 
and calling out to me to see if I was alright.  My employer got in touch with my psychiatrist who 
stated that I needed to be looked after or I would be admitted to Ward B (public).  It seemed that 
there were no services to support me in the community.   
 
After talking with my GP, my employer kindly took me in to stay with her and her family.  I 
remember being embarrassed to learn that I was to stay with my employer, but we had also 
become friends by this stage.  They had two small children and I was afraid I would scare them 
with my strange involuntary arms movements and foot tapping (these symptoms are typical of 




with my boss and her family for about a week.  I spent my time scrubbing and cleaning, tidying 
and arranging things neatly and obsessively.  When I wasn’t obsessively cleaning, I was smoking.  
In a period of about three months, I spent close to a thousand dollars on cigarettes.  From what I 
can gather, I manically spent another few thousand on stuff that took my fancy – art, travel, pretty 
dresses, shoes, skin care products and whatever else I was attracted to.  I didn’t have this money.  
I put everything on credit, maxing out every credit card that I could put my hands on.   
 
I felt terrible that I was encroaching on my boss and possibly affecting her children with my 
crazy behaviour, although, my boss and her husband assured me otherwise.  I opted to leave their 
home and stay with another close friend.  I stayed with her for about a week, after which I 
stabilised a little.  I did a lot of obsessive cleaning and ordering wherever I went.  One time when 
my boss took me to see my GP, I proceeded to organise all the brochures in the waiting area.  
Firstly, in order of topic, then, in alphabetical order.  I threw myself into my work, quite 
manically.  My boss pulled me aside at work to tell me to calm down.  I was being manic - 
overwhelming myself by overworking.   
 
I was starting to show signs of psychosis.  My employer contacted my father, who then travelled 
interstate then came to see me. 
 
I have a memory of my Dad and I seeing my GP.  They discussed my needing some time in 
hospital.  It was agreed that Ward B (public) was the last option.  They decided on me going back 





My life will never be the same.    
 
I will be forever broken.  
 








LIFE SINCE JULY 2015  
 
“Some people never go crazy.  What truly boring lives they must lead!” 
Bukawki (Australian Broadcasting Commission, Changing Minds 2014) 
 
I often wonder what it would be like to think like a normal person, to feel like a normal person, 
to experience life and to love as a normal person.  As someone living with schizoaffective 
disorder, I wonder if my experience of life is that different from the so-called ‘normal’ people.  I 
will forever be ‘Othered’, subhuman, dependent on the State, and somewhat a deviant.  As Said 
argued in ‘Orientalism’ (1978), describing (post)colonialism, there is a divide between ‘West’ 
and ‘East’.  West are the colonisers, having power over the East the colonised.  Those with major 
psychotic illnesses are the colonised (East) who are controlled by the colonisers (West).  People 







This is my life living with schizoaffective disorder.  I will try and describe to you in this chapter 
what living with schizoaffective disorder is like.  This chapter describes some of the cultural 
phenomena I must deal with day in day out.    
 
Every day I have to manage my illness.  Some days are harder than others, some minutes are 
harder than others.  Over the years I have developed exceptional insight, according to many 
mental health professionals, a far cry from the confused individual I was when I first became ill.  
Even though I have this supposed great insight I still find it difficult to make judgements about 
what is real and what is not.  The most reliable yardstick for reality that I have is asking people 
that I trust around me, “Is that real?”, “Did s/he say that?”.  These people include doctors, nurses 





This ever-present confusion about reality adds up to me having poor self-esteem.  I doubt 
everything I hear and see and smell.  I constantly hear the cruel noises shouting at me, telling me 
how stupid and hopeless and worthless I am.  It is tremendously difficult navigating between 
these noises and the stimuli I manage externally in the supposed ‘real’ world.  What do I believe 
to be real? What do I believe?  Without knowing what is real, and when I cannot ask another, I 
am forced to make leaps of faith in judgement. Negotiating a thought or a sense becomes an 
exercise in second guessing what is right and what is wrong.  I will always live with this 
uncertainty.  (I have noted, however, that since commencing Clozapine, the unwelcome noises 
are a lot quieter.)   
 
The sense of touch grounds me.  When I am unwell, or beginning to get unwell, I am often seen 
tapping: tapping the chair I’m sitting in, the table I’m sitting at or tapping my head.  The sense 
of touch centres me.  The surface stays the same.  I cannot distort it.  The senses of hearing and 
sight are subjective for me.  Whereas touch is stable.  As I go about my everyday routine, I 
constantly ground myself through touch.  I touch the wall I walk past in the corridor, the floor at 
my feet, the computer keyboard I type on, the pages of the book I am reading, the hair on my 
head as I brush it for the day.  With touch, I don’t need to ask others, “Do you feel that?”  I trust 
in my own sense of touch. 
 
It is difficult to use my tried and true method of touch whilst navigating my own self-identity.  
Without this stabilising method of assessing truth and with all of the second-guessing and 
confusion about reality, I am left with having the construction of a negative self-identity.  My 




society and the power influences that sway the culture, politics and economics of society.  My 
sense of self identity is already consumed by the social forces in the processes and production of 
socialisation.  My identity is not my own.  It is given to me.  I do not have the power to say who 
I am, where I belong and what I value.  I often lack the strength and power to create my own 
identity, as I am unable to take control over the resources that affect my life, or the outcomes of 
relationships I have formed.  That power is taken from me. 
 
For the 20 plus years I have lived with schizoaffective disorder, I have battled with my perception 
of reality.  It is difficult to decipher what is real when the noises are loud in my head. 
 
Are they real?  This is a reoccurring question.  How does one assess what is real and what is not?  




again, how does the philosophical perception of reality differ from an individual perspective of 
reality?  Can they and should they be separated?  In my readings of philosophy, constructions of 
what it means to be real are cerebral.  As an anthropologist, I am concerned with the social 
construction of reality.  I cannot separate the cerebral with the social and cultural.  Neither can I 
separate reality from other social and cultural phenomena like culture, politics, spirituality and 
economics.   
 
An important premise of my thesis is my belief that medical science disempowers the mental 
health patient.  Regardless of how institutionalised – as an inpatient or outpatient – they are 
disempowered through misrepresentation and the tunnel-vision of medical science.  It is through 
this misrepresentation that the mentally ill become sub-citizens and social misfits (Szasz 1970): 
they are often perceived as engaging in anti-social behaviour, so they must be removed from 
public sight.  There are some correlations between public policy dealing with the psychotic and 
the Indigenous.  My identity as a subhuman is crafted for me by medical science, carefully 
measuring me and labelling me.  I am misrepresented by the dominant and powerful mental 
health professionals as a mental health patient, not a full and equal human being.  This part of 
identity construction is authorised by the scientific paradigm.  I am, in effect, socialised through 
modernist medical science and the cultural phenomena and socio-historical context of which 
medical science purports to (DiGiacomo 1987). My identity is overwhelmed and overtaken by 
just one fraction of who I am - a biomedical facet - which can be treated by medication which, 
simply put, balances the biochemical phenomena in my brain. (Goffman 1963; Kleiman 1988) 





The label bestowed upon me has left me powerless (Becker 1963; Scheff 1974).  Powerlessness 
is demonstrated in many realms.  I am powerless to construct my own self-identity, be it an 
identity as defined by mental health, or not defined by mental health.  I am an object of medical 
positivism, to be measured and weighed.  I am forever battling the right to identify myself 
holistically.  I am frustrated because I am so much more than my illness.  I am more than a client 
with schizoaffective disorder, identified by psycho-metric testing and blood tests - biomedical 
indicators.  I am Rachael Jane McMahon.  Socially, I am a daughter, a wife, a sister, an aunt, a 
friend, an employee, a student, and a girlfriend, plus more.  Spiritually, I have the heritage of 
being Catholic; currently I practice mindfulness.   Culturally, I adhere to the values and ethos of 
my community.  Economically and somewhat politically, I endeavour to have control over the 
resources affecting my life.  I am all of these things and more.    
 
I can negotiate these facets as best as I can, in the non-medical world, with the limited agency I 
have.  However, as someone living with schizoaffective disorder, who is dependent on 
medication, medical science and the State to remain as well as can be, I cannot escape being 
pathologised and having my identity crafted by medicine.  I cannot escape science, as the 
treatment for me is mostly and historically pharmaceutical.  Psychiatry is now exploring and 
learning about its social situatedness in the social sciences.  It is hard to describe which treatment 
is more effective – medical or social.  I’ve come to believe in a combination of both.  The 
emphasis on either remains the preference of the individual.  As an anthropologist, I would love 
to argue that society and culture are the main foundations to sound mental health, but I can’t.  
Even from my example, I need the support of my family and friends, being grounded in my 




is a balance between the healing properties of socialisation and culture and those of 
medicalisation. 
 
My identity is also defined by social stigma.  There is a public perception of major psychotic 
illness which confines its sufferers as deviants.  As alluded to earlier, there is a hierarchy of 
mental health conditions.  Depression and anxiety are the best ones to have.  It is not unusual for 
famous people to be suffering depression and/or anxiety.  Indeed, it is very common to have such 
a diagnosis of depression or anxiety.  There is merit in that, seemingly a badge of honour, 
especially for the creatively minded or those who call themselves ‘artists’.  Eating disorders also 
seem to be a phenomenon of the modern age where the concept of the self is pivotal.  
Schizophrenia and its friend schizoaffective disorder are not esteemed illnesses.  There is great 
shame in any illness with the prefix ‘schizo’.  When one hears on the news about a person who 
is wielding a knife down a street, they are often identified with the prefix ‘schizo’.  Those of us 
living with schizoaffective disorder look to the likes of John Nash to save our reputations.   
 
Public portrayal of madness in contemporary Australia does not empower the mad.  The 
television series, Changing Minds (Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2014) depicts a 
psychiatric ward in the present day.  Changing Minds gave the viewer some insight of being 
mentally ill and being treated in a psychiatric ward.  The Liverpool Hospital, where the series 
was filmed, houses one of the busiest psychiatric wards in Australia, where 1200 mental health 
patients are treated each year.  In Australia, for males aged 15 to 24 years, suicide is the major 
cause of death.  Twenty people attempt suicide each day.  For those living with schizophrenia, a 




people living with mental illness will never recover completely, some of their cognitive 
functioning will be lost with each episode of being unwell.  This is the case with me.   
 
Each time I have a psychotic episode, my cognitive capacity diminishes.  I really notice when 
this happens.  I could read a page of a book, the same page, for two hours and not have a clue 
about what is said.  My memory is terrible, and retaining knowledge is hard.  I must take extra 
time, using varied methods, so that I can begin to be in a still place to study.  With a calm mind 
and repeated ways of reading and processing information, I can just get by.  A long-standing and 
ongoing effort for me is to control and manage my anxiety levels, to limit further psychotic 
episodes.  It is a mammoth effort for me to put all my mental resources into controlling my 
anxiety levels.  Limiting anxiety means limiting psychotic episodes which means maintaining 
cognitive functioning.  
 
Changing Minds also illustrated the intense powerlessness and lack of autonomy of the mentally 
ill.  One patient became aggressive with a nurse when, after waiting for hours to see his assigned 
clinician, he was told that the clinician couldn’t meet him yet because the clinician was heading 
off for his break.  The patient arced up yelling, “I want a break too!  Where’s my thirty minutes 
off the ward?”  The nurse tried to reassure the patient saying that they understood, but the patient 
retaliated by yelling, “‘I understand’ doesn’t cut it for me!” 
 
The television series depicted the warped sense of reality displayed by the patients.  The job of 
the mental health professionals in the hospital was to support the individual patients to get well, 




take the lead in reducing symptoms so that patients can have clarity about reality.  The main tool 
employed to assist patients to have a clearer mind are psycho-tropic medications.  A structure is 
provided by medication in conjunction with cognitive and emotional supports provided by 
psychological therapies.  Patient and staff can together unpack the psychotic episodes and try to 
make sure they never or rarely happen again.   
 
I have adopted an anthropological study of mental health.  Specifically, an autoethnography of 
schizoaffective disorder, looking at the ways I have been labelled as a lesser human, and 
understanding that labelling is part of the culture which encompasses it.  The job of an 
autoethnographer, such as me, is to unpack the cultural phenomena of psychosis, to better 
understand the values and purpose of living with a major psychotic illness.  There is more to 
psychiatry than medical science.  Cultural analysis commands depth of understanding, bringing 
symbols such as medicalised ‘shrouded’ language into clearer meaning.  There are limitations to 
medical science in its approach to effect recovery. Medicine arrests symptoms but is not a tool 
for recovery for the patient as an individual or a social/cultural actor.  Treatment of the mad under 
psychiatric medicine can be correlated with the treatment of the Indigenous people under 
colonial, metanarrative hegemonies, as per Derrida (1978).  This in turn supports the grand 
narrative of medical science.  The mental health professionals are agents of this grand narrative.  
Similar plights have been identified by feminists, race theorists and queer theorists (Campbell 
2000). 
 
Apparently, the mental health ‘misfits’ of society need parameters, governance, control and 
ruling.  To live like this, to feel imprisoned by my own mental health, I am left without cause or 




as subhuman and basically stupid. Yet again, I am not considered to be fully human and lack the 
competency to live a full life.  I am labelled.    
 
I have not the social strength to resist such labelling.  Indeed, according to labelling theory a label 
of ‘psychotic’ can become a self-fulfilling prophecy.  I become what I think and feel, guided and 
stemming from the decree of powerful others (Becker 1963).  The psychiatric profession labels 
me in such a way, and the community follows suit, especially if the subhuman is displaying anti-
social behaviour.  Such behaviour is undesirable.     
 
A prominent way people with mental illness are dehumanised, by professionals and non-
professionals alike, is the telling of a narrative in which they are unfit to be parents.  It has been 
suggested to me by those in my social networks that as someone with my condition, I lacked the 
skills to be able to be pregnant, survive the psychological stress of the birth, and give the newborn 
enough love so that I could form an attachment to my baby.  Basically, it was assumed that I lack 
the ability to raise a child because I have schizoaffective disorder.  I don’t remember there being 
such a side effect on the back of any of my medication boxes. 
 
This is a very confusing state of affairs.  Can I or can I not have children?  Should I or should I 
not have children?    
 
Many doctors and nurses over the twenty plus years of my illness have suggested that I couldn’t 




I could relapse and never be as well again; and/or the compounded stress of being pregnant and 
having a baby could precipitate into a larger psychotic episode worse than I have ever 
experienced before.  I have heard people say, when talking to women with a major psychotic 
illness, that they should consider the option of having their fallopian tubes tied.  Similar 
suggestions have been made about people living with Down Syndrome (ABC 2016).  For many, 
many years I was told both by family and professionals, that I could not and should not have 
children.  I was told that I am almost guaranteed to get post-natal depression.  Also, apparently, 
I won’t be able to breast feed.   
 
Anyway, pregnancy and being a mother will be difficult.  At the very least, I will need to take 
extended time out with a lot of support, which will undoubtingly bleed me dry financially.  What 
to do?  Should I bow to the accepted cultural norm of being a mother?  Although, more and more 
women are choosing not to be mothers; to have an identity separate from their reproductive 
capabilities.   
 
I went to see a psychiatrist earlier this year who specialises in pre, peri and postnatal care for 
those mothers requiring psychiatric treatment.  He stated that I was in fact able to have children.  
I could stay on all of my medications.  The only medication I would have to come off would be 
Quilonum and that would only be during breastfeeding.  The doctor said that I would just need 
extra support during pregnancy and afterwards, just like – I imagine - a normal mother would.  





This was overwhelming news!  For twenty years I have been told that I lack what is needed to be 
a mother.  Also, that due to having a severe mental illness, I should not have a right to have 
children because I am incapable of loving a child. It is uncanny to label someone with 
schizoaffective disorder as someone who is not capable of love.  Other symptoms, yes.  Lacking 
the emotion of love, no.  The emotion of love is omnipresent across all cultures, all faiths and all 
values (Kleinman 1988).  And – all illnesses and disabilities.  The sad thing now, knowing that I 
could have had children, is that I am reaching my biological limits on having children due to my 
age.  For many, many years I wanted children.  For many, many years I was told I could not have 
children.   
 
It is often emotionally painful to hang out with my friends who have children.  Some years ago, 
I went for a trip to the coast with some very close friends, their husbands and children.  In the 
three days that we were away together I had one two-minute conversation that did not involve 
pregnancy, stretch marks, birth, breast feeding and toddlers.  After three days I broke down in 
tears, I told one of my best friends that I didn’t think I had anything in common with my oldest 
friends any more now that they were married with children.  She rightfully replied that she is a 
skilled engineer capable of running a sewage plant but did not know how to deal with her two-
year-old child.   She needed to talk about her new experiences with her child so that she could 
feel supported and gain valuable knowledge that talking with other mums could give.  I thought 
this was a good call.  We have been much more understanding of each other since. 
 
For many years those closest to me have attempted to console me because they thought I couldn’t 




a family, how fulfilled their lives are now and how life was meaningless before the euphoric 
experience and feeling of motherhood, I would get a nod of condolence.  “Don’t worry Rachael”, 
others would say, “You can fulfil your mothering wants/needs elsewhere”.   
 
So, I find myself reflecting, why is it alright for my friends to have children and not me?  Why 
have I found it so hard to find a life partner when so many of my friends have loving long term 
relationships?  Culturally, where do these questions lie?  What values and beliefs are instilled in 
my culture that dictates the definition of a fruitful life?  And, more importantly, what values and 
beliefs installed in my culture state that I lack the ability or capacity to live a normal, albeit 
fruitful life?  Obviously, I need help, medical help to change the way I am; a biological mishap.  
Though, as an anthropologist, I am interested in the cultural perspective of being mad, and how 
that affects my capacity, or results in incapacity.  Why am I discriminated against?  (Smith 2004; 
Mordock & Hall 2002; Gladstone, Boydell & McKeever 2006) 
 
I’ve had those closest to me question my capacity and ability to complete this thesis.  They have 
questioned why I am so determined to finish it and why I put so much pressure on myself.  Their 
concern comes from a good place.  Yet, I feel defeated.  My loved ones think that I must, of 
course, be struggling.  The very strong message I hear is that I am not able to live a full life.  I 
lack the capacity, capability, competence, internal resources and aptitude.   
 
As well, I am disabled, handicapped and labelled by the State, via the power of medical science, 
as requiring constant monitoring and measurement.  I am required to maintain close contact with 




become suspicious and wary, assessing the risk of another psychotic episode and the possible 
necessity of interventions and involuntary treatment? 
 
I am in servitude. I am a subject of prejudice and judgement.  I am in servitude and will be for as 
long as I am sick, which will most likely be until I die.  There is no end to my dependence on the 
State.  I am forever trapped into a reliance on the public health system where I need the State for 
my highly regulated treatment.   
.   
I don’t think I’ll ever be free.  I have certain freedom in my everyday life, freedom in so much 
as my everyday experience of living with a major psychotic illness will allow.  However, my 
everyday experience includes quieting the noises in my head, and managing high levels of 
anxiety about many things, such as, going to work, socialising, negotiating relationships, and 
other things like heights, stairs and driving. For example, I cannot drive above seventy-five 
kilometres, over bridges, long distances, or in merging traffic.   
 
I still must see a mental health professional at least once a week.  This commitment takes up five 
hours.  Each week I see one or more of the following: a psychiatrist, psychologist, 
neuropsychologist, Clozapine nurse, pathology nurse, dietician and/or the GP.  At least a third of 
the five hours spent with the health system is waiting.  The people waiting with me are generally 
unkempt, unhygienic social outcasts who do not respond to or engage with social niceties; they 
seem really disabled from their illness.  In my medical notes I am often described as “well 
kempt”.  I always feel misplaced as I sit and wait.  I feel like I don’t belong.  I feel isolated, in a 




the queue, as I usually must come to the clinic in my lunch hour.  It shouldn’t be the case that 
sometimes I go to the top of the queue.  It’s not fair.   
 
I feel terrible making judgements about my fellow Clozapine users.  I do not know the various 
facets of their lives, and what has happened to them to bring them to this point in time.  I ask 
myself, “Am I stigmatising the other patients?  Am I categorising?  Am I a misfit?”  I think I am 
a misfit too, not fitting into my chosen world of academia.  I can very well be an academic misfit, 
not meeting the standards with my limited and stunted cognitive functioning.  Perhaps I am in 
academic purgatory, wanting to come to intellectual heaven but am lacking the fundamental 
tools, like a functional brain, so I slide back down to a life with limited opportunities.  Living 
with the label of “disability” makes sure that I have limited opportunities. 
 
Mine is a disabled existence, possibilities are limited.  I don’t want to say that a disabled person 
cannot have a full and fruitful life, yet at the same time I want to acknowledge that having a 
disability does place a confinement on what you are able to do.  For example, with the use of a 
wheelchair or hearing aid, things can be done, but they must be done differently.  I will find it 
difficult to complete a PhD.  No mental health professional has said that I cannot complete a 
PhD.  Rather, they have said it will be harder and may take me longer than the typical PhD 
student.  I just must try different tactics, take extra time and go to hospital every now and again 
to get a mental health service, tweaking the medication and my functionality.  I just must keep 





The possibility of a future hospital admission is always lurking in the back of my mind.  Now 
that I can go to Ward C (private) for respite if needed, without fear of poor treatment, with the 
comfort of knowing the staff will treat me well, I feel some solace.  (A description of Ward C 
(private) is given in chapter nine.)  The choices that money buys for you!  Money eradicates 
many ramifications of psychosis it seems.  I don’t want to be that engaged with the mental health 
system.  As little engagement as possible is my desire.  I have seen too many people with mental 
illnesses come in and out of the wards, like a revolving door, with recidivism a way of life.  I feel 
dishonoured as it is by the structure of my treatment.   I want to run away from being involved 
in any sort of institutionalisation that facilitates recidivism – for me it is dehumanising, 
pathologisi ng, disempowering and shaming the self.  Being a part of institutionalisation, that is 
being an inpatient semi-regularly or being engaged as an outpatient regularly, cements your 
dependence on the State.   
 
Be real.  Does money really buy you better medical treatment?  Are there better drugs, better 
doctors and nurses and allied health professionals in the more expensive wards?  Is the treatment 
more holistic or does biomedicine reign where there is cash?  There is less pressure to attend 
group activities, and more opportunity to spend time on your own in your private rooms with 
television and an ensuite.  How is the culture of medicine, psychiatric medicine, different in 
private psychiatric wards than say, for instance, in the Ward B (public)? (A description of Ward 
B (public) is given in chapter eight.)  Is being institutionalised by private medicine the same as 





It is fruitful here to employ a Marxist model of mental health service.  I posit that the rich have 
control over the resources that control their lives and the poor are subject to the owners (Bracken 




The strangest thing happened to me.  I took note because it only happens once every two years 
or so.  I felt calm, at peace, content.  The sensation just sort of came upon me.  Not a wave, but 
a centring.  It was incredible.  I felt still in my mind.  I had what one might describe as clarity.  
There was no noise in my head whatsoever.  I remember thinking tonight that it is incredible how 
much I take for granted.  I have grown used to the noises over the years.  I never really realise 
how noisy it is in my head, until they are gone.  I must say that the stillness is awesome!  My 
thoughts are quiet and still.  My thought processes are lineal rather than chaotic.   God it’s good 
to think rationally and systematically instead of randomly and haphazardly!  To think in order 
rather than disorder.   
 
I felt happy.   
 





I really have no idea why this came upon me tonight.  I was out watching the grand final of the 
local roller derby competition with some friends.  Then it came upon me that my mind was still.  
It lasted for about two minutes.  Two minutes of clarity and bliss.  Then it started to get noisy 
again, in my head.  Again, I felt overwhelmed by aural stimuli.  After only two minutes of 
stillness was I reminded of the hell that I put up with day in day out.  The centeredness and sweet 
feeling of peace gave me a taste of how I imagine the broader population thinks.  Is it true that 
most people live without noise in their head?  It must be liberating having such a clear, lineal 
mind and calm thought processes.   I’ve never been so envious in my life, now that I have an 
inkling of an idea of what life could be like.  Oh, sweet normalcy!  Oh my God what a 
phenomenal feeling!  And why on earth would it happen to me while watching roller derby with 
friends?  
 
Now of course, as I am writing, my gratifying oasis has passed.   
 
Damn that noise!   
 
Even though I have two-minute hiatus every two years, I will always be broken.  My life to 
various degrees, will always involve noises, paranoia, surrealism, anxiety, being fat, being a 
subhuman, and being undervalued.  I am an active, productive member of society.  I work and 
study, and have goals and aspirations and enjoy fruitful, beautiful relationships.  Living with 
schizoaffective disorder, I will always be shackled and under the scope of medical measurement 




the motions, finding their way in the dark.  Has there been a definitive difference in my life after 












There is a fundamental problem I have in life – trying to gauge what is real and what is not real.  
And from that, who or what has power over me and my thoughts?  A huge issue for someone 
wanting a career in academia.  Being an anthropologist who is in love with all things Foucauldian, 
I can happily describe my knowledge as being socially constructed (Hacking 1999; Haslanger 
2012).  In fact, I would argue that all knowledge is socially constructed and acculturated.  All 
knowledge has an historical birth time and place, development and maturation.  Whether the 
knowledge is right or wrong, true or false, valid or invalid, is relative.  Reality for a person with 
schizophrenic tendencies is a subjective and turbulent phenomenon. (Foucault 1967; Szasz 1970) 
 
My common symptoms are not being able to trust my thoughts, not knowing what is real and 
what is not real, extreme anxiety and paranoia, poor memory, poor cognition and poor 
concentration.  Then there are physical side-effects: weight gain, dry mouth and decaying teeth 





A nurse in Ward A (public) wrote in my notes, “[Rachael’s] anxiety is due to the constant chatter 
of voices in her head which at times can become quite overwhelming and distressing.”  
Sometimes I think people see me as vague as I stop talking mid-sentence, but it is because of all 
the chatter in my head.  Honestly, I don’t know which version of reality to believe.  
 
This and the following two chapters comprise three narratives on a rough timeline from 2012 to 
2014.  These fit into an overall chronology of my illness, which is as follows:  
 
Town A 
1997 – First hospital admission – initial psychosis 
1998 – Second hospital admission – more issues with psychosis 
1999 – Third hospital admission – triggered by a relationship ending. 
2000 – Presented to Mental Health services with thoughts of self-harm 










2012 (October) – Paranoia and anxiety and depression.   
Admitted to Ward A (public)   




Admitted to Ward B (public) 
 
Town A 
2015 (June)  
Admitted to Ward C (private) 
2015 (October) – Neuro-Psychological Assessment done.   
 
In the years prior to this narrative, I lived in Town B and had been monitored by my psychiatrist 
and GP for close to seven years.  By then, my diagnosis was committed to that of schizoaffective 
disorder.  I had not been in hospital for 15 years.  I had been mostly well in recent years.  I had a 
relapse of my symptoms in October 2011 when I became hypomanic/manic.  I am oblivious as 
to the cause.  I always seem to be.  During this time, I hardly slept, I worked ridiculous hours, 




‘St Rachael of the Plentiful Milk’, because I drank a lot of milk at the time.  I felt like I was 
running a million miles an hour.  I had never been so productive.   
 
Mania isn’t sustainable.  I managed until October 2012.  By this time, I had exhausted my friends 
and family.  I remained dysfunctional in everyday matters.  I was working two days a week due 
to the restrictions of my PhD scholarship.  I was so unwell.  I took five months off work and 
study.   My supervisor and a close friend took time off work to look after me.   Other good friends 
in Town B also took care of me so I didn’t have to go to the Town B hospital.   
 
I lived in constant anxiety and paranoia that I might offend someone or let someone down.  I 
wanted to get back to work and do a good job.  I never wanted to offend anyone.  I had been told 
that I over apologise.  It’s just that I didn’t know what was real and what wasn’t.  So, I over 
compensated, and this led me to detach from reality, becoming dissociated.   At the time of this 
admission I was working as a researcher and studying for a PhD and believed that my medications 
were making my mind unclear, and that my concentration and memory were poor.   
 
My manic symptoms had changed to anxiety and paranoia.  My anxiety and paranoia were out 
of control.  My psychiatrist prescribed me Valium for such occasions.  Up until now I only used 
Valium about four times a year.  I started using Valium when needed around the time of my 
relapse, and soon enough I became tolerant and dependent.  My psychiatrist had been decreasing 






I had been seeing my GP in Town B.  She noticed deterioration in my mental state and 
recommended admission to a psychiatric ward.  I reported briefly working in the psychiatric unit 
in Town B and felt that this was a frightfully awful place to be.  I therefore decided to come down 
to Town A and to stay with my parents, until a vacancy arose at Ward A (public), where I had 
been before.  I was assessed in Town A and had been waiting for a bed on Ward A (public).  Here 
I felt safe.   
 
My GP wrote a letter to the medical staff at Ward A (public).  My GP stated that I had deteriorated 
at the end of 2011 due to decreases in medication: I was managed as an outpatient by mental 
health services and supported by my friends in Town B.  This episode was different from my 
previous deteriorations and had features of mania with little sleep, impulsive spending and 
agitation.  Valium, or its generic name diazepam, was introduced as part of the management 
strategy.  I stabilised over the last months and the psychiatrist saw me and discussed a weaning 
regime off the diazepam from a starting position of 15 mg.  This was commenced but it transpired 
that I had been taking more than I thought, more like 30 mg a day, so again I deteriorated quite 
acutely.  I experienced intense anxiety and difficulty with thoughts – pervasive and negative 
thoughts - as well as issues with cognition, with a possible suggestion of diazepam withdrawal 
underlying the condition.  My GP had taken the diazepam dose back to 20 mg a day with an idea 
of stabilising me and then weaning me off diazepam again.  My GP stated that my mental state 
remained very fragile and that my medication needed to be reviewed and stabilised.  
 





And so it begins, again 
 
Not long after admission, a nurse helped me identify some aims for my time in hospital.  My 
aims for this admission were to review my medication so that the symptoms, especially auditory 
hallucinations, improve and so that side-effects are minimised (in particular, weight loss is 
attained, and I am able to think more clearly when studying and working).  My Town B GP and 
psychiatrist believed this episode was due to a reduction of medication – olanzapine and 
diazepam. 
 
The Ward A (public) medical notes go on to say that I have been experiencing auditory 
hallucinations for years, and I state that these have never really gone away.  They take the form 
of female or male voices that I do not recognise, who address me directly saying derogative 
comments.  At that moment these were soft voices, like whispers.  I stated that I was pretty good 
at ignoring these and not thinking about them.   
 
One of the initial inpatient notes made in my 2012 Ward A (public) file was: 
“Presented to [Ward A (public)] having returned to [Town A] five days ago - staying with parents 
- has a list of diversionary techniques to ignore her thoughts.  Experiencing auditory 
hallucinations for years – ‘has never gone away’.  Was 23, 24 and 25 years when she was in 
Ward A (public).  She has very little memory of the events.  For 12 years Rachael was moderately 




work and study. Rachael presented as hypomanic/manic.  Has poor concentration and memory.  
Works as a researcher and is currently doing a Ph.D. Is concerned about weight gain, as well.  
Wants to be able to think more clearly so she can study.  Has worked briefly on the mental health 
Ward [in Town B] – finding it both frightening and awful.  [Thus, the travel interstate to a less 
daunting and more therapeutic ward.]  Rachael also worked in a mental health rehabilitation 
service and a dementia unit [in Town A], before moving [to Town B].”   
  
I felt paranoid and anxious all the time.  I had very good friends.  I had to check with them 
constantly - “Did that just happen, or did I imagine it?”  I have had this constantly since the onset 
of my illness, over twenty years ago, so I am pretty much used to it.  I don’t know any other way 
to think.  I tried to work on myself to improve myself.  
 
A nurse in Ward A (public) wrote these notes, “Rachael told me that she was the fourth child of 
six children and the oldest girl.  She told me her parents were in their 70s and found it difficult 
to manage her.”  Rachael said, ‘I feel terrible that they have to support me.  My parents are both 
sick with lung problems. They are very devoted parents; their lives are centred on supporting us, 
that is, their children.  I don’t like being sick and depending on them.  I feel guilty.’” 
 
Out of respect for my parents, I was committed to getting well in hospital.  An important part of 
the healing process on the ward was to commit to the ward program; to the ‘therapeutic’ and 
‘rehabilitative’ ward activities.  However, I disengaged with the ward program. I rejected the 
notion that the ward program was good for all.  I rejected that notion that biomedicine was good 





Importantly, it was at this stage in my healing, healing that is current up until now, that I turned 
my gaze as an amateur anthropologist to the culture of biomedicine.  Biomedicine was and is an 
overwhelming paradigm in the science of medicine, a paradigm that epitomises the hard sciences 
and dissuades the social sciences.  Ward A (public), where I had my first mental health service 
experiences, was the place where I began to conceptualise the methodology of autoethnography, 
although I didn’t know what it was called at the time.  It was at these early stages of my illness, 
that I first gained some insight to what I was to call the Silenced Manifesto - the suffocating 
silence of the shackles of the marginalised and the discourse that embeds it.    I first began to 
understand how the Silenced Manifesto engulfs the institutions of mental health.  
 
Day one - I am broken  
  
Christ not again!  Who’s saying that to me?  I haven’t heard you being so loud in ages.  Why are 
you all being so cruel?  Am I really so despicable, incompetent, stupid and hopeless?  So, is it a 
fact then?  I am fundamentally a screw-up who is stupid and has no place trying to work in 
academia.  It’s a wonder I still have a job!  What was I thinking?!  So, it is actually true then?  
Needless to say, my productivity was practically zilch as I was trying to quieten the noises in my 
head.  And then there are all the other feelings.  The walls falling in on me, the people reading 
my thoughts and seeing my soul when they looked in my eyes, the paranoia and escalating 
anxiety, well, I had to try to ignore that because people would think I’m bonkers.  Sadly, this is 




schizoaffective disorder.  Basically, that means that I am broken, and often so.  I also have bouts 
of depression, which are more acute and less frequent.   
 
I was disappointed to have to leave Town B.  Though, Ward A (public) is a better and more 
progressive loony bin than the one up north.   Besides, I have a lot of support from family and 
friends in Town A.  Over the years I have learnt to hide my illness, to silence it as it is not socially 
acceptable to be talking about noises in your head, or to repeatedly ask people what is real or not 
real.  Angrily I had to accept that I needed professional help. 
 
I stayed with my parents and waited for five days to get a bed at Ward A (public).  Meantime, 
the community mental health team kept an eye on me.  I felt a failure during this time.  I had lost 
the battle that I have been fighting since the last hospitalisation 15 years before.  My sense of self 
had diminished.  I now had to put my faith in the mental health professionals that I had also been 
fighting, or more likely negotiating with, ever since I was first assessed and diagnosed.  My 
psychiatrist in Town B fought with me for years to get me to modify my lifestyle, or slow it down 
so to speak, so that I could avoid becoming unwell.  She was concerned that my illness would 
affect my reputation in Town B, specifically in my work culture.  On returning to Town B, that 
psychiatrist stated that none of her clients go to psychiatric wards and eluded that I find another 
psychiatrist.  I did do this, after I started taking Clozapine.   
 
So, as I have said, I have lost the battle that I most hate to lose.  Succumbing to mental health 
treatment is like surrendering yourself to biomedicine.  Almost like offering yourself up for 




has very little agency.  You surrender your freedom.  You have few rights.  If you show signs of 
too much defiance and little signs of compliance, there is a strong chance that you may be 
sectioned or given an involuntary treatment order.   
 
Yet I was desperate to be admitted to the Ward A (public).  I remembered the times I have been 
admitted to Ward A (public) for treatment.  I certainly didn’t feel safe by possibly being admitted 
to Ward B (public).   Ward A (public) seemed to the best option available.   
 
During these times of illness, I admitted defeat.  I submitted myself to the science and the politics 
of medicine.  I relinquished myself to biomedical treatment.  I conceded to the orders of the 
mental health profession.  I forfeited my personal freedom to the current mental health discourse.  
I handed over my basic human rights and became dependent on the State for treatment.  I had 
become a sub-citizen with little agency and what little agency I did have was dependent on 
opinions in the mental health system.   The socialisation of the mentally ill into the broader social 
strata is heavily influenced by the psychiatric ‘expert’ opinion.  This socialisation process 
involves creating social stigmatisation of the mentally ill (Foucault 1967; 1973; Kleinman 1980).  
And yet, I ached to be admitted, to feel safe – feelings that trumped any rights or personal 
freedoms that I have in the ward.  I was desperate to be admitted to Ward A (public).  So here I 
was, being admitted, once again, into Ward A (public).    
 





Well I am now officially in the loony bin in Town A because, yet again, I am having issues with 
anxiety and reality.  The situation had grown beyond my usual coping technique of asking close 
friends and family, “Is that real?” or “Did I hear that right?”  This is the fourth time I have been 
in this loony bin.  I am admitted to the same ward at the same hospital, but they have had a 
refurbishment since I was here near 20 years ago.   
 
After my admission yesterday, I awake after my first night in the ward.  I observe my 
surroundings.  The walls are lemon with feature walls of mustard.  All the rooms are spread out 
down a corridor with lemon walls also.  The doors and the wall railings are finished with a wood 
veneer.  The nurses’ station is at the end of the corridor of rooms.  The ‘sacred’ medication room 
is a locked room by the nurses’ station.  It is preferred that patients don’t hover around the 
medication room as access to the site might be compromised.  Who knows what mayhem would 
arise if the patients compromised the sacredness and secrecy of the medication room?  Each time, 
the nurses must go through a rite of passage to qualify to give out some of the ‘dangerous’ drugs, 
including diazepam, which I have become addicted to – thus my access to diazepam, what they 
call a S4 drug, needs special vigilance.  The rest of the ward offices make a rabbit warren where 
the allied health professionals hang out.  Further down the warrens are the particularly sacred 
offices of the psychiatrists.  
 
Each patient has a single bed, with a corner style unit desk and chair, a cupboard and drawers at 
the end.  Of course, there are no coat hangers in the cupboard.  We may top ourselves after all.  
There is, however, a full-length mirror in the door - a necessity for all girls.  We may be loonies, 




nail clippers, tweezers, and hair straightener, but I have hidden them.  I am also supposed to hand 
in my crochet when not in use, but I have not done that, and no one has noticed.  I attempt to 
personalise my new space as much as possible.  On my desk are some bush flowers I have picked 
on my walks around the hospital bush grounds. I also have a large arrangement of dried flowers 
from my sister’s friend’s wedding.  I have a pile of necklaces, brooches and earrings.  I have a 
few weird toys that I am quite fond of due to their utter strangeness.  The floors are carpeted in 
blue.  I have a quilt of mum’s and a teddy and pillow from my sister’s home that I sleep with 
when I stay with her.  I have two drawings from my god daughter on the wall, and a few 
gorgeously cute drawings from other friend’s children, plus a drawing of a funny looking bearded 
guy drawing to cover up a hole in the wall.   All in all, my little alcove feels quite friendly. 
 
Off the corridor where all the crazies sleep is a couple of lounge rooms with a TV, DVD player, 
piano, games and old magazines and newspapers.  You’re not exactly kept up to date in here.  
The nurses’ station is the hub of the ward.  Anything worth happening happens at the nurses’ 
station.  It is power central.  All major nursing decisions are made at the hub.    
 
Outside is a beautifully landscaped garden with chairs warming in the sun.  There is a smokers’ 
area under cover of the eaves, just in case in rains.  Wet cigarettes are not very popular.  This 
was in the time before smoking was completely banned from health facilities.  
 





Day three – my need to have control 
 
I crave to feel safe.  I crave to be in control.  Having my schedule means that I am productive.  I 
can’t have control over my thoughts and feelings, but I have my schedule!  Note nurses’ entries 
below: 
Nurse one: 
“Settled, warm and reactive early in the shift.  At approximately 11am Rachael reported feeling 
agitated and anxious.  Nil trigger identified.  Regular 11am diazepam given.  Seen shortly after - 
reported that she felt ‘I had lost half an hour’.  Concerned about this as it put her schedule off.  
Minimal settling effect from diazepam.  Reported visual hallucinations to medical student (walls 
moving, changing colours).  After lunch observed a lot of crying and agitation, paranoid about 
people walking past her door, not sure what their motivations were.  Upset about her ‘failure’, 
felt that her schedule had not been able to stop her becoming unwell.” 
Nurse two: 
“Rachael has generally been settled this morning, using distraction techniques to manage anxiety 
and minimise ruminations.  Good eye contact, circumstantial at times although, has improved 
from last week.   She reports some feelings of things not being real.  Rachael states that others 
read her mind at times - and they talk to her when doing so.  She wondered whether she was ‘just 
making things up [symptoms] to get attention’.  These thoughts were challenged, and the theory 





Day four - will vanilla scent mend me? 
 
The psychiatrist’s office has a lovely vanilla scent that I always comment on, probably ad 
nauseam.  I am always scared of seeing her.  She is the ultimate sacred deity of my care.  When 
I first met with her, and the next few times, I tried to explain to her that I was paranoid, but she 
didn’t believe me, thinking I was confusing it with anxiety - semantics.  When the sacred deity 
didn’t believe me, I felt disempowered and more broken because I was made to feel like I was 
making up my symptoms.  Paradoxically, and to make things worse, I get paranoid about reality 
and whether I make stuff up or not.  So, I am a disempowered stupid patient who doesn’t know 
how I feel or view reality, unless my version of reality is supported by observant medical staff.  
In fact, it wasn’t until a medical student observed firsthand one of my paranoid episodes, which 
I told my psychiatrist about, that my psychiatrist believed that perhaps my constant anxiety was 
due to my constant paranoia.  She then instigated the process of changing my medications.  
Finally!  It seems like sacred deities only believe other deities.  The nursing staff and allied health 
professionals are further down in the mental health pecking order.  The patients are the 
menagerie.  I am fascinated by the power dynamics played by the health professionals – doctors 
versus specialist nurses versus allied health versus students.  The power dynamics are silently 
respected and not obviously at least, contested.  
 
Day five – is it real? 
 
Nurses’ notes describe my incompetent view of reality in varying ways.  For example, “Rachael 




of the words ‘have to’ and ‘should’ statements.  Rachael then became quite confused and thought 
she was making up her symptoms.  I was able to identify a number of indicators that she is not 
making up herself and after about 10 minutes of reassurance she accepted that I do not believe 
she is making up her illness.  The medical student later reported that Rachael believes I think she 
is making it up”.   
 
Day six – the schism of brokenness and belonging 
 
I got up at 5.30am this morning, due to the luxury of setting my alarm I was the only one in the 
room.  The rooms are shared by two people.  I keep my distance from the other ‘inmates’.  I don’t 
want to get caught up in the confusing and sick views of others’ realities.  I struggle enough with 





The weekdays are filled with a rehabilitation program which I refuse to participate in because it 
is frustratingly unchallenging, doesn’t develop any new insights for me and is rather simplistic.  
I have tried to attend the activities and have grown so anxious by their simplicity that I now don’t 
attend.  The ward’s group activity program is an insult to anyone above the mental age of twelve.  
It is based over a five-day period and consists of a community meeting every morning where 
patients are granted the freedom to have their say in the running of the ward – in reality a very 
little and tokenistic agency.  Discussions are had, for example, about whether there is enough salt 
in the kitchen.  Then there is the group walk where about six patients go for a short ramble though 
the bushland behind the hospital.  No one really talks to each other, for various reasons.  I tried 
the group walk which I found terrifying as people were getting inside my head and seeing my 
soul. Then just before lunch are the pinnacle activities of planning for discharge, life skills of 
gardening, mood management and cooking.  To complete the week, there is a psychology-based 
activity for Friday.   
 
Let me describe the basics of mood management (two hours of my life that I’ll never get back)  
Q: “What’s a good emotion?”  A: “Happiness”  
Q: “What’s another good emotion?”  A: “Excitement.”  
Q: “What’s a bad emotion?”  A:” Sadness.”  
Q: “What’s another bad emotion?”  A: “Anger.”   
Sadly, that was about as challenging and exciting as the group got.  After lunch is craft, an outing, 
baking (again), and visits from the mental health foundation (a community based mental health 





In comparison, my self-designed rehabilitation program trains me in the skills and provides me 
with the resources that I will need to return to work and study when I get well.  I feel that my 
self-designed rehabilitation program prepares me to be a full member of society.  Writing practice 
and reading is more useful for reintegration than the simplicity of classing emotions.  The hospital 
program ostracises the mentally ill deemed as lacking, lacking the skills and intelligence to fit in 
to the rest of society, precipitating their identity as social misfits and sub-citizens.   
 
My self-designed rehabilitation program involves a 5.30am start with meditation and 
mindfulness, catching up with news from the outside world, showering and dressing, breakfast, 
a half hour walk, more meditation, creativity (usually crochet – a bit more complicated, and I 
find it more relaxing than other craft, and it helps with cerebral functioning (Brain made simple 
2019)), reading, lunch, two hours of writing, another walk, then free time for visitors and catching 
up with any activity I was unproductive with, for example reading.  I then do another meditation 
after dinner and have an early night.  
 
My program is an effort.  I have been putting off writing due to high levels of anxiety.  I 
painstakingly made myself write yesterday.  Today was helped by a very fruitful meditation 
session.  I am listening to Triple J radio station in the background.  Quite incredible because it 





Day seven – everyday lunacy 
 
I slept in this morning until 6 am. The joy of staying in a communal ward is that you have personal 
encounters with inappropriate people.  First is the young woman that doesn’t seem to understand 
that the shower cubicles have doors and not everyone needs or indeed wants to see you naked.  
Another woman, who I just refer to as the crazy obsessive woman, has obsessive cleanliness 
rituals that cannot be disturbed, in all places such as the bathroom and the dining room.  No one 
dares to interrupt her routine for fear they will be yelled at.   
 
 I have had a shower (didn’t beat crazy obsessive lady), washed my fringe so it is all over the 
place, and haven’t put my make-up on.  I haven’t had my thyroxine and I was told I wouldn’t get 
it until 8am, so I can’t have my muesli until 8.30am, by which time will be famished!  Oh, and I 
haven’t done my meditation yet!  What’s this topsy-turvyness coming to my world? 
 
Later, a nurse took me for a walk off the ward.  As members of the public walked past, I would 
look away and then after they had gone, ask if they saw me.  When asked why I didn’t want 
people to see me I replied, “If they get in my head they will see what I am thinking and they 
would not like it.  They won’t like me, and they will see how jumbled my thinking is.”  I then 
apologised to the nurse for not looking at her or making eye contact, “I am sorry I can’t look at 





I then went on to say that I didn’t understand why I had gotten worse since admission and not 
better.  We discussed the possibility of not having to keep up a front anymore, that Ward A 
(public) was a safe place, and to work on getting better and not to be afraid to ask for help when 
I’m becoming overwhelmed. 
 
Day eight – an anthropology of loneliness:  the emotional frontier 
 
I do not get many visits apart from daily visits from my mum and dad; mum when she is well 
enough.  Jude (my ex-fiancé) comes in every second day.  My sister has been in a few times and 
one of my brothers visited once.  There is a family birthday tomorrow when I will see the whole 
family.  That will be nice.  Hopefully I won’t be too paranoid. 
 
I am ashamed to tell my friends I am unwell in hospital and have them feel obliged to visit me.  
Not only do I feel like a sub-citizen, but a sub-friend who my friends charitably include in their 
social planning.   
 
I felt so guilty yesterday, as people were being nice to me and I didn’t deserve it.  I did three 
meditations before taking 50mg of Seroquel prn (when needed).  I can’t get the emotions of guilt, 
shame, hate, disappointment, anxiety, fear... out of my head.  I also feel like I’m a fraud, a failure, 





I would like to argue that our emotions are a fundamental part in people making decisions of all 
different types.  We reason, but when it comes to the crunch, any decision made cannot be 
separated from emotion; a gut based reaction.  Emotions are decision makers.  As are our senses.  
As are our rationalisations – maybe all three separately, or together.  Are individual, personal 
feelings a social fact or phenomena?  What are the discourses behind feelings and thoughts?  
Behind anyone’s personal discourses of their feelings and thoughts?   
 
Day 9 – fashionista 
 
Another interesting theme I discovered in my medical records, was that I was commonly 
described as “well kempt”, “well-groomed” and “well presented”.  I thought it humorous how 
the nurses noted on a few occasions the colours of my clothes.  For example, my physical state 
was described as “brightly dressed in green socks and a red top”.  Another nurse ended her 
medical notes entry by stating, “Well kempt.  Dressed appropriately”.  There seems to be a focus 
on my appearance in many entries, especially my being “well-kempt”.  What does being ‘well 
kempt’ mean?  And how is it related to mental health?  Goffman (1963) stated that visual 
presentation is related to mental health capacity.  To be ‘unkempt’ is to welcome visual stigma.  
To be ‘well-kempt’ represents potential capacity and healthiness.   Is there actually a correlation 
between being well-kempt and being mentally well?   
 
Other comments in my medical notes include that I am “polite on engagement”, however at times 
I will become “distracted and appear to respond to stimuli…pausing mid-sentence and looking 





Day ten – hell on earth 
 
During my stay in Ward A (public), I began a withdrawal plan to get me off diazepam.  I was 
very keen to move back to Town B and resume my life again; though the mental health 
professionals in Town A strongly suggested that I stay as an outpatient so that I could have 
support in my diazepam withdrawal.  I disagreed with the mental health professionals until my 
first two weeks of the withdrawal. It was hell.  I honestly could not have imagined how terrible 
it was.   So, I quickly changed my mind and decided to stay the extra two months.   I remember 
the pain, repeated, day in day out.  My diazepam reduction plan, as it was called, outlines very 
slow and gradual withdrawal over four months.  By the time I was admitted to Ward B (public) 
I was still on small doses of diazepam.  I remember the pain and I promised myself I would never 
ever get addicted to drugs again knowingly or unknowingly, if at all possible.  Frustratingly 
diazepam 
 
Day eleven – being in the world 
 
I will now tell you about my discovery of a marvellous super glue.  It is based on the theory of 
phenomenology and mindfulness, as described by Didonna 2009, that I first heard about on my 
admission to the ward.  Apparently I am not the first to make this discovery.  In fact, mindfulness 
and phenomenology are well grounded, researched and established concepts in psychology, as 
well as philosophy and religion, and other disciplines.  Many psychological therapies are based 




cognitive behavioural therapies and mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (Didonna 2009), and 
in my case the use of meditation. 
 
Lundh (2020) states that phenomenology can be defined as the scientific analysis of our 
subjective experience of ‘being in the world’.  Lundh (2020) describes how Husserl used a 
phenomenological method to turn attention to conscious experience as such. As he formulates 
it, this represents a shift in perspective from our usual natural attitude with its focus on the 
world (and our practical engagement with things in the world) to a phenomenological attitude 
characterized by a focus on our experiences of being in the world.  Instead of focusing on the 
objective world as it appears from our subjective perspective (i.e., our natural attitude), 
attention is turned to the subjective perspective as such (a phenomenological attitude). 
 
Meditation is an esteemed tool for mindfulness and phenomenology.  It helps me to centre on the 
present, accepting it for what it is.  Mindfulness is about the present, not regretting the past or 
projecting into the future, thus lessening anxiety.  Mindfulness isn’t about punishment but about 
a gentle and loving approach.  Meditativeness mindfulness, for me, is like super glue for my 
broken mind.   Meditative mindfulness has had a brilliant therapeutic effect on me.  Funnily 
enough, due to my illness, I read a big book on it but due to being so unwell I can’t remember 
anything that was written!  However, I seemed to have picked up on the gist of it.  It’s about 
being present in the moment, consuming my mind and all emotional attention.  It’s also about an 
ethos of gentleness, connectedness and forgiveness of the self and everything affecting the 




It is about meditation on the now and the experience of the now.  Reality now.  Feelings now. 
The purpose and meaning of life now.   
 
This view of reality marries transcendentalism with the physical, psychological, emotional and 
the experiences of the senses now.  We cannot change the past.  We don’t know what the future 
brings.  We do know what is now.  Any therapy that does not address any elements of mindfulness 
is deemed to be inadequate (Kabat-Zinn 2006).   
 
Day twelve – thoughts to trust  
 
My main goal for the first four weeks was to trust my thoughts.  This is an ongoing issue for me 
as I battle to find reality.   Below is an outline of the plan. 
 
Goals/issues Strengths and 
supports 




Dr Trial and error Team (None made) 
Come off Valium Nurse Wean off 
Valium 




Clarity of thought 




minute of silence 
Add extra 
meditation in 
middle of day 
Me (None made) 
Manage anxiety Nurses, me Mindfulness, 
reading, writing, 
including 
writing to the 
anxiety 
Me (None made) 
 
 
This plan was made eleven days after being admitted.  I am curious as to why such a plan takes 
so long to develop.  One possible suggestion is that the staff may have been waiting until I was 
better, with more clarity of thought and thus more capacity to think in such terms.  Their 
perspective of my self-efficacy was influenced by what they knew of my symptoms; and 
particularly about the insistent and persistent thoughts that were a major part of my presentation 
when I was admitted. 
 
Day thirteen – clarity of insanity 
 
A report from a psychologist I was seeing on Ward A (public) stated that I had been practising 
mindfulness and using distraction techniques when distressed and was finding this helpful.  I 




work.  I said several times, “I need to write well, I need to be productive”, putting emphasis on 
the word ‘need’.  The psychologist encouraged me to take rest and have some fun in my life as 
this will help me to be more productive.  I reported feeling stressed at the thought of doing 
something fun and was very focused on returning to work, I noted that part of the reason I am 
consumed by work is because it offers distraction from the fact that I am single and it helps me 
to challenge my beliefs that I am not very bright and that I was and am weak.  The psychologist 
suggested that I believe I became unwell because I am weak.   
 
It is very important to me to have firm structures and a detailed plan for productive work.  This 
is possibly because my world is so unclear.  I continue to question whether things are real or not.  
I need to control what enters my cognition.  Knowledge is power and the more knowledge I have 
secures my sense of reality and provides me with the foundation to live a fruitful life.  My self-
image may be largely influenced by a belief that I am handicapped by my mental illness. 
 
Day fourteen – AWOL 
 
I was very apologetic about getting lost on my walk - walking for one hour instead of 20 minutes 
- and it went as far as to say that I thought I may be punished for not returning on time.  I required 
reassurance and support.  I was able to distract with meditation and a visit from my father.  Staff 
note, “When anxious, Rachael appears to be in an associative state, downcast eye contact with 
anxious affect, and stooped posture, although able to be distracted with verbal prompts, nil 
reported psychotic symptoms this shift, however reported psychotic symptoms noted in Drug and 





Day fifteen – productivity 
 
I need to write well.   I need to be productive.   
 
 Day sixteen - assessments 
 
One of the assessments the staff at Ward A (public) administered to me to measure lack of 
confidence in social interactions was called ‘The Holistic Assessment - Tidal Model’.  This 
assessment included some of the reasons that lead me to be admitted to Ward A (public).  I had 
poor clarity of thought, poor memory, and diazepam tolerance.  I would describe my pre-
admission state as feeling crap and increasingly paranoid, which led me to use more and more 
diazepam, and become less and less able to work and study.  I resented having to come to hospital 
again, but I recognised that I needed to be able to work again as well.  I identified the needs of 
my mission as having my medication reviewed and acquiring more management tools to cope 
with my mental health.  Most importantly I wanted to be able to trust my thoughts again. 
 
My pre-admission mental state examination (MSE) showed that I was pleasant, at times anxious, 
that I lost concentration at times, and had a dry mouth.  I had no abnormality of speech and no 





My admitting MSE noted that I looked my stated age.  Again, it was noted that I dressed very 
brightly with red top and green socks.  I was cooperative with good eye contact.  My speech was 
normal considering weight volume.  My mood was subjectively and objectively euthymic, my 
affect reactive.  There was evidence of auditory hallucinations, but no evidence of delusions 
today. “Rachael appears to have good insight”. 
 
It was interesting to note that a risk issue included ‘risk to reputation’ specifically via ‘diazepam 
withdrawals’.  This insight depicts the intense socialisation of psychiatric care.  
   
Day seventeen – Personality Assessment Inventory 
 
Below is some context of my Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) used in my stay of Ward 
A (public).  (I repeat myself here and in chapter ten and in more detail due to the significance of 
the material.)   
 
“With respect to negative impression management, there are indications suggesting that 
the client intended to portray herself in an especially negative or pathological manner.  
Some deliberate distortion of the clinical picture may be present; evaluation of the critical 
items indicates she is not malingering.  Also, such results often indicate a ‘cry of help’, or 
an extreme or exaggerated negative evaluation of oneself and one’s life.  This exaggerated 
negative evaluation is consistent with how the respondent describes herself in interview. 




CONSIDERABLE DISTORTION AND ARE UNLIKELY TO BE AN ACCURATE 
REFLECTION OF THE RESPONDENT’S OBJECTIVE STATUS – THE FOLLOWING 
INTERPRETATION IS PROVIDED ONLY AS AN INDICATION OF THE 
RESPONDENT’S SELF DESCRIPTIONS (Assessor’s bold and capitalised effects.)  
 
“Despite the general level of negative distortion noted above, there are some areas where the 
client described problems of great intensity... These areas could indicate core problems that stand 
out from the general level of distress and dysfunction reported by the client, such problems merit 
particular focus in further inquiry.  These areas include disruptions in thought process; unusual 
ideas or believes; feelings of helplessness; tension and apprehension; heightened activity level; 
irrational fears; and compulsiveness or rigidity.” (See chapter ten for more discussion) 
 
Some clinical notes from the PAI:  
 
Self-concept 
“The self-concept of the client appears to involve a generally harsh, negative self-evaluation.  
She is prone to be self-critical and pessimistic, dwelling on past values and lost opportunities 
with considerable uncertainty and indecision about her plans and goals for the future.”   
 




“The respondent’s interpersonal style seems best characterised as a self-effacing and lacking 
confidence in social interactions.  She is likely to have difficulty in having her needs met in 
personal relationships, and instead will subordinate her own interests to those of others in a 
manner that may seem self-punitive.  Her failure to assert herself may result in missed treatment 
or exploitation by others, although, at this point, it appears that the strategy has been effective in 
maintaining her important relationships.” 
 
“In considering the social environment of the client with respect to perceived stressors and the 
availability of social supports with which to deal with the stressors, her responses indicate that 
both her recent level of stress and her perceived level of social support are about average in 
comparison to normal adults.   The reasonably low stress environment and the impact of social 
support system are both favourable prognostic signs of future adjustment.” 
 
Day eighteen – still broken 
 
I’m having a bad day where I am disillusioned by the possibility of my recovery.  I am puzzled 
by the values and techniques of the staff and the biomedical model they seem to esteem.  I haven’t 
seen a lot of holistic therapeutic techniques.  The group program is the closest attempt to a holistic 
model, but it is ineffectual.  Craft, a seemly panacea for mental health rehabilitation, does have 
its therapeutic properties, despite my qualms and scepticisms. 




Final day – has the glue worked? 
 
My inability to concentrate on anything for long may fundamentally ruin the validity of this thesis 
unless one holds on to the postmodern/poststructionalist value of multiple and relative truths.  
The discourse of the therapeutic processes of an inpatient in a psychiatric ward depends on the 
biomedical model where doctors are sacred deities, nurses and allied health are their followers, 
and the patients are inadvertently disempowered as they are not able to be taught all the holistic 
skills necessary to live a productive life outside of the ward.  They may not be able to be taught 
all the holistic skills necessary for them to survive life outside the ward.  This is due to the 
possible deterioration of the cognitive functioning which that can happen to people with major 
psychotic disorders.  The token holistic allied health professionals do their best with the limited 
resources available to them.  The reality is that psychiatric wards have revolving doors for chronic 
sufferers, of whom there are many.  So, the cultural discourse of the psychiatric medical system 
produces band aids for what they can patch up with medications, knowing full well that the 
treatment is inadequate.  The follow up treatment in a perfect world is taken over by the 
community mental health team but much of their attention is based on crisis management not 
chronic management.  So, this had better be good glue to keep me together for a good while 
longer.  I hate being broken, a lot. 
 
Below is a brief description of my 2012 discharge summary from Ward A (public): 
“Rachael settled well on the ward.  Champix [a medication to help stop smoking] was decreased 
then stopped since this may exacerbate psychosis.  She was started with a nicotine patch.  Her 




one of her daily diazepam doses by 2.5mg every other week.  She was encouraged to structure 
her day and take regular exercise.  She was seen by the ward psychologist.  She made good 
progress and leave went well.  She has decided to ask her employer whether she may be able to 
work from home until the end of the year.  Upon discharge Rachael had no paranoia ideation.  
Rachael is currently considering whether she would like to spend further time with her parents 
[in Town A] or go back to Town B.” 
 
There was also a description of current, revised medications on discharge, a brief description of 
my social situation which included living arrangements, nurturing relationships with friends and 
family, and employment, and a list of the mental health professionals I had to see.   
 
Risks to reputation and of misadventure have been noted several times as possibilities in my 
notes.  This illustrates the hazards of stigmatisation of the mentally ill (Goffman 1963).  These 
points were made aside notes of my mental state.  These included descriptions such as: 
“disorganised, latency of speech, tangentiality and loosening of association, disoriented, 
cognitive deficits apparent, circumstantial in speech, and reports poor memory”.  The notes 
acknowledged that I experience auditory hallucinations but stated I had strategies in place to 
manage them. 
 
My medical notes go onto say, “Rachael reports feeling paranoid at times, feeling as if people 
are out to get her.  She hears voices of different people, of both genders, but thinks that the voices 
come from inside her head.  She feels at times that everything is surreal, that sometimes the world 




thinking and complicates her thoughts in this way.  She has been encouraged to simplify her 




There are about seven voices, of different sexes and ages, living in, but not attached to me.  I 
don’t like to call them ‘voices’, this feels too much like schizophrenia cliché for my liking.  
Instead, as previously mentioned, I prefer to call them ‘noises’.  I haven’t named them 
individually, on purpose.  I don’t want to empower them with an acknowledged identity.  Usually 
they all remain a whisper, and it is easier to control them.  I’ve spent twenty years training myself 
to disassociate from them; to negate a reality. 
 
From my understanding of Hegel in his Phenomenology of Mind, consciousness (what I like to 
extrapolate as ‘reality’) is what your senses (smell, taste, sight, hearing and touch) tell you.  
Aristotle (in Evans 2001: 42) states that you can’t experience your senses separate from some 
kind of reason or rationality of them.  Senses are the data and enable reason to de-code and 
transcribe.  My senses were not sensing what they are meant to, according to mental health 
professionals, and my reasoning was completely paranoid.  I didn’t trust my sight, smell, hearing, 
taste, as these senses are arguably more subjective.  I did trust the sense of touch because touch 
was the only sense that grounded me to reality.  Even sick people have their version of the 






It is assumed by my mental health professionals, a priori, that my knowledge and constructions 
of reality are unfounded and obsolete.  The mentally ill cannot be trusted; their opinions are 
invalid.  What makes the production of knowledge so consequential is the power play that it is 
founded on.  As I have already been categorised as subhuman, my knowledge is inconsequential.  
Knowing that I am subhuman everything that comes into my ‘disabled’ mind is largely ignored 
by health professionals.  I suffocate in the desperation to be heard.  I would like my voice heard, 
not judged by the approximately seven noises that I hear or belittled by the mental health 
professionals that essentially have my life in their hands.  I would hope that I have some 
intelligence or some credence of knowledge that I have been socialised into.  How has having a 
mental illness, a schizo illness at that, enculturated, categorised, made (dis)ease and de-
humanised me? 
 
The mentally ill are disempowered, similarly to groups in the present and the past, like women, 
Indigenous peoples, homosexuals, and slaves.  Said (1978) spoke about the concept of the ‘Other’ 
in describing how the West view themselves as having power over the East.  For example, this 
idea relates to how after the World Wars I and II the West effectively drew on maps where they 
thought countries should be, defining and delineating colonies according to their Western 
mandate.   
 
The Other includes the disabled, like the mentally ill. While the mentally ill are classified as 




health professionals have power over the mentally ill.  Us are perceived as having knowledge 
and power over the Other (also a concept developed by Foucault).  
 
There is an air of patronage, superiority and supremacy in the way the mental health staff relate 
to you.  At times they are dismissive and vague, like they are not really listening to you.   At 
other times they are paternalistic, as if they are hearing only what they expect to hear.  The health 
professionals disengage from the plight, the reality of the patient, by not really listening.  They 
only hear what they have to hear to be able to classify the mental illness that the ‘disabled’ person 
is defined as having.   
 
Fortunately, there are some mental health professionals who are committed to improving the 
quality of life of those living with a mentally illness in ways that do show a true desire to listen 
and to hear the mentally ill as people not just patients.  There have been countless times over 
the years of my illness when I feel like I am choked, paralysed and muted, unable to 
communicate to doctors, psychologists and nurses how I am feeling and what I am thinking.  
What is at most an issue is the added marginalisation and subjugation that mental health 






Above is a drawing of Ward A (public).  It is based on Bentham’s model of a prison, where the 
inmates could be monitored efficiently and effectively from within a hub.  All the wards in this 











Day one – a very bad day; a very long day 
 
Five months on...the worst thing ever...the glue has disintegrated....and I’m back to Town B. 
This has really come out of nowhere.  I cannot think of any real cause.  I seemed to have snapped. 
 
This is bad.  This is really really bad. Fuck! 
I’ve lost again. Damn it! 
The world is caving in. I cannot breathe.  Noises are so darn loud.  I cannot escape them.  Stop 
it!!! Get out of my head!!! 
 




One thing at a time Rachael.  Breathe.  One thing at a time. 
 
I need to see Dr P, my GP.  She will help me, look after me.  Past seeing her, I don’t know what 
will happen.  Focus on Dr P.  One thing at a time.  One thing…. 
 
I have managed to drive to the GP.  My GP is four hundred metres down the road, yet it is too 
terrifying to walk the distance in the open spaces – too much stimulation in the wide spaces for 




Walk through the door.   
You can do it. 
Breathe. 
 
I’ve somehow made it to the GP’s surgery.  My body has taken over.  I am shaking; trembling.  
I go to a corner of the waiting room and hide there.  The noises are too much!   I am flinching 





I didn’t think about checking in at reception.  The staff know me and would have taken note.   I 
have been seeing Dr P weekly for a couple of years to manage my mental health. 
 
The noises make up some of the racket.  I am dodging the noises.  They are terrifying me.  Stop 
saying those things!  I am disorientated amidst the noise of deprecating yelling – the noises – and 
the everyday noises of the GP clinic.  I don’t know what to listen to!  What is real?  I dissociate, 
a technique I use to protect myself from these very situations.   
 
I cannot engage with my mind.    I feel so detached from the here and now.   It is like I am 
drowning in air, with the world sweeping, spiralling and crashing in on me, from all and no 
directions at the same time, smothering me, choking me, and overwhelming me from any possible 
escape, completely disorienting me, taking away any sense or comprehension of reality.   
 
Dr P comes out to see me.  I flinch away at the noise that her saying my name makes.  Dr P’s 
voice cuts and pierces through the intensity and screams of the noises.  The impossible task now 
is to make it to her room.  I hold on to the wall as I slowly make my way.  God it’s petrifying!  
So many threats and dangers.  The noises are everywhere.  I am engulfed; captured! 
 
When I finally make it to Dr P’s room, I cower in the corner, I start rocking back and forth and 
chanting something in time (not sure what) to the rocking, hoping to make the noises go away, 




I was lost, but I do remember that seeing Dr P was my best bet at getting rid of this panic, anguish 
and extreme anxiety.  
 
I think Dr P was a little desperate herself.  The way I was acting was definitely in the ‘too hard’ 
basket.  With reflection, I know that she cared about me and was doing everything she could to 
help me.  Dr P rang up the mental health team straight away.  I heard her make this call and 
panicked.  She was negotiating what she should do.  I heard her talk about sectioning me under 
the Mental Health Act (as per the state).  As discussed before, that is when a patient is put under 
care of the State and forced into treatment.  I used to be a nurse working with the mentally ill, so 
I am aware of the system.  My nursing experience both equipped and disarmed me from dealing 
with my mental illness.  Seeing my distress, Dr P assured me that the main reason she was going 
to section me was so that there would be someone looking after me all the time.  She rang the 
ambulance, and after what seemed like a decade, but was really minutes, the ambulance came 
and collected me.  It was terrifying walking with the ambulance officers to the ambulance and 
then strapping myself in, under close guidance from the ambulance officers.  I likened it to 
walking the infamous Green Mile, walking closer to my imminent death. 
 
I was to be transported to the Town B Hospital.  It seemed to me to take hours, when it was really 
a ten-minute trip.  Detachment from time seemed to be symptomatic.  There is no other alternative 
for individuals suffering psychosis in the Town B region.  I had to suck it up, despite my pure 
fear and despair about having to have any association with the Ward B (public).  I was in a state 
of hopelessness and absolute devastation.  Being connected and linked with the Ward B (public) 





When we got to the Emergency Department, I was escorted by the ambulance officers and two 
nurses to a private room.  It was like I was in a medical factory.  There was machinery and 
apparatus everywhere, making beeping and meeping noises that overwhelmed my heightened 
senses.  I paced up and down the room as fast as I could.  This was my attempt to manage the 
stimulation, with exercise and the production of adrenalin.  I was also evaluating the room and 
its threats.   I remember trying to assess the obvious threats to my safety or supposed threat/s at 
least.  I remember feeling very suspicious and guarded about my surrounds.  This was a new 
experience for me, being ill in Town B was very different to the system they have in Town A.  
At this time, I had never been sectioned before, so I was extremely distrustful and dubious.  I felt 
that my life was threatened by the strangers made to look after me.   
 
I was convinced that the people assigned to look after me were looking into my soul, reading my 
mind by looking into my eyes.  As such, I didn’t engage in eye contact.  There were two nurses 
who stayed with me. There was also a security guard.  The guard petrified me; I felt extremely 
paranoid that he was a threat to my safety, and he was ganging up on me with the noises.  I could 
sense his thoughts and his desire to catch me off guard.  I kept hiding from him, behind the 
machinery.  I was panicking.  Seeing how distressed I was with the security guard; the nurses 
asked the security guard to watch me without me seeing him.  I heard all of this and was trying 
to negotiate the obvious conspiracy that was looming.  I remember preparing myself for an attack.  
I doubted the motives of the nurses, and I especially doubted the motives of the security guard.  
How could I be safe when there are all these people creeping up on me to capture me, take control 





The nurses gave me some medication that dissolved on my tongue.  Within ten minutes I began 
to calm down.  The medication was five milligrams of olanzapine – an anti-psychotic.  I was 
given a number of these wafers in this first night, as well as diazepam, to help calm me. 
 
I now had some of my old reliable insight back.  It was always there, somewhere, trying to make 
sense of the foreign world around me.   
 
I was able to sit on the bed in the medical factory room and stay there for a few minutes at a time.  
Yet I was still twitching at the quietest noise.  I did feel less threatened yet remained very 
suspicious and paranoid.  The edge was just taken off. 
 
The mental health clinical nurse consultant came around and examined me for potential risk: to 
self and/or others.  After seeing none, only a horrified shell of a woman, she lifted the section.  
With that, the security guard went away, as did the nurses.  The magical powers of Mental Health 
Clinical Nurse Consultants!  I wonder who grants them this awesome power?  The State.  For 
what reasons?   
 
It seems as if the mental health system is a clinical arm of the State and the State’s bureaucracy, 
creating cultural artefacts/biofacts from various (culture associated) measurements of the 
mentally ill.  This is so that bureaucracy has control over the knowledge generated, and the power 




and medicine.  When you’re in the system - having to get your medication from the Government, 
such as I do because I take Clozapine - you are totally a ward of the State (Biehl 2005; Kleinman 
1980; DiGiacomo 1987; 2010). 
 
I was then escorted to what was obviously a room reserved for the insane.  It was coloured beige 
and had smooth, corner-less couches – the purpose of which is to safe-guard against injury or 
self-harm.  It is interesting that the mentally ill require a room created under such a different 
paradigm of medicine.  The ‘medical factory’ hell I was in at the beginning of my encounter with 
Town B hospital, with its noisy medical technology to measure and cure people, can be compared 
to the beige medical wasteland of mental health.  Here there is no objective technology for 
measurement or cure, and no other intervention or noises discussing my position and plight, other 
than the chaos of what is in my head.    
 
Ironically, it was in this room that I regained some composure.  I decided to contact a couple of 
friends.  My friend A dropped everything and came straight away.  My hopeless boyfriend just 
wanted to be kept informed.  This was mostly due to his sense of shame in having a loopy 
girlfriend who was admitted to Ward B (public).  Ward B (public) is heavily stigmatised in Town 
B.   
 
After what felt like days, the psychiatric registrar came to assess me.  He wanted me to go to the 
dreaded and horrible Ward B (public) I had hoped so much to avoid.  It was known around Town 
as ‘the arse end of the world, where the arse holes congregate’.  The local stigma of mental health 




society’s greatest misfits and deviants.  If there are sub-citizens or subhumans partaking in anti-
social behaviour, they were taken to the Ward B (public).  Anyone who gave the community a 
bad look was expelled via police to Ward B (public).   
 
I did not want to go!  I was adamant!  The registrar was adamant too.  At this point, with the 
release of the section on me, I still felt I had a degree of agency about my own health.  The 
registrar ‘reasoned’ with me.  He negotiated with me, or at least that was what I thought we were 
doing at this stage.  He stated that I needed admission to the Ward B (public) so that I would 
never have to go through this again.  I also needed my medications reviewed.  He said we could 
work together to get me well and keep me well.  Part of the selling point the registrar made was 
that I could smoke there.  I trusted the registrar.  We had reasoned well with each other.  Still 
thinking that it was my choice, I agreed to stay in the Ward B (public) for at least one night, for 
now.  The registrar left, content that I was going to Ward B (public).  
 
Hours passed.  According to my medical notes it had been about eight hours of waiting.  Every 
so often a nurse would pop their head in the door, sometimes accidentally.  Thank God I had 
friend A with me.  I was in desperate need of a friend, someone on my side.  I was suspicious of 
the medical staff.  Paranoia is a huge part of my mental illness repertoire. 
  





Midnight came.  I was escorted to Ward B (public) by two huge security guards, a nurse and a 
psychiatrist.  Four strong and well-equipped adults ready to use their self-defence skills on me in 
case of any threats to safety.   Apparently, I was deemed a threat to someone or something such 
that I require such an escort.  One of the security guards knew me.  He was a boyfriend of a 
friend.  He tried to spark up conversation, somewhat unsuccessfully.  I was focussed on entering 
the locked Ward B (public).  I remember trying to be congenial, for the sake of my reputation.  
Damn!  There is no anonymity in this town!  I cannot hide my failed mental health.  I was 
paranoid that my insanity could affect my trusted friendships.  Mental health is such a stigma, 
placing me in the subhuman category.   I just didn’t want to become an obligation to my friends 
– subhuman becoming subfriend. 
 
I made it to the ward.  There were four locked doors we needed to negotiate.   
I wanted to run away at every turn of lock. 
 
Four.  Oh God! 
Three. Shit! 
Two. Close my eyes. 
One. Close my heart and hope for recovery and freedom. 





The nurse on duty was tired, cold, stern and non-obliging.  It was 12:30am and the ward was 
quiet, except for me.  Apparently, I was shouting.  The nurse took my basic observations – blood 
pressure, temperature, pulse, respirations, and weight.  The registrar had ordered me my usual 
medication (as noted by my GP), as well as some extra medication when needed, ‘prns’ as they 
call them, to calm me down.  I took the medication.  I knew the ramifications and risks of not 
taking the drugs of course - I used to be a mental health nurse.  After I took my medication, the 
night nurse ordered me to go to bed.   
 
My friend A had not yet come with my bed clothes and toiletries.  I wanted to wait till they 
arrived.  The nurse coldly and firmly ordered me to bed again, as if I was in a prison rather than 
a safe environment.  She should know that safety and security are foundations of care, especially 
needed for the psychotic.  As I was to discover later, she had a default punitive manner with 
patients.   
 
I said that I wanted a cigarette.  I knew that it was hospital policy not to smoke on hospital 
grounds.  However, I had a caveat - I repeated what the registrar had said – that this was allowed 
for me.  The registrar then lied – to my face - and stated that he never said that was an option.  I 
couldn’t believe it!  This lie concreted my psychosis for the nurse – I was obviously completely 
loopy, making up conversations.  My reaction definitely warranted her (questionably effective) 
punitive approach.  This angered me.  I said in a loud stern voice that I wanted to leave.  The 
registrar said that if I left, I would be sectioned, or else I could go to the high security forensics 





So, if I stayed, I was accepting the label of uncontrollable lunatic, hearing untruths from doctors.  
Or else if I tried to leave, I would be sectioned.  Either way I was imprisoned at Ward B (public), 
completely disempowered and demoralised.  There was nothing therapeutic about the nurse’s 
dealings with me, or in the pretence that the registrar entrapped me.  To appease me, the nurse 
offered me a (plastic) cup of warm milk.  I was more humiliated and concretely labelled a sub-
citizen/subhuman/social misfit without self-determination or free choice.  Psychiatry is unlike 
other forms of medicine.  As Szasz states (1970: xxiii), “In the changing attitudes towards 
witchcraft, modern psychiatry was born as a medical discipline”. Psychiatric patients are 
assumed a priori as lacking and unable to rationalise or negotiate their own treatment.  Psychiatry 
deals with the whole of the patient and not just the biomedical facets.  For example, psychiatry 
claims to concern itself with the risk of loss of reputation – the whole of the person.    
 
My friend A, the darling that she is, finally made it to the ward with my stuff.  It was about 2am 
by this time.  She couldn’t enter the ward due to high security.  I wasn’t allowed to see her.  I had 
to wait till visiting hours.  That was the ironic nail in what felt like a coffin, fastening me to this 
seemingly punitive treatment at Ward B (public).  Friendship with darling A was more 
therapeutic to me than a plastic cup of milk – yet this was being controlled and limited.  She told 





The nurse admitting me took all my belongings from me.  Below is a list of my confiscated 
belongings: 
• Handbag containing: 
o Wallet containing various cards, including Visa, student card, health care 
membership card, bank key card, Medicare card, driver’s licence 
o Coin purses 
o Memory stick 
o Half a packet of cigarettes 













o Pocket mirror 
o Bandaid 
 
From reading my medical notes from that first night, I found out that the nurse admitting me 
thought that I was not capable of comprehending at least a third of the admitting paperwork.  I 
was apparently too confused and verging on aggression and could not be reasoned with.  This 
was her reality, mine was that I was defeated by a lying registrar and devastated that I had lost 
another battle with insanity. 
 
My friend bought me three chocolate bars when she dropped my things off at Ward B (public).  
The admitting nurse did not allow me to have these chocolate bars.  The next day, a more 





It is hard for me to believe that I was incapable of going through the processes of being admitted.  
What I did find to be the case was that I was patronised by a registrar lying to get me to come to 
Ward B (public) and a nurse who is focussed on managing behaviour not treating psychosis.  I 
was very, very unwell, but I am really, really not completely stupid (or I would hope to believe).  
I have insight to my illness, unusual insight.  I was 23 when I was first diagnosed, I’ve lived with 
my illness for long enough to know when I am being patronised. 
 
Day two – a rude awakening 
 
Upon waking the next morning, I realised that my worst nightmare had come true.  I really was 
an inpatient in Ward B (public).  I was now committed to be in a ward that I had run away from 
five months earlier.  How the hell did this happen?  I thought I was smart enough to negotiate the 
mental health system and find it therapeutic.  I thought I had some power, some rights to self-
determination.  It seems that I have been treated as I would have been centuries ago.  Punished 
for being a heretic; punished for being mentally ill.  My voice had been muffled and silenced.  
My freedom shackled.  (Somewhat congruent with the Silenced Manifesto.) 
 
I don’t think I have ever felt more alone, helpless, powerless and ostracised before in my life.  I 
was terrified, imprisoned by my psychosis and imprisoned by my horror that I was actually an 
inpatient of Ward B (public).  My psychosis amplified my terror.  The walls were caving in on 




– a single bed and a bed side table.  There was also a small built-in robe.  The furniture edges 
were rounded and padded to eliminate the temptation of self-harm.  The colours in the room, 
beneath the stains and dirt, were beige and pale green.  The walls were covered in graffiti.   The 
bolted shut tinted windows had satanic messages scratched into them.  One that was repeated a 
few times, for purposes of clarity perhaps, said ‘Die you fuck!’  In the ensuite was grime that 
seemed to have festered there for years.  The water in the shower was tepid only, again for the 
purpose of minimising self-harm.  With all these precautionary ‘decorating’ features, it was hard 
to imagine how one could be healed and grow in such an environment.  I remember comparing 
the conditions to inmates in prison (through a work project), wondering if prison was more 
supportive of the socially unwell than the mentally unwell in Ward B (public), both populations 
defined as misfits.  
 
I was panicking, petrified! How do I get out of here?  It all seemed like a whirlwind of horror, 
my sense of reality and grounding spinning out of rational control.  I was trying to deal with 
psychosis and negotiate the health professionals at the same time.  It was too much for me.  I 
recall the events of the night before, my first minutes of being in this ward.  I couldn’t believe it!  
Dr: “You will be a voluntary inpatient.”  Me: “Good.  I’ll leave then!”  Dr: “If you leave, I will 
section you.”  Me: “So I have no choice!  I am stuck here!”   I panicked!  I recall the nurse’s 
paternalistic and derogative tone, the registrar plainly lying to me, making me seem crazier, 
making stuff up.  Dr: “You are a voluntary patient.” Either way I was to be admitted. 
 
That first morning I hid in my room, behind the bed.  There was a knock on the door.  It alarmed 




sort of like being slapped on the face.  The person behind the door knock was a nurse telling me 
that breakfast was ready.  I would have to come out of my room into what was called the dining 
room.   
 
The Ward B (public) looked different in day light.  I walked out of my room with the nurse, my 
door was to be locked for the day, so the nurse told me.  I walked with my head down, scared 
stiff of the sight of my new surroundings.  I still to this day walk and sit with my head down, my 
body slouched.  Hiding?  The world was spinning.  I felt like I was going to implode with fear.  
I tried to take in all in.  My noises were loud.  I was finding it extremely difficult to process what 
was happening.  It seemed like a horrible, surreal nightmare!  Panicking again, I was finding it 
hard to breath.  I was stifled with the plethora of stimulation to process. 
 
I laid low that first day on the ward, doing my best not to communicate with anyone.  It was best 
that I do that, minimise any potential damage, or other interactions with cranky nurses or lying 
registrars. 
 
Day three – they’re watching me 
 
Third day and, despite still being suspicious, I was well enough to take in the layout of the ward, 
even though it was explained to me yesterday.  It was based on like a hub and spoke model, 
where all corridors spread out in arms from the nurses’ hub in the middle.  The ward consisted 




was locked and secure.  It reminded me of architecture described by Foucault - Bentham’s 
Panopticon.  The Panopticon was designed by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832).  It is a tower from 
which wards men, doctor, teacher, or foreman can spy on and penetrate behaviour.  The subjects 
under surveillance never know quite when they are being watched, and so effectively police 
themselves (Horrocks and Jevtic 2004: 118).   
 
Patients in Ward B (public) could speak to staff through a small slit in the glass of the hub and 
voice their concerns.  With the staff hub at the centre, with views across the ward of the lounge 
room and dining room were like spokes.  Off the dining room was the courtyard.  Morning 
meetings were held in the lounge room.  There was a TV in the lounge room, which was 
monitored and not left on during the day when patients were to be attending activities.  The 
activities room was through one of the locked doors, opened for patients at set times during the 
day.  Patients were encouraged to participate.  The activities room was the litmus test for good 
mental health and looming discharge.  If you were seen to go and participate, and remain 
congenial, then you were successful in playing the power game with the staff.  It seems odd to 
me that one’s wellness depends on your ability to make a bead necklace or to ride on an exercise 
bike.  Wellness is dependent on health cultural artefacts – technologies/apparatus, and they may 
be gendered.  These skills, to me at least, do not equip the mentally ill with tools to attain and 
maintain rehabilitation and be an active, fruitful member the community.  Skills and tools are 
needed to manage good health.  The non-biomedical tools I use to manage my own good health 
are dissociation, mindfulness meditation, yoga, good diet and exercise, talking therapies, and 





There were twenty rooms and about twenty-five patients.  The other patients in the ward were so 
publicly unwell that the ward seemed like a showing at Bedlam, a little bit like a madhouse of 
old.  And here I was, one of these madmen!  The stigma of Ward B (public) was genuine and 
true.  To add to my paranoia, I noticed that there were security cameras covering the whole ward.  
Whether it was a hospital policy to have cameras throughout all the wards, I did not know.  I was 
too paranoid to comprehend. 
 
I was trying to focus on what the nurse was saying, despite the noises and sensations engulfing 
me in a crushing world.  I recalled that the ward was not that unfamiliar to me.  Years before I 
worked casual shifts for a nursing agency.  I worked some shifts in this ward.  I remember how 
chaotic and disorderly the ward was.  I remember the nurses’ frustration with the patients.  Some 
nurses even seemed to resent an unwell patient for making their shift that much more difficult, 
as if monitoring someone for suicide risk was a hassle.  The ward seemed to me to be a turbulent 
and tumultuous social creature, whereby the hierarchy of medical staff breathed the breath of 
punitive treatment and behaviour management into the patients.  
 
As I have mentioned, I worked for a mental health non-government organisation.  One of my 
clients in that organisation was now in Ward B (public).  She was oblivious to me being there, 
sleeping most of the time on the ward couches.  She is the definition of recidivism; someone who 
rarely, if ever, recovers.  Other patients, apart from the ones yelling, pretty much kept to 
themselves, although it was clearly visible that these people were unwell.  For example, those 






Day four – learning to play 
 
Ironically, the medical hierarchy who assume such power and authority as to imprison someone 
against their will, themselves have little to rely on and validate their roles and work on the 
questionable medical ‘facts’ of modern psychiatry.  These facts validate the mental health 
professionals’ hierarchy.  Facts and knowledge go hand in hand with power. 
 
The Ward B (public) staff can be defined as demi-gods, they are so outstanding and powerful in 
this context that they are close to the divine.  The hierarchy of power in the ward goes as follows: 
the highest demi-god is the psychiatrist, then the psychiatric registrar, medical intern, clinical 
nurse consultant, senior nurses, junior nurses and enrolled nurses.  Then what Foucault (1967) 
calls the underdogs - subhumans, the patients – the plebs.  The medical staff decree that the 
patients deserve little to no power.  The only way the patients can gain power is to obey the staff 
and their own visions around what constitutes therapy, like their vision about the power of craft.   
 
Otherwise, and not uncommonly, the patients are deemed as misfits, unfit for society.  Perhaps 
these misfits are unable to look after themselves.  They go against the norm; so much so that they 
are deemed incompetent and incapable to manage their mental health.   
 
According to SANE Australia (2017), a national mental health charity, there are circumstances 




be legally compelled to receive treatment — medication and/or therapy — without your 
consent.  This isn’t rare: in 2014–15, just under a third of all mental health-related stays in 
Australian hospitals with specialised psychiatric care were involuntary.  The laws covering 
involuntary hospitalisation vary from state to state, but generally, you can only be hospitalised 
involuntarily if you’re judged to meet all of the following criteria: you have a mental illness; 
you need treatment; and you can’t make a decision about your own care.  Plus one or both of 
these criteria: you are considered to be a danger to your own safety; you are considered to be a 
danger to someone else’s safety (SANE Australia 2017). 
 
Interestingly enough, and an example of marginalisation in one territory, the Northern Territory, 
52% of admissions to mental health inpatient facilities are Indigenous (Department of Health 
2014) and only 18% of all inmates are voluntary.  The estimated number of involuntary 
admissions has been increasing steadily (Anti-Discrimination Commission n.d.). 
  
I had yet to learn the power play apparent in the ward, such that I could claw my way back to 
freedom.  The ward was completely un-therapeutic.  I was to find that Ward B (public) was a 
parent State.  I had to obey the staff and heed to their power structure, otherwise I would become 
a ‘ward of [this] State’.  I had to play the game.  
 
Ward B (public) aims to manage and assimilate their social misfits and deviants so that they may 
be situated and developed to be a part of the community. The only methods deemed efficacious 




the forensic ward and loss of all freedom – this ward is already a locked ward, but the forensic 
ward has even stricter security.     
 
Day five - smoke and power 
  
Values of self-determination, empowerment and agency - all essential for therapeutic healing 
from mental illness – were dead here.  I was choking, gagging.  My spirit was rotting.  I was 
dying. 
 
Punitive action often trumped therapeutic action.  I remember watching an encounter between a 
nurse and an Aboriginal patient, not an unusual encounter.  The patient wanted a cigarette and 
was getting extremely anxious because he was told he could not have one.  The nurse suggested 
he use a nicotine substitute.  The patient was getting more and more agitated.  The nurse was 
getting more and more angry.  The nurse was getting more and more patronising too, speaking 
in slower simpler language, despite the patient speaking perfect English.  It seemed that when it 
came down to it, ‘therapeutic support’ on the ward was actually simply behaviour management.   
Behaviour management, in a child-like State, was simply about belittling the ones that need 
support the most; about disempowering the already disempowered; about disarming the ones that 
most need the resources to keep them well, taking away any form of self-determination possible.  
The staff on Ward B (public), seemed to be concerned more with behaviour management then 





Day six – a day in the margins 
 
Having been a nurse working in mental health, I was probably better equipped than other patients 
about the inside knowledge of psychiatry, and about what is considered therapeutic care, albeit 
appropriate care at a minimum standard.   
 
That is what makes the tragedy greater.  If you are an Aboriginal person, you are already 
marginalised in society.  Just as it is not uncommon to be marginalised by the dominant 
population, it is not uncommon for Aboriginal inpatients at Ward B (public) to be further 
marginalised.  For example, Ward B (public)’s inpatients can also be socialised within a certain 
ethnicity, disability, race, sexual orientation or some other category of sub-citizen.  I remember 
watching the other patients, most of them were Aboriginal.  Many of the patients from remote 
communities had an escort with them, usually a relative   They were often cowering in the lounge 
area, playing music (if permitted) or hiding from themselves and others throughout the ward.  
Those who were well on the route of recovery were engaging with the craft program and the 
exercise program.  Recovery meant the same for everyone, that is, making beaded necklaces and 
completing three minutes on the exercise bike.  I managed to make my niece a necklace but failed 
at the exercise rehabilitation method.  
 





0530hrs Wake and read novel 
0700hrs Breakfast 
0845hrs Ward meeting 
0900hrs Group activities in gym. 
See health professionals as required 
1200hrs Lunch.  Bedroom unlocked till lunch is over 
1300hrs Group activities in gym 
1500 – 2000hrs Visitors allowed 
1730hrs Dinner 
1830hrs  Free time 
2130hrs Bed 
 
There is some flexibility in the schedule.  I spent a lot of time relaxing and contemplating in the 
courtyard.  I also spent a lot of time reading and writing.  If I had my wits about me earlier, I 
would have realised that the quickest way out of the ward was to do what the nurses wanted you 
to do, which is to participate in group work.   
 
I have never found any extensive peer reviewed evidence supporting group work as being so 
important, nor how group work is supposed to fit in so well with the culture of the inpatient 




work.  It seems that group work relates to the symbols and semantics of an apparent or assumed 
culture of healing, and there is a power associated with that.  The staff stand behind these 
symbols and use them to protect themselves.  I wondered if I was being marginalised because I 
did not participate in group work enough.  
 
Day seven – out of mind, out of sight 
 
I felt alienated and alone, like I was wrongly imprisoned.  I was not like the other patients.  I was 
functioning within the economy.  I had a job, family, boyfriend, friends, a place of study, a secure 
home.  Amongst other patients, many lacked basic hygiene, unable to wash their hair let alone 
comb it.  They wore the same clothes day in and day out.  I don’t know why this is.  Perhaps it 
was because they didn’t have any other clothes, or couldn’t afford them, or perhaps because they 
had no family or friends that could bring them some clothes.  Or perhaps wearing clean clothes 
was not a priority for them.  I guess that personal grooming and presentation becomes less of a 
priority once you are categorised as sub-citizen and a social misfit.  I think most likely that they 
were defined as social misfits, not belonging anywhere, categorised as sub-citizens, not being in 
the right place and not accepted within the wider community.   
 
Being a social misfit, deviant and sub-citizen is part and parcel of the socio-cultural identity of 
being an inpatient of this ward.  We are shamefully hidden from the community, ignored by the 
public, ignored by those that love you the most.  My boyfriend could only manage a quick visit 
once, because of the huge stigma associated with the place.  Ward B (public) was part of local 




community image serene.  It was general consensus in Town B, as an example, that ‘anti-social 
behaviour’, is behaviour deemed as inappropriate and unacceptable by the broader community, 
was caused and instigated at least in part by the mentally ill (Department of Health 2014). 
 
There is a desire to hide the mentally ill, they are not pretty, they are not pleasant to listen to.  
The mentally ill should be put somewhere out of sight.  There are not many options for hiding 
mentally ill sub-citizens. A public ward is the only option in many cases.  The ward also, 
temporarily, assists with the problem of homelessness of these misfits.  They are tied to many 
social and social welfare issues, signifying and highlighting the failure of society.  They do not 
belong anywhere (for example, so is the case of the Northern Territory Government Department 
of Health, Northern Territory Mental Health Service Strategic Plan 2015 – 2021).  This kind of 
provision of shelter for misfits is not a long-term solution.  In this system, misfits have no place, 
not even in the outskirts of society.    
 
From a Marxist perspective, the severely mentally ill are considered to be non-contributing 
members of the community.  Although there are now organisations that support the mentally ill 
in finding and keeping employment, there are those considered grossly disabled by their mental 
illness and unable to work.  There is seemly not a place for the mentally ill in the workings of 
our economy.  Their economic role is passive and dependent of the social welfare of the State for 
survival.  For several years after I was first diagnosed, I was seen as unfit to get a job and keep a 
job.  During these years, I did not contribute to the functioning of the economy.  I did not own or 




because I did not have an active role in the economy. The disabled mentally ill are wards of the 
State.    
 
Day eight – code switch 
 
I wanted to limit my engagement with anything that would lead me to form an attachment with 
the ward experience.  
  
At first, I was (passively) hostile to the nurses at Ward B (public), mirroring their hostility to me.  
Then I realised that I had to learn how to engage with the hierarchy of ward staff.  They were my 
ticket out of here.   
 
Mental health professionals say that they shy away from both strict diagnosis and one size fits 
all treatment.  I have heard them say that mental health is a kaleidoscopic phenomenon to which 
there is no one answer or ‘truth’ in treatment.  “Madness has in our age become some sort of lost 
truth” (Foucault 1967: vii).  Ironic again that truth is relative to the socialised illness of the 
individual.  Mental health is in fact perhaps the most postmodern of all Western medicines.  There 
is not an exact method.  There is not an exact truth, but fluid truths.  It is relative to the pathology, 





Day nine – pharmaceutical play time 
 
I counted nine times when the nurses made mistakes with my medication.  I questioned these 
mistakes, and I was quickly silenced.   The head nurse assured me that the mistakes were 
harmless.  Only four of these medication mishaps were documented in my medical notes. 
 
On one occasion, the nurse was dispensing medication on her trolley with the drug charts open, 
I read on my medication chart that I was prescribed an injection used to calm the typical violent 
inpatient.  I questioned this prescription, as completely unnecessary and totally out of character 
for me, I was told that it was protocol.  All patients were assumed to be a threat to the ‘calm’ 
functioning of the ward.  This prescription protocol defined the inpatient fundamentally and a 
priori as a threat, the focus being on the lacking and deficit of the patient, not the potential and 
strength to heal.  Every measure was taken to guard and protect, not heal and support.  I was so 
frustrated by the derogative and patronising manner of the nurse that I started crying in despair.  
The nurse then snapped at me, saying “For goodness sake Rachael, if you’re going to cry, go to 
your room!  You’re upsetting people!”  (Ironic, because we weren’t allowed to spend time in our 
rooms during the day.)  Another nurse then spoke to me.  I explained to him how this attitude is 
not empowering or therapeutic in the slightest, and that many of the nurses were burnt out and 
jaded.  This nurse ignored the gravity of what I was saying, stating that all the nurses work here 
because they are nurturing and caring towards others.  It was obvious that the nurses’ closed 





On another occasion, the nurse distributing medication didn’t have my correct dosage of 
Quilonum.  The nurse wrote in my notes, “During 2000hrs drug administration patient had an 
order of 900mg and I administered Quilonum modified release 250mg x 3 and patient refused 
the other half to make it to 875mg...”  I would expect that a psychiatric ward would stock a 
common drug such as Quilonum.  A following nursing note stated that I was ‘surly and sullen’ 
and difficult to engage with.  When asked if I was okay I stated, “How could I be okay here? 
This place is horrible!”  Apparently, I was mildly verbally abusive to the nurse administering the 
medication, who tried to give me Quilonum from the stock that she had.  I was given the wrong 
medication.  The smaller size Quilonum would have been acceptable, but this was important 
because I had always had it drummed into me that it was important to keep my Quilonum levels 
stable (as measured in blood tests).  According to my medical notes, a risk assessment was 
completed, and the doctor was informed.   
 
Another interesting note was that the psychiatrist clearly stated, and even underlined the order in 
my notes, that I was not be given diazepam (Valium).  Yet that same day, I was given 10mg by 
a nurse, which I accepted, but not to my knowledge did I take Valium.  A further medication 
mishap was that I was withheld my dose of Prothiaden as there was none in stock on the Ward.  
The impact of these medication mishaps meant that they played havoc with my self-confidence 
and self-belief.  I was encouraged to believe that what the staff said was gospel.  As such, I 
perpetuated my given label as stupid and lacking and unable to negotiate my own health.  The  






Day Ten – Splitting Personalities 
 
It appears, from my medical notes, that some of the Ward B (public) nurses believed I 
exaggerated and exacerbated my psychotic signs and symptoms when I thought I was being 
watched.  Below are some observations from some nurses: 
“Has spent a lot of time talking on phone, paranoid at times, jerking bodily movements 
exacerbated when anxious or in view.” 
“Jerking movements not visible when alone or with visitors, more exaggerated when being 
observed.” 
“Body movements, left hand shaking, eyes darting suspiciously around, and jumped as if to get 
a fright displayed during discussion with Rachael, however writer observed her texting on her 
phone, watching TV for a long period of time with nil body movements seen.” 
 
Stemming from my supposed exacerbated signs and symptoms, the nurses started to note how I 
was ‘staff splitting’.  This means that I played the nurses off each other.  Like a child who is not 
able to get what she wants from one parent, so they go to the other parent for better luck.  A quote 
from the medical notes is below: 
 “Rachael became very teary and upset with the medication nurse this am after discussing prn 
medication.  Rachael then stated that this space is not good for her mental health...staff splitting 





The reference to hospital policy was regarding my defiance to accept the medication prescriptions 
policy.  Here I would like to note the power of bureaucracy and how the strength of the magical 
red tape, and the seemingly ritual practice of ward governance, supports hospital treatment.  
There is a schism between bureaucracy and what happens on the psychiatric ward.  Often 
different languages are used.  Often misrepresenting what is meant between Ward B (public) and 
hospital policy.  For example, there is a hospital policy to rehabilitate Ward B (public) patients 
where possible, but I did not hear about any goals of rehabilitation until the day before I left. 
 
Day eleven – tensions over the fruit loops 
 
I was considered defiant by staff.   
 
Here in this locked public psychiatric ward ‘management issues’ seemed to be a focal point.  
Note that the management issues are regarding behaviour not so much signs and symptoms.  It 
seems, through reading my medical notes from the Ward B (public), that I displayed some of my 
own management issues.    
One nurse noted, “She [Rachael] refused to participate in unit activities”.  [Yet in the afternoon] 
“maintained a high profile in gym doing craft”. 
 
One incident that was not written about in the notes occurred during breakfast on day eleven.  I 
didn’t want to mingle or socialise with any other inpatients or staff, so I took my bowl of cereal 




and helped me gain some stillness within this otherwise horrific experience.  My solace was short 
lived.  Again, what I thought could and should be promoted as a therapeutic environment was 
not the case.  A nurse told me, quite roughly, that I had to eat my breakfast inside at the dining 
table.  I asked “Why?  I like it outside.  It clears my head.”  The nurse said, “You just have to!”  
I asked calmly, mainly because I didn’t understand and was curious as to her reasoning, “But 
why?  It is obvious that eating in the courtyard makes me feel better, and this ward exists to make 
the mentally ill feel better.”  The nurse responded, “You just have to eat in here.  It is the rule 
and the policy!” I stated that I would like to see such policy.  It was obvious that our banter 
wasn’t going anywhere, so once again I acquiesced and continued to play the game.  
 
Day twelve – rehabilitation?  
 
The only way I could retain some self-respect during my admission was to employ my skills as 
an anthropologist. As did DiGiacomo (1987), I started to unpack what I was seeing around me, 
what I was experiencing and how people were relating to each other.  I observed negotiations of 
power, which defined the mentally ill as colonised (Smith 1999).   
 
In Ward B (public), the colonialist parent State clearly confines and defines the inpatient as in 
need of prescribed direction.  The patient cannot have agency.  The only means for ‘recovery and 
rehabilitation’ is to play the game, pander to the nurses of note, don’t say anything that is in 
defiance to the biomedical model, be subservient.  Once I accepted my subservient role and 
played the ‘game of recovery’, in complete compliance with the nursing staff, I began to be 





At the end of my admission, I had an appointment with the rehabilitation nurse.  I raised my 
perceptions of the ‘game of recovery’ to this specialist nurse.  I told her that I felt disempowered 
rather than empowered by my experience in the ward.  I went on to say that I hadn’t heard the 
word ‘empowerment’, ‘rehabilitation’, or any other such hopeful words in conversations in the 
ward.  I explained how my time in the Ward B (public) was despairing.  She was shocked, and 
started to say that it couldn’t be so, as if to say, “surely it couldn’t have been that bad?”  I had to 
convince her of the reality of my experience of this culture shock rehabilitation?’  The resources 
I had to rehabilitate were my own, developed by me with support from loved ones and intelligent 
ones.  If anything, Ward B (public) disarmed me.   
 
Discharge – thank God! 
 
On the day I was discharged from Ward B (public), I was released with a change in medication.  
I was back on olanzapine, 10mg in the morning, and 15mg at night.  I had been weaned off the 
quetiapine and was still taking a little diazepam.  (I was to be prescribed more drugs once I started 
taking Clozapine.)   
 
The discharge notes summarised my reason for admission.  Let me quote: 
“Referred by GP after she presented with extreme distress, saying that she is not safe and that 
she cannot control her thoughts and the thoughts are taking over.  Rachael tended to engage in 




hallucinations, only varying in intensity.  They were critical and distressing.  She presented to 
the Emergency Department today around 1535hrs.  She had 10mg of olanzapine which she said 
helped her with the voices a little bit.  She says she hasn’t been feeling well after her recent 
medication change post discharge from [Ward A (public)] (Admission in October 2012).  The 
auditory hallucinations have increased and became more distressing over the last few days.  On 
reviewing Rachael, she was very distressed and appeared to be responding to internal stimuli.”   
 
My admission Mental State Examination was as follows: 
“Appearance: 39-year-old Caucasian lady, appropriately dressed and groomed.  Appeared very 
distressed and responding to internal stimuli. 
Behaviour: No eye contact, was constantly hyper vigilant, looking towards the corners.  
Appeared paranoid and suspicious. 
Speech: Normal tone and volume.  Slightly pressured. 
Thought form: No FTD (Formal Thought Disorder) 
Thought content: Very distressed by the noises in the Emergency Department and voices of 
people talking to her over the last few days.  Paranoid and distressed.  Didn’t want to be admitted 
to Ward B (public) initially as she thinks it is a ‘scary madhouse’.   
Perception: Admits to auditory hallucinations over the last few days, sometimes of people talking 
to her and making derogatory comments of ‘how much of a crappy person she is’.  Says she’s 
been hypersensitive to noises and music as well.  Says certain beats on radio music sounded like 
‘codes’.  Denies that the voices are telling her to harm herself or others. 




Insight: Good insight into her illness and her medication changes.  She’s aware that she needs to 
commence on a different anti-psychotic [medication]. 
Judgement: Reasonable.” 
 
My progress whilst in hospital was as quoted below: 
“Rachael was admitted and commenced on olanzapine again.  Her quetiapine dose has also 
decreased gradually throughout the admission.  She was kept on 2.5mg diazepam nocte.  Her 
mental state improved throughout the admission.  She wanted to be followed up by her GP and 




My admission to Ward B (public) was more detrimental to me than being an outpatient.  As an 
outpatient, I would have been managed without as high a degree of stigma.  As an inpatient, I 
was treated and defined as a subhuman.  Relationships I had were damaged from me being an 
inpatient at Ward B (public) - it was that much of a stigma.  There was not a culture of 
rehabilitation in the ward.  Instead, the care was somewhat punitive, addressing behaviour issues 
rather than treating the patient’s health holistically.  
 
I had my last meeting with the registrar.  I hadn’t forgiven him from lying to me about smoking 




at Ward B (public), I carried around a little green suitcase with me – a handbag.  When he asked 
me why I carried my little green suitcase around with me, I told him that it was because we 
weren’t allowed in our rooms during the day, and I wanted to carry my books with me. The other 
patients didn’t seem to have the same need to carry their own little green suitcases of books.  
Obviously crazy behaviour! 
 
 
Above is the panopticon version of Ward B - Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon (late 18h century).  
The sociological effect in the context of this thesis is that the mentally ill patients are aware of 
the presence of authority at all times, a system of control without knowing how they are being 






WARD THREE: WARD C (PRIVATE) 
 
JUNE 2015  
 
I returned to live and study in Town A in August 2014.  It was about a year on.   
 
Things just haven’t been good in the last few weeks.  The noises are getting louder, unbearable!  
They keep saying things like, “You stupid idiot!”, “Who is ever going to like you, let along spend 
time with you?”, “You m’ose well die now and stop annoying everyone!”, “Die you stupid bitch 
die!”  The noises talk over each, shouting coming from all directions.  Different voices, 
penetrating.  At least they don’t give me details of how I should degrade myself or die. 
 
I’m super paranoid, not knowing what is real and what isn’t.  I’ve been trying to hold it together.  
Damn it!  I hate losing!  My anxiety is through the roof!  I’m having panic attack after panic 
attack.  It is unbearable, intense.   I am being crushed.  I can’t breathe with the overwhelming 





I had some good years, but these last two years have been terrible.  All the tools and techniques 
I have developed over the years are no use to me now.  I used to be able to control my anxiety 
with meditation, mindfulness, healthy lifestyle, breath awareness and control, cognitive 
behavioural therapy (although I’m not a big fan) and sometimes avoidance.  Avoidance is not 
considered a useful technique to battle anxiety as it negates the cause and solution. 
  
When I was not able to figure out what was real and what was not real, I could ask close friends 
and family – “Is that real?”, “Did you hear that?”, “Is that person looking at me?”  Managing my 
psychosis was definitely made bearable by the support and feedback given to me by my loved 
ones.  I could tell I was getting more unwell if I had stopped trusting my loved ones.  Then the 
paranoia increased.  My psychiatrist in Town A believes that my anxiety is linked to my 
psychosis. 
 
I’ve rung the mental health team to make an emergency appointment with my psychiatrist.  I 
have made an appointment for tomorrow.   
 
Tomorrow has come and somehow, I manage to drive there okay.  I lose it though once I get to 
the mental health service.  “What?” “What was that?” “Who is that?”.  Screaming and blaring in 
my head, ear splitting, deafening me.  “Who do I listen to?” “Who is real?” “What is real?”  
Again, when I get unwell, the world crashes in on me!  I can just remember the seemingly loud 
noise of the elevator, and of people getting in.  I could feel the penetrating eyes of the other 
people in the small elevator, looking at me, scrutinising and piercing their sight right through my 




always try and make an effort to dress well and put on make-up – counteracting the possible 
visual stigma.  This sometimes confuses people into thinking I am an employee not a client.   
 
I am mostly insightful.  When I am well, I can recognise my qualities and purpose.  I am usually 
calm and even keeled – many years of taking Quilonum.  I have a silly but mostly black sense of 
humour, coming from years of working in aged care.  I have a strong sense of loyalty to family 
and friends and I would do anything for those I love.  I am ambitious and meticulous, painstaking, 
fastidious, and thorough.  I am also patient and tolerant, persistent and stubborn, and this is why 
I mostly win my battles.   
 
Many people who meet me are shocked when I disclose to them about my schizoaffective 
disorder.  Not that I tell people generally, but sometimes, rarely, it comes up.  I actually hate 
disclosing.  Often employers demand that I tell them.  I’m not sure if this should be permitted, 
whether it is their right to know about something very private for me.  I can understand the need 
for managers to be able to look out for the interests of their staff, but it is a basic human right to 
retain security.   As per section 25, part I of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Assembly 
1948, “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
him/herself, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary services, and the 
right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age, or other 
lack of likelihood in circumstances beyond his/her control” (My emphasis). 
 
With regard to feeling secure with my disability, I need to feel safe and comfortable in living 





Doctor T, my psychiatrist, comes out to the waiting area.  Hearing her voice “Rachael”, startles 
me away from the noises’ deadly repertoire, and my great efforts to silence them.  I get up slowly, 
and timidly walk with the doctor, my head hung low.  The doctor asks, “Do you mind if we have 
a student doctor sit in on us today?”  This freaked me out!  I fearfully started to ask the doctor 
about whether the student could look into and read my soul when she saw me.  Doctor T knew 
not to push the matter, and when we arrived at her room, she asked the student to leave.  I asked, 
“Is she angry with me?  “She saw into my soul, didn’t she?!”  “She’ll come after me now and 
punish me!  That’s what they [the noises] say.” 
 
I sat down on the chair.  It had started again.  I started cowering and trying to hide myself 
somehow within the limits of the chair.  I was tapping again too, tapping my fingers against the 
chair arm, against my face, my head.  The sense of touch was the only way I knew how to centre 
myself.  Touch seemed real.   
 





Bloody hell!   
 
It seems that I am going through another psychotic episode.   
 
Damn!!  Usually I can handle the milder psychotic episodes, but this one is beyond my control.  
I have won the fight against many, many psychotic episodes over many, many years, but there 
are some I cannot manage.  I cannot master this one.  I need a hospital stay to get back on track: 
to control my anxiety, my psychosis causing anxiety; manage my paranoia; address my cognitive 
functioning disabilities; cement a healthy diet and exercise regime including meditation and 




paramount.  I need to trust and believe in my thoughts and thought processes.  If I don’t have 
control of my thoughts, I cannot be an academic or a policy advisor or even a giraffe breeder. 
 
Doctor T asked me, “Has anything happened?  What has changed?”  “I don’t know, don’t know, 
don’t...” I said.    Looking at me, seeing how fragile and unstable I was, Doctor T said that I 
needed to be in hospital.   
 
I don’t know why I became unwell again.  There isn’t always a reason.  There was no apparent 
reason this time.  However, now I was having a relapse, a psychotic episode, causing incredible 
anxiety.  My psychiatrist wanted me to go to hospital.  My medication needed adjusting.  Doctor 
T started ringing the psychiatric wards in Town A.  There were no beds available right away, so 
I was put on priority listing.  The helpful thing was that I now had full private insurance which 
essentially increased my chances of receiving care.   
  
My boyfriend at the time, with the help of the community mental health nurses, took me home, 
a safe place, to wait until we received notice of a spare bed in any hospital.  John, my boyfriend, 
looked after me that night.  A community nurse came by to check up on me and give me 
medication.  It was a waiting game.  I remember feeling disassociated, detached from reality, 
disconnected from the world and being in it.  I was distant, not belonging anywhere, frightened 





I think my boyfriend felt the same in many ways.  He had never had a crazy girlfriend before, let 
alone one that had to be hospitalised.  He didn’t know quite what to do with me or say to me.  
That makes two of us, although I’ve had twenty more years experience with it. I was very worried 
and concerned about John.  He is very resilient and strong.  He was at first supportive.   
 
It is sometimes very difficult for people conversing with me to get any sense from me.  When I 
talk it is tangential and all over the place, finding it almost impossible to follow a conversation 
with clarity and direction.  For example, a group of friends could be talking seriously and clearly 
about buying motorbikes, when the next sentence from me will be about dentistry, a completed 
and unrelated topic, but seemingly logical to me.  Sometimes I must explain my thought 
processes to friends because they are confused and don’t understand my flow of cognition and 
communication.   My memory and my ability to contain knowledge has been diminished. I often 
have to ask the same questions half a dozen times in a few minutes.  The chop and change in 
conversation makes it complicated, gruelling and confusing for others.  Then there is the issue of 
me not hearing what is being said, partly because of the noises in my head taking up so much 
capacity adding to my confusion.  
 
I remember feeling uncertain of how John might react.  He hadn’t in the past understood when I 
tried to explain my schizoaffective disorder it to him.  It is different to describe common mental 
health disorders, like depression, which seem easier for people to relate to, understand and 
therefore deal with.  This makes it even more confusing and scary to describe uncommon and 




disorder, with very little luck.  The book I found was directed at young children.  The DSM-V 
would have been too confronting. 
 
While waiting for a hospital admission, we decided to watch some movies, to bide the time away. 
John annoyingly banned me from watching horror films – just in case I get any ideas while I’m 
having a psychotic episode.  As if I could be influenced by Jack Nicholson’s part in ‘The 
Shining’. 
 
Somehow, I got to sleep that night... I’m not sure if John did. 
 
In the morning, at about 9am, I received a call from Ward C (private), the administrative wing 
of the Ward C (private), stating that they had a spare bed for me, and could I please come in at 
1300hrs.  And so, we did.      
 
I remember arriving at the private psychiatric ward, Ward C (private), at 1300hrs, as directed, 
and being given a pile of paperwork to fill out.  It was a significant step in my relationship with 
John, as he wanted to be recorded as my emergency contact.  I was pleased. 
 
I was worried, however.  John was a mental health virgin and had never been in a psychiatric 
ward, let alone helping to admit his girlfriend in to one.  I was very anxious about him and I’m 





The walls are painted beige with green skirting boards.  There were pot plants around the wall 
for aesthetics.  There were cameras on the ceiling, in the corners.  Also, the obligatory smoke 
alarms.  Being a Catholic hospital, there was religious iconography around the ward, mostly in 
the forms of paintings and statues.   Icons were displayed in the common areas, such as the dining 
room, group rooms and television/relaxation area.  Being a patient in a Catholic hospital facility 
meant that I must take my own contraceptive pill, as contraception aids are forbidden in Catholic 
facilities.  I have had friends refused vasectomies in the same hospital as it is against the teachings 
of the Catholic Church.   
 
After a few days in a highly monitored room, I graduated and was allowed into a room of my 
own.  I had my own bathroom, television, wardrobe, desk and bookshelves. The television was 
situated above the bed for easy viewing when lying down.  A far cry from the graffitied insanities 
and punitive treatment in the Ward B (public).  Ward C (private) also contrasted with Ward A 
(public) where I had to share a room, bathroom, television and everything else. Perhaps it is 
considered more therapeutic to have your own room.  
 
The staff at Ward C (private) were amiable, understanding and patient.  Not prerogative, 
patronising and superior, and considering themselves as privileged.  The Ward C (private) staff 





This ward is a private mental health ward.  For the 17 days I spent there, it cost over $10,600 
AUD.  The care was very good.  The nurses were supportive and understanding.  It seems that 
only the privileged can afford good health care.  Seventeen percent of my wage goes toward my 
mental health costs.  And I receive free psychiatric, psychological and Clozapine care.  If I was 
paying for all my mental health costs, I would conservatively spend 31% of my wage on my 
mental health.  (I have not included the costs of my physical health, which involves yearly 
medical imaging decreed necessary by the medical profession’s need to measure, 
compartmentalise and evaluate.)  There is a financial burden to having a mental illness.  It is hard 
to reason that the chronically mentally ill, spending a third of their income on managing their 
disability, does not contribute to the economy of the community.   
 
Arguing from a Marxist perspective, I am committed to a position of servitude and dependence 
on the health system and the State, forced to surrender any true agency as I do not control the 
resources and health commodities, I need to survive.  It is ironic that the path to my freedom is 
actually the path to my imprisonment.  I need freedom, but I cannot be free without being defined 
by the language/s of being captured.  These are the language/s of economy and the access to 
resources.  The economic resources that I need to own to live a full life are controlled by politics 
and culture.  I need these resources to function in society; I need these resources to survive.   
 
Ward C (private) is seemingly the ward of the privileged, socially acceptable mentally ill.  Most 
of the patients there are sick with first world illnesses such as anxiety and depression.  There is 




were no overtly psychotic people in the ward.  ‘Schizo’ patients are hidden from the social arena, 
even in this hospital. 
 
The cultures between Ward B (public) and Ward C (private) cannot be more different.  On my 
first day at Ward C (private), my allocated psychiatrist asked me, “What has it meant to you, 
having this illness for so many years?  Has it changed you?  Has it meant that you couldn’t live 
the life you wanted?”  I couldn’t believe it!  I was stunned!  I said in shock, “No one has ever 
asked me that before!”  I umm’d and ahhh’d a little.  Then I began to sob.  I was unsure, because 
I spend a lot of time trying not to think about what could have been.  I don’t think I would ever 
get out of bed if that were the case.  Then I said, through the tears that had started to flow down 
my cheeks, “It has changed my life fundamentally!  I have lost relationships, my chosen career, 
my healthy body, my mind and intellect, my memory, my zest for life, my effervescence, zing 
and joyful demeanour, my hopes and dreams, my confidence, my self-esteem, my capacity and 
competency.” 
 
My life without schizoaffective disorder. Wow!!  I can’t comprehend that!  More than half my 
life has been defined and confined by my mental health.  I feel imprisoned by my diagnosis and 
prognosis.  I am no longer in charge of my own life.  I have limited or no agency.  Having a 
mental illness can make you a ward of the State if you do not comply with the mandate of mental 
health professionals.  I am empty with schizoaffective disorder, though I don’t know how to live 





My life has been turned around and spun on its head.  I am not the young woman I was, with 
dreams and aspirations and a thirst for a exciting future. 
 
What I have left is the shell of a fat forty-year-old (odd) woman, who asks herself every day, 
“How do I get out of this black hole?”  I am imprisoned by a shield of anxiety and psychosis that 
encases me tightly.  I can see the outside world, and vaguely hear what a normal life sounds like, 
but I am disabled and unable to reach, breath or smell normalcy.  No one can hear my cries.  No 
one can feel my pain.  Could this all be made up by me?  Is this real?  I am forever afraid that my 
friends and family will have enough of me because I am so needy and demanding.  I feel like a 
shell of who I used to be.  I am persistently worried that every relationship I begin will end 
because I am crazy.  I would break up with myself if I could.  I also stay in relationships much 
longer than I should because I am convinced that I cannot do any better.  
 
At Ward C (private) we were encouraged to attend group sessions, though, happily, we were not 
dishonoured by a decision not to attend.  The staff explained why group work was important, 
speaking to you as an equal.  There was nothing punitive about my treatment.  If we chose not to 
socialise with others, we were not forced to socialise.  Such luxury!  Compared to Ward B 
(public), it was a holiday resort!  It was also a step up from the other Town A ward.  We had 
choices, and a degree of self-determination.  It seems that not being forced to socialise with others 
is therapeutic and less anxiety provoking, at least for me. 
  
There were some things in Ward C (private) that reminded you that you were in a psychiatric 




you are not allowed out.  Then after a couple of days you are allowed out for a walk with a sober 
adult.  Leading to the ultimate leave, overnight leave, also with a responsible adult.   
 
During my stay at Ward C (private), I had a brain MRI to better diagnose my anxiety.  They 
found seven lesions in my brain.  I waited for days for these results.  I thought I may have a 
reason, a cause for my mental health condition.  Finally, a doctor and a nurse came to speak with 
me in my room.  Apparently, the lesions were insignificant and not related to my mental health.  
I went to the neurologist who claimed that the lesions were not the cause of anything.  The 
condition was called “Radiological MS”.  That is, I have the lesions someone with multiple 
sclerosis may have, but without symptoms.  I must have a regular brain MRIs for a few years to 
see if there is any change.  (Note that one year later, that is 2016, my ‘without symptoms’ 
developed into ‘symptoms’, with arm and leg spasms.  As of 2019, the spasms are getting worse). 
 
A typical day in Ward C (private) involved: 
0700hrs Get up, mindfulness, meditation, shower and dress 
0800hrs Breakfast 
0830hrs Reading 
0900hrs Walk – by myself 
0945hrs Reading mindfulness meditation 





1300hrs Group activities 
1400hrs Writing, mindfulness, meditation 




During the day, there was always time to see the doctors and to complete activities of daily living, 
such as washing clothes. 
 
This admission was different to those in the other two psychiatric wards, completely different. It 
was almost like a hotel.  The nurses wore normal respectful clothes, they were considerate and 
attentive to my needs. The staff normalised my position, speaking to me as if I was intelligent, 
not assuming I was a sub-human.   
 
That was the primary difference between the three wards: the private psychiatric ward 
acknowledged my humanity.  I was not subhuman; a sub-citizen.  I had agency and a voice.  Why 
should Ward C (private) have more empowerment for patients than Ward B (public) or Ward A 





The private ward had the typical mental health ward lay out, with the central hub housing all the 
sacred notes and policies.  The hub was different to Ward B (public) in that there was not a glass 
pane separating patient from staff in Ward C (private), separating the misfits from the esteemed 
and protected staff.  Despite this seemly common panoptic ward design-type, the allied health 
professionals, psychiatrists, pastoral carers, group coordinators, and the administrators all shared 
offices spread around the hub.    
 
I was an inpatient on the ward for 16 days. 
 
 







THE ART OF MEASUREMENT  
 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 
  
“A point to consider: the space to produce knowledge and the way this space is or is not 
heard.”  
(Field notes June 9th, 2014)    
 
I agree with the concept that all things are born and understood from socio-cultural phenomena, 
and not solely understood through positivist natural sciences.  Indeed, the label ’schizophrenia’ 
only came about in texts in 1908 (Hacking 1999: 9).  This is when the social sciences were 
developing.  It goes to follow that what we know as schizoaffective disorder, pre social science 
and psychology, was mainly defined within the realms of hard science.  The confusion between 
the old school of understanding of schizophrenia, which was born from the biomedical model, 
led to some confusion that stood to believe that schizophrenia is a scientific delusion (Hacking 





A factoid is a socially created fact, assumed by the powerful.   The powerful factors surrounding 
the social construction of reality, as stated by Lea (2008), are numbers and graphs.  Numbers and 
graphs are deemed honourable.  Historically, the social-scientific facts and factoids are not as 
honourable as quantitative methods.  Again, the biomedical realm has historically encompassed 
mental health, but mental health biomedical science cannot be understood separately from the 
social construction of reality.  For example, during my admission in Ward B (public), I was 
desperate to have social contact.  Social contact fuels me so that I have the courage to go on.  It 
helps me to stay strong.  However, admission to Ward B (public) was highly stigmatised in the 
Town B community.  Due to this stigma and keeping my reputation in high regard, I had to be 
careful about who I told.  For example, some of my friends were not told due to the stigma and 
shame they felt, and the consequent feeling of intense shame that I felt.  I was dishonoured.  I 
was made to feel like a social misfit and deranged then.  
 
Mental health is commonly pathologised, but it is also socialised, creating a foundation in a social 
construction of reality.  I am interested in looking at the examples of two assessments that best 
encapsulate my experience and relationship with measurement.  These examples best capture the 
confounding factors in psycho-metric testing, and how potentially inaccurate they are in their 
representations of the mentally ill, and thus the tools accuracy altogether.   
 
I was a subject for the Neuro-Psychological Assessment and the Personality Assessment 
Inventory (PAI).  I'm interested in the ‘measurements’ of those living with schizoaffective 
disorder or major psychotic disorders and what that means for them.  I am interested regarding 
my own contribution to the cultural archives (Foucault 2013), to know the perceived truth that 




significant anthropologically, that is, in context of my (dis)empowerment of the mentally ill.  
Which brings me to wonder, how was I categorised from these measurements? 
 
I feel very strongly that my cognitive functioning has diminished substantively over the many 
years of living with my psychotic illness.  I know that my memory is terrible, my concentration 
is lacking, and my ability to analyse data is stunted.  I was hoping to get some constructive 
suggestions and tools to assist me to retain, or hopefully improve, my cognitive functioning, and 
I did.  The person who administered the testing in Town A was a very intelligent and an 
experienced neuropsychologist.     
 
Measurement and mental health 
 
Measurement and assessment in mental health is vastly different from that performed in other 
arms of medicine.  Exactly what is it that mental health assessments are trying to assess?  Are 
the measurement technologies used in mental health different technologies than those used 
elsewhere in medicine?  The measurements performed in psychiatry are subjective and esoteric 
in many ways.  The brain, the organ most referred to in psychiatry, is an enigma.  I must note, 
however, that psychiatry also has a hand in more holistic medicines.  Treatment for psychiatric 






From what I gather, psychometric testing is circumstantial.  The tests are shady, giving a 
confounded result.  Mental health professionals perform the usual assessments that other 
branches in medicine perform.  However, the psychometric testing and other smaller assessments 
performed on mental health participants are unique.  So, in becoming a consumer in a psychiatric 
ward, I am in some way enculturated into the inexact science, further becoming a subject to the 
culture precipitating the labels of subhumans, sub-citizen and social misfit.  I am conflicted about 
whether I should participate in a subculture which disempowers me.  Biomedical treatment is 
better treatment than none.  Again, I am dependent on the system which disempowers me.  Again, 
I am dependent on the State, with the hope that the testing will help me be okay.   
 
The Neuro-Psychological Assessment I participated in illustrated how the factoid was given 
agency and, in some ways, has been anthromorphised.  Through this tool, I was categorised and 
labelled.  What I thought would be an empowering experience, learning about my strengths, in 
fact further inhibited me.  It was official.  The psychotic episodes I have had over the years have 
limited my cognitive capacity.  Now I am being monitored and reviewed regularly by the State.  
Each month, and often more frequently, I am measured.  Legitimised and given authority by 
these measurements, I am a part the institutional apparatus and infrastructure of these 
measurements, as a cultural artefact and product.   As I was unwell, and needed treatment, I had 
little choice but to succumb to a system of disempowerment.  The measurements develop from a 






Excerpts from the neuropsychological report 
 
Below is a passage of the neuropsychological report testing me:  
 
“At the time of neuro-psychological assessment, Rachael was 40 years of age, in the fourth year 
of her PhD and working part time in a quality assurance role.  [She was referred from her 
psychiatrist] to assist with perceived cognitive difficulties she was experiencing that were 
causing concern in relation to her studies.  During these sessions, she requested to undergo a 
neuro-psychological assessment to assist further with her post-graduate study and her work.” 
 
“Rachael currently reports memory difficulties with problems ‘retaining’ new ‘knowledge’, even 
if she re-reads information she has encountered only two hours earlier and can be repetitive in 
conversation.  She felt her concentration is lacking and finds it difficult to focus on task.  When 
reading, for example, it feels like her mind goes into a sort of ‘suspension’.  She stated that she 
is unable to process the material, such that she seems ‘dissociated from my thinking’.  She 
currently feels that her thinking lacks ‘clarity’ and feels limited in the quality of her ‘analysis’ 
skills such that she feels like a ‘below average student’ at present.  This is against a diagnosis of 
schizoaffective disorder, which Rachael has been living with since her early 20s.  Current 
assessment was timed to allow for recovery from a relapse in her condition.” 
 
“On presentation, Rachael was a pleasure to work with and she appeared to apply her effort 
throughout, which was supported by the pattern of results across psychometric indicators of 
effort.  On observation, she appeared to have difficulties sustaining her attention at times, with 




to have good insight into her health and communicated her lived experience of schizoaffective 
disorder in a way that demonstrated self-awareness and self-reflective capacities.” 
  
“Results of formal cognitive testing demonstrated variability amongst Rachael’s current 
cognitive skills.  Verbal intellectual skills were high average, congruent with expectation and 
Rachael had a particular strength in her general knowledge.  Working memory capacities (that 
is, the capacity to hold and manipulate information in mind) were average and within expected 
limits.  Speed of information processing was high average range and congruent with expectation.  
Perceptual problem-solving skills were low average, and whilst within normal limits for her age 
range, were considered low expectation, given Rachael’s other strong capacities.”   
 
“Interesting to note was that when provided with additional time, Rachael demonstrated the 
capacity to complete one of these tasks as slightly stronger – average levels.  Attentional skills 
were within the normal range, with some minor variability, ranging from the average-low average 
range up to the average range.”   
 
“Memory performances were variable.  New learning and recent memory of visual-spatial 
information was in the average range, and though normal for her age, was somewhat reduced as 
compared to her stronger verbal intellectual skills.  Her new learning and recent memory for 
auditory-verbal information was variable.  Immediate recall of pairs of words that were repeated 
was in the average-low average range and was average following a time delay.  Recall of a story 
immediately after presentation was in the borderline to extremely low range and was in the low 





“Tests of executive functioning were performed in generally the average range as compared to 
age matched peers.  Therefore, there were many which were well within normal limits (for 
example, average) for Rachael’s age, but possibly reflect departures from what is expected based 
on her educational achievements.” 
 
I could not believe the results.  I was hoping for some reassurance and validation.   What I found 
out was that I have been affected terribly by my mental illness.  Apparently, cognitive 
diminishment is common for people with my diagnosis.  So, I am officially disabled; officially 
lacking full mental capacity.  My capabilities were in fact diminished.  I was sadly ‘handicapped’ 
according to some mental health professionals.  In calling me ‘handicapped’ even though 
questionably a Freudian slip of the tongue, having said so, the professionals perpetuated the label 
they try hard to eradicate.   
 
Below is an extract of some of the text of my personality assessment inventory (PAI) (assessment 
done October 2012): 
 
“With respect to negative impression management, there are indications suggesting that 
the client intended to portray herself in an especially negative or pathological manner.  
Some deliberate distortion of the clinical picture may be present; evaluation of the critical 
items indicates she is not malingering.  Also, such results often indicate a ‘cry of help’, or 
an extreme or exaggerated negative evaluation of oneself and one’s life.  This exaggerated 
negative evaluation is consistent with how the respondent describes herself in interview. 
Regardless of the cause, THE TEST RESULTS POTENTIALLY INVOLVE 
CONSIDERABLE DISTORTION AND ARE UNLIKELY TO BE AN ACCURATE 




INTERPRETATION IS PROVIDED ONLY AS AN INDICATION OF THE 
RESPONDENT’S SELF DESCRIPTIONS” (Assessor’s bold and capitalised effects.)  
 
“Despite the general level of negative distortion noted above, there are some areas where the 
client described problems of great intensity... These areas could indicate core problems that stand 
out from the general level of distress and dysfunction reported by the client, such problems merit 
particular focus in further inquiry.  These areas include disruptions in thought process; unusual 
ideas or believes; feelings of helplessness; tension and apprehension; heightened activity level; 
irrational fears; and compulsiveness or rigidity.”  
 
“She likely questions and mistrusts the motives of those around her, despite the nature or history 
of her relationships with the following areas: antisocial behaviour; problems with empathy; 
unusually elevated mood or heightened activity.” 
 
“A number of aspects of the client’s self-description suggest marked peculiarities in thinking and 
experience at a level of severity and usual even in clinical samples.  These features are often 
associated with an active psychotic episode, with poor judgement and impairment in reality 
testing as hallmark characteristics.  It is likely that she experiences unusual perceptual or sensory 
events as well as unusual ideas that may include enchanted thinking or delusional beliefs.  Her 
thought processes are likely to be marked by confusion, distractibility, and difficulty 
concentrating, and she may experience her thoughts as blocked, withdrawn, or somehow 






“The client reports a number of difficulties consistent with a significant depressive experience.  
She is likely to be plagued by thoughts of worthlessness, hopelessness, and personal failure. She 
admits openly to feelings of sadness, a loss of interest in normal activity, and a loss of sense of 
pleasure in things that were previously enjoyed.  However, there appear to be relatively few 
physiological signs of depression.  The symptom picture appears to be relatively free of changes 
in energy, appetite, weight, and sleep patterns.” 
 
“The client indicates that she is experiencing specific fears or anxiety surrounding some 
situations.  The patterns of responses reveal that she is likely to display a variety of maladaptive 
behaviour patterns aimed at controlling anxiety.  For instance, phobic behaviours are likely to 
interfere in some significant way in her life, and it is probable that she monitors her environment 
in the vigilant fashion to avoid contact with the feared object or situation.  She is more likely to 
have multiple phobias or a more distressing phobia such as agoraphobia, then to suffer from a 
simple phobia.”   
 
The assessor goes on to say, “the respondent (me) displays core needs that need to be addressed.  
These include disruptions in thought processes; unusual ideas or beliefs; feelings of helplessness; 
tension and apprehension; heightened activity level; irrational fears; and compulsiveness of 
rigidity.   The respondent is likely to be withdrawn and isolated, and she may have few if any 
close interpersonal relationships and may get quite anxious and threatened by such relationships.  
Her social judgement is probably fairly poor, and she has difficulty making decisions, even about 





My presentation during testing was affected and based on my psychotic state at the time during 
the hospital stay in Ward A (public) – October 2012 - where my perception or reality was 
eschewed and unreal.  The testing did not represent who I am.  This is not who I am.  I was 
psychotic and dissociated from reality; at a time when I was nothing valued in society   I am 
misunderstood, devalued and famed.  The misrepresentation affected my life.  The language and 
symbolic power used to adversely misrepresent my experience of living with schizoaffective 
disorder is based on biomedicine and science.  I was represented by a testing which begets testing 
which begets misrepresentation, as well as stigma (Bourdieu 1991; Goffman 1963).  An 
identification understood and measurable by biomedicine (DiGiacomo 1987).   Suffering with 
schizoaffective disorder, and not knowing how to understand the disorder apart from 
biomedicine; I am pathologised.  
 
The assessor went on to say, “The respondent indicates that she is experiencing a discomforting 
level of anxiety and tension.  She is likely to be plagued by worry to the degree that her ability 
to concentrate and attend are significantly compromised.  Associates are likely to comment about 
her over-concern regarding issues and events over which she has no control.  Affectively, she 
feels a great deal of tension, has difficulty relaxing, and likely experienced fatigue as a result of 
high perceived stress.  Overt physical signs of tension and stress, such as sweaty palms, trembling 
hands, complaints of irregular heartbeats, and shortness of breath are also present.” 
 
Here I comment, again, because I am being defined and assessed by a priori assumption of 
madness.  I’m defined by the assessment, by an assessment grounded in biomedicine and 





The assessor follows on, “Her self-image may be largely influenced by a belief that she is 
handicapped by her mental illness.  She is probably also seen by others as being something of a 
perfectionist.  She is likely to be a rigid individual who follows her personal guidelines for 
conduct in an inflexible and unyielding manner.  She ruminates about matters to the degree that 
she often has difficulty making decisions and perceiving the larger significance of decisions that 
are made.  Change in routine, unexpected events, and contradictory information are likely to 
generate untoward stress.  She may fear her own impulses and doubt her ability to control them.” 
 
“Given this self-doubt, she tends to blame herself for setbacks and sees any prospects for the 
future as dependent upon the actions of others.” 
 
For me, the assessment displays an unfathomable difference between my own self-perception 
and the PAI assessment of me.  How is this difference defined and negotiated?  How does this 
unfathomable difference between self and institutional measurement illustrate the significance 
and potency of relationships across the divide?  What power dynamics are rife to craft an 
argument and identity around difference?  It is these power dynamics that are fundamental to 
craft the critical theory stance of (post)colonialism.  The purpose of (post)colonialism in this 
discussion highlights colonial existence, whereby the self is subjugated and disempowered under 
the powerful existing hegemony, in this case the PAI assessor and supporting paradigm of 
biomedicine (Said 1978).  To associate with Smith (1999), the concept and process of mental 
illness service delivery can be likened to colonialism, whereby the dynamic between self and 
institutional measurement are unpacked.  (Post)colonialism implies a step away from 





A concept that epitomises the difference and power negotiate ons across the board is the Silenced 
Manifesto.  The Silenced Manifesto allows for a space, a ‘(post)colonial space’, admitting and 
permitting a possible commensurability between the heard (colonisers) and the silenced (the 
colonised).  These advances coalesce as (post)colonial logic (Kowal 2008: 341).  The language 
used in such as analysis forms to make the manifesto discourse.  The language used coalesces 
between my own self-perception and the PAI assessment of me.    
 
To continue, the assessor goes on, “The respondent’s interpersonal style seems best characterised 
as self-effacing and lacking confidence in social interactions.  She is likely to have difficulty in 
having her needs met in personal relationships and instead will subordinate her own interests to 
those of others in a manner that may seem self-punitive.  Her failure to assert herself may result 
in mistreatment or exploitation by others, although at this point, it appears that the strategy has 
been effective in maintaining her important relationships.”  
 
When reading the above report from my PAI, I was amazed.  Yet, nowhere in my medical notes 
is there evidence to show that I am empowered to define my own identity.  I am defined by the 
hierarchy of mental health professionals as fundamentally lacking and without the means or 
resources to participate fully in society.  There is somewhat of an assumed a priori knowledge 
that the psychiatric participants are lacking or in deficit in some way, and in need of intervention 
and support.  I lack the capacity to make my own friends and to develop a social and fruitful life 
(according to the Personality Assessment Inventory – PAI).  I am the consumer, the inmate, the 
social misfit.  What’s more, in other spheres, more broadly defined in society, in economics and 





It appeared and felt to me that I was reading about an entirely different person.  I didn’t relate to 
anything the psychologist said.  It made me wonder what on earth the assessor was hearing, 
because in reading her report, I didn’t recognise myself at all.  I felt divorced from my assessment.  
This assessment is a good example of miscommunication between health professional and 
consumer.   
 
This miscommunication also illustrates power differentiations between the health professional 
and consumer.  The language used between health professional and consumer whilst both 
speaking English, was seemly incommensurable.  The cultural clash becomes a strong imbalance 
between the health professional and me.  Miscommunication and misrepresentation are 
commonplace in medicine.  For example, the “Sharing the True Stories Report” (Cass et al 2002) 
based in Darwin, Northern Territory, showed an example of the significance of 
miscommunication between cross-cultural groups.   
 
Measurements and assessments become cultural artefacts in the world of the (post)colonialist 
medical science and specifically (post)colonialist psychiatry.  Cultural artefacts are socio-
political objects which aid in the governmentality of (post)colonial power structures.  In reaction 
to exploring and negating, the nature of (post)colonialism is known by deconstructing it.  Social 
power play is rife, which brings to light the nuances of the social in practice and the social in 
theory if there is an actual difference between the two.  Note that (post)colonial power structures 
negotiate power in whichever name you give the paradigm, such as the science of biomedicine.  
Foucault’s concept of pastoral power contributes to the construct of the State and 
governmentality, both of which are socio-structural constructs, operating, validating, justifying 





There are assumptions made a priori in the factoid assessments.  The individual needs to be 
empowered and in charge of their own agency and future – the individual is the central focus and 
values the factoid.  The factoid assumes that the power of the individual reigns.  However, 
Foucault argues that the power really belongs to the social pathways and social structures which 
define and confine the agency of the individual.  According to Foucault (2007), the individual is 
not something that needs to be liberated, rather the individual is the closely monitored product 
of relations between power and knowledge.  Power dynamics are profound in the case of the 
mental health consumer and the services provided to them.   The psychological measurements in 
these testings have significance to anthropology; they come to life as a series of statistics, cultural 
artefacts and factoids.  They can also raise the question of what the measurements represent, and 
indeed who owns the knowledge of the crazy? (Lea 2008) Psychometric measurements are a 
socio-political technology which aid in the governmentality of current power structures.   
 
I later received clarification and explanation of the neuropsychological assessment and the PAI.  
An expert in the field, a neuropsychologist, assured me that these tests are not necessarily 
completely accurate.  There are masses of bewildering and puzzling factors.  I had a lot riding on 
the tests.  I wanted to prove that, despite my disability, I was absolutely capable, competent and 
clever enough to get exceptional marks on these tests; to prove that I am proficient and qualified 
enough to complete my PhD, and that I can live a full life.  Instead I received average marks with 
average indicators.  However, as the excerpt stated, I applied great effort and commitment to my 
study if nothing else.   
 
I was worried, indeed petrified, that this test proved that I was inept, and I lacked aptitude to 
complete my PhD.  Although the neuropsychologist noted that there are a lot of impermeable 




health professionals that I am capable of completing my PhD, though it may just take me three 
times longer.  The truth of the matter is that my quality of life has diminished permanently.    
 
Proximity of measurement  
 
Measurements, assessments and diagnostic tools are historical and cultural artefacts used in the 
proximity (Kowal 2006) of medical science, specifically psychiatry.  An example used in 
psychiatry is the cultural medical practice of having regular set blood tests.  First, the blood test 
results have a numerical value - certain levels of certain medications must be present in the blood, 
at therapeutic levels defined by medical science.  Second, the process of having monthly blood 
tests can be seen as a cultural regime, where the mental health participant is drawn into the 
rhetoric of psychiatry and becomes defined and dependent on the medical system, fixed in a 
paternal relationship with mental health services.   
 
The blood tests are anthropological symbols of servitude – that is related to symbolic and 
interpretive anthropology (Wikipedia 2014), from the consumer and ‘protection’ for the mental 
health professionals.  The measurement, in this case the blood test, precipitates in an Us and 
Other dynamic where power play is rife (Derrida 1966).  The mental health professionals - the 
Us - use techniques of measurement, diagnosis and treatment, to stake a claim on the way the 
mentally ill should live.  The mentally ill – Other – not being privy to the sanctity of medical 
knowledge, have little choice but to trust the deified mental health professionals.  As per Smith 
(1999: 52), “What makes ideas real is the system of knowledge, the formations of culture and the 




a struggle over the extent to which individual consciousness and reality shapes or is shaped by 
social structure.” 
 
In an analysis of diagnosis and the utilisation of measurement tools to legitimise the cultural 
labelling of the mentally ill, the roles of the subhuman/sub-citizen/social misfit are bantered and 
negotiated and ultimately legitimised.  Diagnoses are defined and perpetuated by the culture of 
madness and predicated by the scientific fairy-tale statistics of evaluation (Lea 2008).  This is a 
seemly impossible venture, especially considering the anecdotal cultural evidence that ultimately 
measures the unmeasurable.   
 
Nevertheless, psychiatric science with its measurements cannot be ignored.  In trying to find a 
sound measurement tool; to bring to life the magical proof of numbers in a diagnosis – psychiatry 
relies on measurement - statistics, pie graphs and bar graphs.  The magic of digits and quantitative 
methods cannot be ignored.  These digits and graphs can be understood as cultural artefacts or 
factoids.  Statistics actually represent the kaleidoscopic phenomena of mental illness.  The 
illuminations of measurement factoids enable the mental health facts to develop a social life. 
(Lea: 2008: 128)  
 
Measurements legitimising diagnosis seem to create a space of proximity where it is possible to 
negotiate and exchange between and within the socio-cultural structure, and this is embedded in 
the many persuasions of power control and comprehension from which they came.  This space 
for legitimising measurements is important as it provides some cognition, some proximity, for 
negotiation between cultural artefacts and factoids (Kowal 2006; Lea 2008).  To make this space 




measured and the un-measured.  What is defined as within the realms of the measurable and the 
un-measurable? That is, discovering an understanding between what is science and how this 
relates to non-science.  For example, considering the cultural artefact, and if or how there is space 
for an understanding of science, one can ask if and how and why it is significant.  Thus, some 
space is available in the proximity to measure the unmeasurable.         
 
If there is space for proximity and measurement between the measurable and the unmeasurable 
there is also space for proximity and analysis.  What if there is a misrepresentation in the 
proximity?  One can argue that in trying to define and assess the diagnostic process, the mental 
health professionals can categorise and misrepresent the mentally ill.  As such, mental health 
measurements may perpetuate a culture which ultimately leads to a crisis of representation (Smith 
1999).  The ultimate power of the physician, in this case the psychiatrist, reigns as a demi-god in 
medical science.  In an effort to make commensurable the incommensurable, there is a call for 
university students of today to study the anthropology of medical science and/or medical 
anthropology (Kleinman 1988).  
 
Mental health has become part of dinner party conversations, corridor talk, seminars and political 
enquiries.  As part of my experience, immersed in the context and texts of a major psychotic 
illness, there exists an idea of what is an acceptable form of mental illness.  It certainly isn’t 
schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder.  There is a ‘right’ kind of madness, which is somewhat 
more accepted and respected.  It is not uncommon today to have highly esteemed personalities, 
whether they be politicians or musicians, living with depression or anxiety or even more 
complicated disorders, pay homage to their diagnosis to add to their common respect and appeal 







There exists a concept called ‘ethnographic capital’.  It is perhaps more of a reality than a concept.  
Ethnography, according to ethnographers, equips the researcher with the power and commodity 
of knowledge.  The ‘capital’ of ethnography relates to how knowledge comes to be owned 
through its development and creation.  Socio-cultural structures or perhaps institutions such as 
governments, have a vested interest in owning knowledge which produces cultural artefacts, 
because owning knowledge empowers institutions/structures.  Ownership of knowledge, 
accumulated as capital, becomes a commodity because it can be defined, understood, exchanged 
and given value.  These commodities, for example cultural commodities of art and discourse, 
have made capital out of the ethnography (Lea 2008: 84).   
 
What is ethnographic capital in this study?  I have found that autoethnographic methods of 
measurement build autoethnographic capital.  The cultural phenomenon of measurement 
supports the power of the psychiatrist’s diagnosis.  Measurements are part of the cultural 
phenomenon that supply the ‘truth’ for the science of psychiatry.  Measurements also supply the 
truth supporting the ‘right kind of mental illness’.  Like what Lea (2008: 84) describes as the 







‘Discourse’, as defined by Foucault, refers to the ways of constituting knowledge through text.  
Together with the social practices, the subjectivity and power relations of discourse adhere to 
such knowledges and relations between them.  Discourses are more than ways of thinking and 
producing meaning (Massey University – University of New Zealand 2020).   
 
The language used in texts, which has developed for the mentally ill, is potent.  For example, the 
texts available for the consumer are mostly to do with their rights and responsibilities.  The walls 
at my psychiatrist’s rooms, covered in mental health advocacy brochures, used the powerful 
words of psychiatric jargon.  The ‘Charter of Consumer Rights’; ‘Do You Know your Rights as 
a Consumer?’; ‘Your Rights and Responsibilities as a Consumer’ and brochures about the right 
to give feedback about services received.  The brochures are aimed to empower the mental health 
participant.  As well, the brochures could be seen as propaganda for mental health service 
provision, though I didn’t understand the significance at the time.  Once, when I was waiting at 
my doctor’s rooms, and somewhat manic, I completely reorganised the mental health brochures 
to my liking.  This act empowered me in a sense, to make order the significant texts to my liking.  
I organised and structured the brochures first in topic, then chronologically, then alphabetically.  
If there were any misfit brochures, I would order them in the colours of the rainbow.   So, it 
seems that the efficacy of the brochures was questionable in my case. 
   
These information resources are based on the broader documents of state/territory and national 
mandates of mental health in Australia.  For example, the Northern Territory’s overarching 
document is called the ‘Northern Territory of Australia Mental Health and Related Services Act’ 




Health Act 2015’.  And national governance in mental health is led by the ‘National Standard of 
Mental Health Practices’ (2010).   
 
All these texts combined and analysed together form cultural and discourse phenomena.  Mental 
health is in some ways an art form that negotiates the language complexities between cultural 
meaning, natural sciences, social sciences and esoteric, existential and holistic care. 
 
The effective words of mental health language, used by mental health professionals, often have 
underlying meaning attached to them.  For example, the question ‘How are you feeling?’ has 
extra underlying meaning.  Not only is the mental health professional interested in your physical 
feelings due to physical reactions to medication, the consumer is also supposed to describe other 
non-physical symptoms.  Here the question ‘How are you feeling?’ also conveys the meaning of 
an insightful nature, especially regarding psychotic symptoms, which affects all phenomena.  
Reporting on the esoteric factors ‘I am feeling’ requires me to have a sense, an insight to the 
degree and the depth of my feelings.  
 
 I must be careful here.  If I use the wrong words or expression, I may give the mental health 
professional the wrong impression and wrongly reflect my condition and what label I should be 
classed under. Usually with diagnostic labelling, mysterious and obscure feelings are defined and 
labelled into diagnostic categories.  Psychiatry itself is defined as profound and perplexing (Szasz 







I get caught in an extreme and intense storm of madness, seemingly engulfed in a turbulent 
whirlwind of insanity.  I am suffocating in the wiles of the storm of lunacy.  I am helpless, with 
no site of freedom ahead of me.  I am imprisoned by my label and my diagnosis, reliant on the 
science of psychiatry to grant me freedom, because it doesn’t seem like I can do it on my own. 
 
Measurement can be liberating for some and disempowering for others.   Coming from the camp 
of disempowerment, where I am defined and confined by my diagnosis and categorisation of 
subhuman, sub-citizen and social misfit, these questions are important.  How am I labelled as a 
subhuman, sub-citizen, social misfit?  How is this defined and enacted?  What are the tools of 
diagnosis, the tools that measure sanity?  And what is the broader significance of these 
measurements?   
 
There is a sacredness about measurement, about culture, about representation and meaning.  Each 
measurement utilises a tool of some sort.  These measurements are objectified to define and 
identify the properties according to the modern science of medicine.  Medical science of the 
masses comes under the realm of public health.   
 
Public health studies make it clear that health is reliant on cultural constructs, arguing that there 
are social determinants to health.  For example, Australian Indigenous peoples’ health is affected 
by socialisation into the racist and colonisers’ culture. (Carson et al 2007; Paradies 2006; Thomas 




emphasise the point that measurements have a subjective element, or whole.  The factoids support 
and create cultural products, or artefacts, which add depth to the original biomedical scientific 
assessments (Lea 2008). 
 
The State and the silenced 
 
Then there is the phenomenon of silenced reports on shelves.  Here I place the concept of the 
Silenced Manifesto, with the silenced becoming part of the hidden mental health discourse.  (To 
be detailed in chapters 12 and 13.)  The sciences of the brain (including psychiatry, psychology, 
neurology and neuropsychology) produce and utilise methods for authorising, legitimising, 
validating and treating mental illness.  These psychometric tests have cultural significance and 
produce artefacts.  These measurements are highly esteemed in biomedicine (McMahon 2013).  
They situate the individual in question in accordance to a pre-determined definition of 
‘normality’.  This information substantiates the diagnosis and treatment of such.   
 
Policy is central to governance infrastructure, linking together and forming foundations of the 
capital and substance of the socio-cultural, political and economic.  National quality frameworks, 
part of the backbone of policy, form objects of governance, and produce objects of knowledge.  
These political objects of knowledge produce further knowledge.  Health professionals forge and 
define programs through power banter, for example, between themselves the governing bodies, 
the Us, and mental health clients, the Other.  The bureaucracy decrees that psychometric 
measurements are necessary tools for knowledge production, an extension of the biomedical 
model and scientific measurement which defines and justifies national policy and governance.  





There are seemly no absolute and completely reliable and valid measures to assess mental health 
participants, and there are certainly not reliable and exact measures to direct treatment.  My 
experience with schizoaffective disorder, for instance, would be contextualised by the many 
variants in my life.  Diagnosis and subsequent treatment need to be individually assessed, and 
not be declared for an assumed homogenised group, combining pathological mechanisms in to 
one disorder.   Psychiatry needs to be careful not to simply generalise or categorise too swiftly, 
especially not at the at the expense of the individual’s health (Szasz 1970). 
 
Foucault argues, when looking at the agency of the individual, power really belongs to the social 
pathways and social structures with which the individual is defined and confined.  According to 
Foucault, “the individual is not something that needs to be liberated, rather the individual is the 
closely monitored product of relations between power and knowledge” (Farrell 2020).  Foucault 
also argues that power play exists in all interactions, including measurement processes, which 
are essentially part of a production of knowledge based somewhat on socio-cultural and political 
factoids (Foucault in Appignanesi et al 2005).  Information alone assumes an independent 
universal and highly potent ability to change people’s lives and behaviours (Lea 2008:127). The 
prevailing assumption is that scientised facts have a considerable capacity to engender sorts of 
behaviour change (Lea & Wilson 2005).  As such, data itself has developed to being inherently 
powerful (Lea 2008: 132). 
 
Many different capabilities exist in the utilising and conceptual analysis of measurement.  




throughout the social body, operating at even the most micro levels of social relations.  Power is 
omnipresent (O’Farrell 2005).  Dynamics of factoids include giving agency to and 
anthromorphising the factoid; empowering the individual narrative; and empowering the State 
and the various institutional apparatus and infrastructure of which the factoids are a product.   
 
Cuthbert (2013) states that it is essential to treat the various and mostly complex symptoms, 
rather than concentrate on categorising people into definitional diagnosis.  A system of 
measurement is essential. A system of measuring brain science is essential.    A system of 
incorporating the heterogeneous and multi-faceted phenomena into psychiatry and brain science 
is essential.  This includes incorporating the factors of experiential, environmental, and 
behavioural measures, as well as observable, neurobiological, neuropsychological and genetic 
measures.  A system of assessing and treating psychiatric symptoms is essential.  Some scholars 
argue that a grouped definition of schizophrenia does not exist.  Other scholars argue that we 
need valid and reliable ways to measure.  Others argue that the cultural phenomena of mental 
health cannot be negated.   We need rigorous research to decipher rigorous ways of measuring 




My goal for now is to prove to myself that I am intelligent.  For over half my life I have been 
mentally ill and have managed competing, confusing, baffling and bewildering noises in my 
head.  With these noisy thoughts, I have limited capacity to decipher rival knowledge.  I cannot 




are valid and true.  That I don’t have to constantly second guess myself and annoy people by my 
constant need for reassurance and validation.  With psychosis, I hear things that (I hope) are not 
true.   I am constantly in a state of distrust and confusion about the version of truth in my head.   
 
Measurement may be likened to a tool of (post)colonialism (Smith 1999: 6; 23).  Many distinct 
populations, including the mentally ill, have experienced colonialism, in various ways (Smith 
1999: 26). Diagnosis and labelling are (post)colonial actions (Smith 1999: 26).  Those labelled 
as mentally ill, or non-white, or female are historically not granted the status of fully human.  
Some of us are not even considered partially human (Smith 1999: 26). 
 
The psychometric measurement tools are empowered as entities of their own and generate or 
adversely define structure and agency for those who engage or disengage with the tool.  For 
example, an individual could have his/her voice heard within the institutional bounds of the 
service provided.  Further analysis could portray how institutions can use the ‘science’ of 
measurement. 
 
Outside the walls of positivist medical science lay the social foundations of mental health.  These 
foundations include facets such as: taking account of the complex nature of human interaction, 
socialisation of science, and the power dynamics bantered in the potent, and cogent exchange of 
what is socio-cultural capital.  Health factoids circulate as authoritative accounts of success (Lea 
2008: 150-1).  For it is a fact of bureaucratic logic that the full sweep of human experience and 
meaning can be distilled into categories of assumed wider impact (such as economics, politics, 






7 LESIONS: 7 VOICES: 7 DRUGS: 7 STORIES: 7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
MY CRAZINESS IS PERPETUAL: 7 STORIES OF BEING LABELLED 
AND EMBEDDED IN CULTURE 
 
Seven stories of my craziness follow, although there are many more. 
 
1. My perspective of the self: who am I? 
 
Who am I? 
 
Am I the inpatient in a psychiatric ward that got lost in the foyer of the hospital trying to find a 
toilet?  Or am I the inpatient who was trying to get in another patient’s bed, apparently not 
wanting to be removed.  Or am I the person whose potential employer ran away from, until she 





Who am I?  Am I the subject: the mental health subject? 
 
Am I the loved and cherished daughter, sister, friend, colleague, cousin, or partner I’ve always 
wanted to be? 
 
Who am I?  Or am I the crazy girl, disabled by the noises she hears, or the paranoia that plagues 
her, or the panic that suffocates her, or the incredible depression that bestows her?  
 
Who am I?  Am I the label that people mark me with, the stigma, the disempowered human misfit 
that is ostracised from society?   
 
Who am I?   What have I got to offer?  What is my space?  Where am I placed?   
 
I am stuck in the paradigm of mental health science provision.  Lacking the agency to live a full 
life.  My life is not my own.  I am stuck.  I am within the space of disablement, where I am 
silenced and shelved via diagnosis and in relation to the deity of mental health professionals, who 
decree my appropriate care.  And the care providers have the best intentions.  It is the culture that 






2. The highs and lows of living with schizoaffective disorder 
 
How has living with schizoaffective disorder changed me? What are the symptoms?  For one, 
and an obvious one: the noises – I prefer to call them noises, as mentioned previously.  There are 
about seven of them.  They are always chattering, never giving me any peace.  When I am well, 
they are just a whisper.  When I am unwell, they are shouting and wailing.  They say things like: 
“You’re hopeless”, “You’re stupid and worthless”, “You won’t amount anything”, “You’re fat 
and ugly – no one will want you”, “You are a burden to your family and friends, if you even have 
any”, “You are a social misfit, a sub-human and a sub-citizen, sapping resources from society for 
your sorry arse”.  The noises are all different ages and of different sexes.  About seven of them 
rule my head.  
 
It is very hard to negotiate these noises.  Everything gets so blaring.  My senses are magnified.  
The noises can be all consuming.  It seems that they fight for my attention.   I also try not to listen 
to them because I feel it empowers them.  This whole process smothers me more, making me 
question my perceptions.  I become paranoid, as the noises challenge all my senses, and all the 
ways that I can decipher reality.  
 
I am silenced.   Once known that I have a major psychotic illness, I am assumed a priori to be 
stupid and disabled, therefore, not to be listened to.  I am labelled, I am stigmatised, I am Othered, 





I am fighting the labels and culture by embarking on this PhD.  I want to prove everyone wrong, 
especially myself, for I think I am fundamentally stupid - an assumption that has been embedded 
in my psychology over the many years of subjugation from the persistent noises.  I am fighting 
this uphill battle because I have been told by a neurologist that my brain does not function 
properly.  Also, in some other testing, the measurements rightly or wrongly have shown that my 
cognition is lacking.  I am determined to show medical science wrong.  I hope I am wrong.  
 
I feel an intense shame about how I act while I am unwell.  I am a mess.  One day, when I hadn’t 
been to work for three days, my supervisor came to my house.  Apparently, I was passed out on 
the couch.  There was an empty bottle of gin on the floor beside me.  I was in the depths of 
despair, hardly able to get up.  There was nothing in the fridge, no food in the house at all.  My 
supervisor brought me some food.  I hadn’t eaten in days. 
 
In a matter of a week, I had jumped out of my depression.  I was buzzing with energy.  I was 
overactive and unstoppable.  I had just been given a class to teach.  I threw myself into the job.  
So much so that my supervisor pulled me aside and told me to calm down and slow down.  I was 
smoking incessantly, spending a ridiculous amount, all on a multitude of credit cards.  I scrubbed 
my house clean and clean and clean again.  My supervisor paid me to clean her house.  I scrubbed 
her whole house, polishing all wooden floors and furniture with orange oil, putting everything in 
neat order.  I remembered having the conflict in my logic.  I had difficulty deciphering what was 





3. The significance of coffee  
 
In a recent job in Town C my supervisor pulled me aside to go and have a coffee.  I knew that 
when you are pulled aside for a coffee something is wrong.  So, my supervisor pulled me aside, 
halfway through my contract.   
 
What he then said was devastating and shocked me to my core.   
 
He stated that I have not got the skills for my job.  That my resume and referees’ reports were 
vastly different from the person here in front of him.  He also said that there is no way that my 
contract would be extended, as I had hoped.   
 
My supervisor stated that the severity of my mental illness was to blame for not being suitable 
for the job.  This seemed incredulous, mainly because the organisation prided itself on 
accommodating and supporting those with mental health issues.  They seemed to support people 
with minor mental health issues, but any illness more complicated or volatile, is too much to 
understand and too much to fathom. 
 
Considering that I do have a disability, as affirmed by my supervisor, an option was to give me 




organisation does support people with mental health disabilities.  I would be the token disabled 
employee, though my supervisor would not phrase it that way.  
 
I thought at the time that my supervisor could give me a lifeline.  I asked him if he could possibly 
support me in being a referee.  He refused.  He said that he can’t be honest and true to himself in 
being a referee for me. 
 
My supervisor stated that they will advertise for my position.  When I asked if I should apply, he 
stated that I could apply, but I won’t get the job.  I asked him whether they would re-advertise if 
they couldn’t find someone suitable.  He said yes.  And still I will not get the job.  I can apply 
for the job, but I will not get it.  But do apply!  It reminded me of being sectioned.  I was totally 
disempowered and paralysed.  Whatever I choose as an option, I lose out.  
 
My supervisor otherwise displayed supportive and empathetic behaviour, holding my hand and 
crying, offering his services.  Though when it came to employment - to really support and 
empower me, the help that would mean something to me, he was unable to give.  Again, I could 
not be truly supported because I, in his sight, lack the skills.  The skills they need are apparently 
those of a well person.   
 
I was good at what I do yet was not valued for my skills – I was effectively sectioned by my boss.  
I’m not sure what skills are valued?  A previous supervisor once gave me a reference stating that 





So, my supervisor thought he could ‘help me’.  What does this mean exactly?  It seemed to me 
that the help my supervisor was offering was absolutely from a kind heart, but at the same time, 
also paternalistic.  I am being extremely supported yet fundamentally and ironically suppressed 
and discriminated against - stigmatised.  
 
4. The dynamic of needing the disability support pension 
 
My psychiatrist believed I should apply for the disability support pension as a safety net.  As it 
now stands, losing my job, I am definitely in need of it.  Even succumbing to needing the 
disability support pension is a slap in the face.  I remembered being on the pension before, how 
shameful it was.  I felt like I wasn’t part of society, like I wasn’t contributing.   
 
Below are snippets from a letter written by my supervisor (the one who could not support me) to 
help support my application for the disability support pension.  The comments are very harsh, 
yet sometimes, frustratingly very true: 
 
“...the magnitude of Rachael’s mental illness has resulted in her having a significant 
psychosocial disability, which makes it extremely challenging for Rachael to function 




“I am now able to recognise that this was not just a case of regular ‘interview nerves’, but 
a manifestation of Rachael’s psychosocial disability” 
 
“It impedes her ability to process clearly with any speed what has been asked of her, and the 
more she realises that she has missed the point of the request, the more rattled she becomes and 
the more difficulty she has in understanding what has been asked of her. It becomes a great 
impediment to Rachael in interview situations and in the workplace. It is also very clear that this 
sequence of events causes Rachael great humiliation and distress.” 
  
 “We have many examples from her period of employment with us of Rachael apparently 
understanding what she has been asked to do and how to go about undertaking the task – but in 
reality, producing something very different from what we intended. Rachael requires a period of 
time and additional support to absorb information that we are unable to accommodate. She has 
difficulty processing instructions and managing more than one task at a time. Rachael appears to 
suffer functional memory problems and gets easily confused. When this happens, she gets very 
stressed and this further exacerbates the problems to an extent where even basic tasks can be a 
struggle. This is not just my experience working with Rachael, but also that of my colleagues. 
We see in Rachael, intellect, determination and goodwill, but an inability to complete the tasks 
appropriate to her job description.”   





Physically, emotionally, intellectually. It’s suffocating.  I cannot move.  It’s shameful.  I want to 
scream, yet I have no voice.   
 
5. I feel so ashamed 
 
There are so many emotions tied up in living with schizoaffective disorder.  So many feelings 
involved in the pain of life.  These range from: humiliation, devastation, anguish, feeling deeply 
remorseful and crippled, guilt, suffocation, desperation, a feeling of drowning, and being lost.    
 
Of particular note is the feeling of shame.   
 
Along with this, I feel like a subhuman, a sub-citizen. 
 
I am ashamed of it all.  It is official.  I am stupid.  I don’t belong.  I make stuff up so that I seem 
to fit in, but I really don’t fit in.  I am ashamed that I was dependent on my boss and friends.  I 
was a liability, sapping whatever I could, drawing out whenever I could.  I do not fit in even in 
my culture. 
 
The shame I feel, and still feel... I drown in it.  I know that it is silly of me to invest time in even 
thinking about the stigma that infects me.  I don’t seem to have a choice.  No matter how much 




complete and empowered identity.  It is too soon for our society to do away with the titles of 
subhuman, sub-citizen and social misfit, although all power is claimed and people living with 
schizoaffective disorder are declared equal.      
 
Expressed feelings from the mentally ill are not important. They are only a compilation of 
random, meaningless and empty words.  My feelings are obsolete, as I’d imagine would be the 
case for many of the mentally ill.   
 
6. The inevitable powerlessness 
 
I am punished and powerless for having a major mental illness.  It seems that only minor mental 
illnesses are tolerated.  My mental illness is the reason I am classed, or labelled, as unskilled.  
This really hurts.  Diplomatically phrased by the Executive Officer of my (aforehand) supervisor, 
‘I have a different skill set’ – one not needed.   In the same breath of announcing to the staff that 
my contract was not going to be extended, the Executive Officer emphasised that there will now 
be a commitment to the implementation of the organisation’s vision of evaluation, measurement 
and quality assurance – all skills that I possess and are known to possess.  This was ignored, 
while I sat, my heart breaking, and no one knew, cared or understood.  I’m invisible and silenced.  
No one sees me or hears me.  The rules of human resources management from my 





Whose voice is being heard? What are the implicit or explicit silences in this discourse? Which 
noises are empowered (Hanisch 1969)?   I am silenced.   Once known that I have schizoaffective 
disorder, I am assumed a priori to be stupid and disabled, therefore, not to be listened to.  I am 
labelled, I am stigmatised, I am Othered.  With every voice heard, there is/are noises silenced.  
For every voice empowered there is/are noises disempowered.  Again, which noises are heard?  
What social structure manifests the noises and makes them clear?  The Silenced Manifesto 
provides the social structure of governance, manipulates the vernacular and shelves the silenced.    
 
I have such skills, demonstrated skills, but I am silenced in this space.  Those also labelled as 
mentally ill are also silenced, just for being in the community space.  The silenced, those labelled 
as inadequate, or perhaps more commonly labelled as disabled, the seriously mentally ill lack 
power.  As labelled and disabled, I am powerless.  I have not the power to take what I need from 
society, my own authority and self-determination.  The powerful allow the distribution of 
command to the disabled, with supremacy.  Disabled, suffocated, silenced. Not fully human; not 
a full citizen. 
 
Because of this, I am overwhelmed.  I am drowning.  I cannot understand why I am being treated 
this way.  The whole point of working is to retain some sense of self-worth and dignity.  By 
working I am contributing to society, paying taxes and being an active member of the politico-





My mental health status becomes the fault of everything going wrong in my life.  I go to the 
doctor with a physical ailment and come out petrified and defeated that my physical health has 
actually turned into a mental health issue.  I had lost another battle. 
 
As an act of pity, or perhaps good will, my supervisor offered his help for me to get a job.  The 
main way he would support me would be by attending interviews with me, translating questions 
as the interview went along, because I apparently get confused about what is being asked of me.  
I should note that I am very, very bad at interviews.  With that in mind, I cannot figure out if this 
gesture is meant to be significantly kind, or significantly insulting.  My boss said he will be my 
advocate because I am disabled and need help.  Despite the sugar-coated insult, I accepted his 
offer.  My supervisor then stated that he will write an email to my psychiatrist to explain his 
benevolent gesture, buying into the cultural vernacular that my actions and presumptive 
allegiances are determined and sanctioned by the greater good, a macro-narrative of society, for 
example the medical professional.  My micro-narrative, an autoethnography of society just 
doesn’t cut it. 
 
7. The phenomenal meta-narrative 
 
Through living with schizoaffective disorder, I have noted that I am in a constant dialogue, 
sometimes even a fight, competing with bioscience.  Science is a meta-narrative that consumes 





Being labelled in a stigmatised culture comes with self-loathing, and a belief that I lack dignity, 
personhood and agency.  This label of fundamentally lacking impinges on the basic human rights 
for those with disabilities.  Specifically, Articles 5 and 12 of the United Nations Convention of 
the Rights of People with Disabilities (UNCRPD 2014).  To add, the WHO has developed a 
comprehensive mental health action plan (2013-2020).  It calls for a change in the attitudes that 
perpetuate stigma and discrimination that have isolated people since ancient times, and it calls 
for an expansion of services in order to promote greater efficiency in the use of resources (WHO 
2013). 
 
What is it like to live with a disability? How am I disabled?  As per the United Nations (UNCRPD 
- Department of Economic and Social Affairs Disability 2014), disability should not impinge on 
the quality of life and agency awarded to those living without a mental illness.   How has my 
disability affected my life?  I lack the discourses and resources, the social, cultural, economic, 
political resources that can potentially enable me to live a full life.  Being disabled, I am regarded 
as a social misfit and deranged, identities constructed for me as a lesser human being.  I am 









THE SILENCED MANIFESTO 
 
“The Silenced Manifesto, being likened to the exposition of a religion, through its 
commanding language and discourse, mandates the governance and placement of the 
silenced.”  
(Field notes April 8th, 2018)  
 
“[There is] no need to hear your voice, when I can talk about you better than you can speak 
about yourself.  No need to hear your voice.  Only tell me about your pain.  I want to know 
your story.  And then I will tell it back to you in a new way.  Tell it back to you in such a 




author, authority.  I am still [the] colonizer, the speaking subject, and you are now at the 
center of my talk”  
(bell hooks, 1989).  
 
My goal is to prove to myself that I am intelligent.  I am paranoid about it.  For almost half my 
life I have been mentally ill, and have in turn heard competing, confusing, baffling and 
bewildering ‘noises’ in my head.  Describing them simply as ‘noises’ takes away the agency and 
power that the ‘voices’ try to claim.  With these noises, I have limited capacity to decipher rival 
knowledge.  I cannot trust the version of reality my mind gives me.  I want to feel that my 
thoughts and perceptions are valid and true, that I don’t have to constantly second guess myself 
and annoy people by my incessant need for reassurance and validation.  With psychosis, I hear 
things that (I hope) are not true.   I am in a constant state of distrust and confusion about the 
version of truth in my head.   
 
This chapter expands on my concept of the Silenced Manifesto.  The Silenced Manifesto is a 
powerful concept that I have developed as part of my original contribution.  It describes the 
position of the marginalised and what Foucault (1961) calls the ‘underdog’ and how they have 
been and are being silenced.  It encompasses the discourse that perpetuates the labelling of the 
subhuman, sub-citizen and social misfits.    
 
The focus of the Silenced Manifesto as a concept is to give a voice to those whose voice is not 
or has not been heard.  This concept may be reappropriated to many situations where there is 
disempowerment, discrimination, and discernment of a group, or indeed regarding an individual.  




disorder.  We have been silenced by our diagnoses and labelling, both historically and now.  We 
are/have been silenced, suffocated, and disabled in more compounding ways than living with the 
original disability.  The labelling and silencing have perpetuated and enhanced the position of 
lacking for the disabled; it has a snowball effect.  The silenced become more silent. And the 
disempowering discourse becomes more entrenched.  Thus, the Silenced Manifesto imprisons 
the marginalised.  
 
In my lived experience of having schizoaffective disorder, my quality of life has diminished - 
permanently. I have been stuck, categorised and hence silenced by my diagnosis and the 
perceived appropriate treatment I need to have, as per mental health professionals decree.  The 
silencing and suffocating of my expression, my thoughts, my essence is perhaps the most 
disabling, disempowering and de-humanising experience of my life.  And I wish I could say that 
it happened only once.  Rather, I argue that such silencing and suffocation is embedded in 
psychiatry.  This is compounded by the added marginalisation and subjugation that mental health 
participants receive when they are an already marginalised and subjugated group, namely the 
disabled as labelled, in this instance.  My story is one embedded in the definably unjust world of 
psychiatry. 
 
The ‘silenced’ part of the Silenced Manifesto refers to the complex of narratives where the 
marginalised are silenced.  They are simply not heard.  The silenced, I argue, lack the resources 
to be heard.  They lack the language of governance to be heard.  They lack the power to be heard.  
Their silenced narrative; their plight, their voice, their language; their politics, their power; are 




marginalised. Their true representation is in crisis (Smith 1999; Rabinow in Clifford & Marcus 
1986).           
 
The ‘manifesto’ of the Silenced Manifesto unlocks the incredible chest of knowledge, the 
language, the symbols, the narratives, the texts and the discourses which decree who has power 
over the structure of society.  The manifesto is the part of culture that culminates and represents 
the discourse which has power over the underdog (Foucault 1961), the colonisers having control 
of the colonised.   
 
I have separated the discussion of the Silenced Manifesto into sub-headings: 
• An anthropological paradigm – the Silenced Manifesto 
• Methodology and the Silence Manifesto  
• The Silenced Manifesto – its application to all narratives 
• My narrative, language and the Silenced Manifesto 
• Reality and the Silenced Manifesto 
• Labelling theory and measurement and the Silenced Manifesto 
• Social theory and the Silenced Manifesto 
• (Post)colonialism and the Silenced Manifesto 
• The Communist Manifesto and the Silenced Manifesto 
• Governance, politics, policy and the Silenced Manifesto 
• The space of commensurability and the Silenced Manifesto 
• The Silenced Manifesto and stigma 
o The Silenced Manifesto and the stigmatised self 





As discussed in earlier in this thesis, at times my logic and expression are fragmented, as my 
mind is fragmented.  I have tried to explain the concept of the Silenced Manifesto with the best 
logic that I know how.  Though my expression may be spasmodic and somewhat ‘fruitful’.       
 
An Anthropological Paradigm – the Silenced Manifesto 
 
The Silenced Manifesto is also an anthropological paradigm, tied to culture by its spoken and 
written word.  Culture, the learned behaviours and ideas that are characteristic of a social group, 
exists to support society; that is its function. Just like the heart's function is to maintain blood to 
the body, culture functions to maintain society. Individual need is still important, but it is 
succumbed to maintaining the structure of society.  Foucault argues that the power really belongs 
to the social pathways and social structures which define and confine the agency of the individual 
(in Rabinow 1984).   
 
Foucault (in Saar 2002) also spoke about the ‘genealogy of subjectivity’ where we think we 
are free agents in our society, but we are defined by our historical development over time.  
This historical definition process is covert.  It has meant that notably, power intersubjectivities 
and processes have been embedded in the cultural values and social fabric.  Over the last few 
centuries, the pillars of science have been naturalised, that is science as supreme is considered 
an assumption before any other knowledge or perspective.  Scientific fact has an a priori 
assumption.   This version of reality is the version of reality with its’ accompanying meta-





Following on and situating the discussion, regarding Indigenous Australians, there is the ‘Closing 
the Gap’ discourse; and economies of scale built on ‘Closing the Gap’ (Kowal 2006).  There is 
an assumed remedialism here (Kowal 2006) that may be associated with the historical 
construction of sub-citizen policy, and the identity structure and manufacture of subhumanity, all 
to influence the power negotiations that make the social misfit.  All this is developed and 
precipitated by the culture which supplies the space, the sustenance, the life blood and the 
resources for these underdog categories to survive (Foucault 1961).  The Silenced Manifesto 
helps define and express these categories of survival; finding a structural means which allows for 
survival separate from the hegemony; a way of fighting through the glass ceiling of the Silenced 
Manifesto.  
 
An anthropological perspective of the Silenced Manifesto, regarding this thesis, entails 
enculturating the silenced and the hidden into an imprisoning discourse and reality from the 
perspective of my lived experience of having a psychotic illness.  I have been labelled, and these 
labels have been perpetuated by a culture and a corresponding narrative which upholds 
Otherhood and colonisation.  Here the labels of subhuman, sub-citizen and social misfit are 
perpetuated by a culture that values the disempowerment and inequality of the underdog, albeit 
covertly and perhaps unknowingly.  An analysis of culture and the discourse it pertains serves to 
unpack the values held by the micro/macro/metanarratives.       
 
Kleinman (1980: 178) comments that culture affects the way we perceive, label and cope with 
somatic symptoms as well as psychological ones.  All illness is normative (that is at least in part 
socially learned and guided by cultural norms) and culture shapes illness behaviour principally 





Methodology and the Silenced Manifesto 
 
The Silenced Manifesto is also a methodology, which piggybacks on emancipatory 
methodologies, for example and in this case, autoethnography.  The methodology of an 
autoethnography, unpacks the plight and perspective of the underdog, in this case the subhuman, 
sub-citizen and the social misfit.  The Silenced Manifesto describes the way that these 
subordinates are hidden.  As well as describing how and why the underdog is stigmatised and 
labelled as such.   
 
An autoethnography, such as mine, is used as a methodology to illustrate and expose the broader 
meta-cultural phenomena as well as the more micro cultural phenomena; both being universal 
underpinnings of the Silenced Manifesto.  A sample of one is not egotistical or narcissistic.  The 
singular sample size enriches the study and analysis by depicting a different alternative viewpoint 
– amplifying the whisper of the disabled, or the ‘handicapped’ as I have been labelled and 
defined.  Again, through the labelling and the culture labelling, here is a strong reference to the 
Silenced Manifesto.    
 
The Silenced Manifesto – its application to all narratives 
 
The universality of the Silenced Manifesto can be expressed by the concept/s of colonisation and 
discrimination, where the marginalised are ultimately disempowered, by not having the resources 
necessary for agency, not knowing the language of the powerful and as such, not being able to 




micro/macro/and metanarratives where agency and structure suffocate and limit the freedom of 
everyone, but most importantly in this case, the mentally ill. 
 
The universal narratives as part of the Silenced Manifesto include those related to tangible 
textualized objects such as discourse, text, language, historical accounts, stories, policies, rules 
and regulations, government acts, and measurement.  The Silenced Manifesto illustrates the 
silenced’s position.  For example, where there is an imbalance of power, this imbalance is hidden 
and silenced both overtly and definitely covertly.  The silence in its overt form is omnipresent 
and ubiquitous, and more covertly, unseen, unheard or unheeded.   
 
The silence permeates all narratives, universally, to various degrees.  Examples of how the 
Silenced Manifesto is perpetuated as a universal concept include categorising the underdog as 
lacking and part of a crisis of representation, as per (post)colonisation (Smith 1999).  The 
universal application of the Silenced Manifesto can be related to the system of governance and 
politics which has contributed to the discourse separating Us and Other, colonisers and colonised.  
This discourse infiltrates the macro narrative where the structure of the health system is pieced 
together by policies and bureaucracy (Lea 2008).  The Silenced Manifesto, with its universal and 
suffocating discourse developed through history, describes how the marginalised cry out to be 
heard.  Yet their voice is stifled by the weight of colonising labels such as stigma.  They live with 
a perpetual and invisible limit that confines and defines their freedom to succeed in ways that 
they wish.  This is similar to the metaphor of the glass ceiling associated with the struggle of 
feminism to achieve in their career goals (Shade 2018).   Foucault (1961; 1976) advocates for 
basing concepts of power imbalance in their historical situatedness, such as those socially 




and confined by a historical development of governance and politics that essentially labels the 
Other into a dynamic of socially crafted reality (Hacking 1999; Lea 2008).   
 
The meta narrative of national and international governance is streamed down into the macro 
narrative of the health system, which in turn is streamed down to an individual, a micro narrative, 
where internal struggles of power play with relationships and knowledge are negotiated and 
textualized into a discourse that can be situated universally.  The individual narrative 
reappropriates into a great internal struggle.  This internal struggle is navigated within forced 
boundaries, succumbing to power negotiates of narratives, of the Silenced Manifesto.    
 
Another universal application of the Silenced Manifesto can be related to class actions against 
the Catholic Church from then abused children, or even the stolen generation amongst Australian 
Indigenous peoples where these disempowered people have had their worlds classified and 
categorised as per their dominant and decriminalised discourse.  The institutionalised are good 
examples of how discourse and silencing are infiltrated by a culture that fundamentally, yet 
covertly, endorses inequality, as power is negotiated between Us and Other and knowledge 
production.   
 
This culture perpetuates a system that inadvertently and covertly and mostly unknowingly 
endorses and supports discrimination and disparity.  The universal application of the Silenced 
Manifesto situates the universal narrative of a culture into a socialised dynamic, albeit a culture 





At times subhumans, sub-citizens and social misfits fall into the realms and traps and labelling 
of each of the narratives, that is micro/macro/meta narratives.  It is not unusual for there to be 
miscommunication between the three narratives.  At times, through the dynamics of different 
narratives, one questions the extent and precipitation to which the culture perpetuates the 
existence of the subhumans, sub-citizens and social misfits.  Considering this, one should 
question who is silenced and not silenced in the politics of the narratives.  I question who is 
marginalised and disempowered by this process.  Which characters have gained and/or lost 
power?  And considering the process and development of narratives, looking outside the square, 
the mentally ill can and should craft their own narrative, to try and empower and demystify, and 
to unpack the stigma that exists so pervasively in culture.  Here the Silenced Manifesto is 
anthromorphised, where the manifesto can personify narrative/s.  Through the narrative/s, and its 
system of organisation of language and symbols the disempowered are given a voice.  The 
silenced have come alive. 
 
My Narrative, Language and the Silenced Manifesto  
 
“Here the underdog are not heard.  They speak another language. There is little commensurable 
space to communicate and understand.  Who are the silenced?  Who are the noisy?”  
(Field notes June 12th, 2018)   
 
I hope my narrative will assist to emancipate those living with a psychotic illness.  By revealing 
in text my hidden world of being dehumanised and disabled, being forced into an identity of 




to empower those living with schizoaffective disorder, and indeed potentially other mental 
illnesses.  The discourse revealed by my narrative.       
 
This narrative explores some of the dynamics between the self, the production of knowledge (the 
factoids generated), the technologies of governance, and the compilation of the use of 
measurement into a system of governmentality, to be used to validate, justify and make 
accountable the position of the service implementers.  I am still trying to reconcile or find some 
commensurability between the motive of the service provider, the rigour of the methodology 
which makes the service provision valid and accountable, the ultimate governance of services, 
and the self-determination and agency of the service recipient.   
 
Language is the site of social organisation, within which power is exercised and contested.  To 
the present time, reality consists of many narratives and discourses.   As a site of exploration and 
struggle, language is constantly an area where there are competing meanings and related 
practices, and discourses (Foucault 1978; 1979).  Discourses represent the negotiations of power 
between groups and individuals to determine what is ‘true’ in relation to each other.  What 
something means to an individual is dependent on the discourses available to them (Grant 2010: 
581).  The Silenced Manifesto utilises the worth of language and communication to negotiate 
powerplay in discussion of self within the space of commensurability.  
 
The sick person encounters difficult medical languages as s/he moves through the health care 
system (Kleinman 1980: 53).  Sickness is to be understood and explained by semantic networks.  




experience, psychological states and social relationships.  Healing viewed from that perspective 
involves the same semantic networks (Kleinman 1980: 364).  The social is intertwined by 
symbols, and to language it is a necessity to communicate internally and externally in the social 
landscape.  Symbols and thereby language, are fundamental and pivotal to all functions social 
and otherwise. 
 
Language is the system that permits structured thinking.  Thinking is the ‘system output’ that 
occurs in the interactions between subjects (situated within culture) and the environment (nature).  
These interactions, social, cultural or otherwise, are the objects of thinking.  Language allows us 
to communicate in social relationships; and to categorise our environment as represented symbols 
(Appignanesi 2004).  Language, a symbolic tool supporting the connections within the social, 
can be likened to a social entity, a cultural artefact.  In its operations, sometimes illicit, language 
may (dis)empower, silence and control, as per the Silenced Manifesto.  Language connects 
medicine as it connects and translates the experience of madness and its negotiation of power.   
 
Foucault explains how power is a relationship not an object (Foucault in Rabinow 2002).  Our 
identity, experience and stories are intertwined with the identities, experience and stories of the 
Other; our writing must be both faithful to experience and respectful of relationships.  Sometimes 
these narratives show that individual experience does not fit theory (Richard 2008: 1720 in Ellis 
& Bochner; Muncey 2005).   
 
Richards (2008: 1720) argues that narratives are often treated as data for a researcher.  They do 
not, however, come into existence as data, but instead as a process of identification formation 
that has significance for the narrator.  They are formed as individual stories that are generalisable.  




linkages, there is structure and agency and their intersection, then colonisers and colonised, and 
social reproduction and social change (Laslett 1999: 392 in Wall 2008: 39).   
 
Narratives are created and maintained by social phenomena, which also creates and maintains 
individual phenomena.  Like all stories, narratives are a way of making sense of things, in this 
case, mental health.   Mental health narratives are often presented with culturally embedded 
symbols that reveal personal and social beliefs (Sharf & Vanderford 2003). Indeed, in analysing 
the phenomena of narratives, the concept of socially constructed facts is precipitated.  The cycle 
of deviance and mental health turns again and again.  In this cycle, the mentally ill remain 
squashed into a medicalised narrative.   
 
The biomedical model can be described as a cultural system, which precipitates the political, 
economic, social and environmental narratives of mental health.  DiGiacomo (Senior et al 2006) 
argues that the position of biomedicine as a cultural system focuses on the symbolic structures, 
events, and relationships involved in biomedicine (Kleinman 1987: 341), including micro, macro 
and meta narratives.  DiGiacomo describes the power dynamics of biomedicine between the 
positions of micro (the individual doctor) and macro (the national medical system) and meta (the 
broader international health system) and how it negotiates and compares to the individual micro 
system of symbolic structures, events, and relationships in the cultural system of the dynamics 
of the micro self.  The cultural dynamic in the micro/macro/meta biomedicine narrative is 
exemplified by the example of DiGiacomo.  Her experience of biomedicine illustrates the cultural 
complexities of her battle to be involved in the decision-making process of her treatment, and to 





Mental health patients, the mental health professionals and government bodies upholding policies 
form the institution of mental health service delivery.  The culture embedding and centring 
mental health service delivery has traditionally been borne from the positivist macro-narrative of 
medical science.  With the advent of social sciences, other narratives were introduced into the 
mental health vernacular.  What is of great importance is the new emphasis of new types of 
measurements, thus new ways of delivering assessments, diagnosis and treatments.  I am 
interested in unpacking and repacking the foundation and the contents of the social structure of 
mental health service delivery, which I believe creates a sound basis for culture analysis, 
illustrating and highlighting the grounded values and norms.    
 
Reality here is viewed as textual and understood within the parameters of language.  Reality 
consists of many micro, macro and meta narratives and discourses, which are all reliant on the 
structure and utilisation of language, encompassing the values of the Silenced Manifesto.  The 
social world is structured, covertly, by our means of understanding and communicating in the 
world, which is through the prism of symbols and language.  Narratives and discourses, directed 
by language, control us but we are not overtly aware as we are so engulfed in them.  In our 
everyday lives we are blinded by this power play as we are so accustomed to it.  Derrida (1978) 
argued that we must deconstruct and make less natural or real the meta-narrative at hand.  The 








Reality and the Silenced Manifesto 
 
“What makes ideas real is the system of knowledge, the formations of culture and the 
relations of power in which these concepts are located...a major sociological concern 
becomes a struggle over the extent to which individual consciousness and reality shapes or 
is shaped by social structure”  
(Smith 1999)    
 
Socially crafted reality, a relatively new developed concept, in the last fifty years or so, is part of 
a re-arrangement of views of science and rationalisation, creates a whole new gamut of cultural 
artefacts (Lea 2008).  These cultural artefacts, developed from a self-reflective social 
construction of reality, act to construct madness.  As an anthropologist, I am consumed by the 
social construction of reality.  I cannot separate the cerebral from the social.  Neither can I 
separate reality from other social phenomena like culture, politics, spirituality and economics.  
 
Now the question lies, how is reality constructed, albeit socially constructed, by someone with a 
psychotic illness that fundamentally skews all perceptions of reality?  Psychosis is a social 
construction in the sense that its ramifications and the magnitude of its true meaning are very 
much defined in the social phenomena.  If psychosis were not such a stigma those suffering from 
this mental illness would not be so ostracised, demoralised and stereotyped as subhuman, sub-
citizens and social denigrates. 
 
Then there is another factor in the socially crafted concept – verisimilitude – the feeling or 




does not come quietly wrapped in facts.  Facts are the consequences of the ways in which we 
represent.   Latour (1991: 21) states the philosophers of science and historians of ideas would 
like to avoid the world of the laboratory.   
 
Health care systems are socially and culturally constructed.  They are a form of a social 
construction of reality.  A social construction of reality signifies the world of human interaction 
existing outside the individual and between individuals (Kleinman: 1980: 25).  At the same time, 
something can be both biomedically real and a social construct.  
 
In each case, the chaotic repetition and heterogeneous iteration and absorption of health facts has 
its own specific density of encounter (Hacking 1999), but at the same time each moment forms 
part of a wider patterning.  They both draw on and reify historical classifications (the agreed 
consolations of phenomena that warrants sombre measurement) and a culturally established 
“trust in numbers” (Porter 1990).  That is, each iteration embeds and is embedded within a deep 
socio-cultural underpinning that imbues statistical representation with a logic and 
comprehensibility they would not otherwise have given their highly abstracted character.  This 
heritage enables first the authoring of factual research within health (and ordains the institutional 
resources such authoring relies upon) and second the widespread acceptance is that such cultural 
artefacts are transparent representations of a more serious underlying social construction of 
reality they purpose purport to explain (Lea 2008: 145).  
 
Regarding the Silenced Manifesto and its place in the dialogue between what creates reality, 




living with a psychotic illness, is understood both as biomedical and social.  Each perspective 
has its own discourse that seeks to find a space of commensurability to understand the language 
of each other.  Communication, text, discourse, language of the silenced is more about the realm 
of the social sciences than the biomedical sciences.  The social construction of reality for the 
silenced is about those who are silenced just as much as those who are already granted a clear 
voice.  It is a discourse between the silenced – the subhuman, sub-citizen and social misfit – and 
the powerful - the greater debate of governance.  The Silenced Manifesto depicts a space for 
reality construction that lives within the boundaries of discourse, albeit a quiet discourse.  
Considering a socially constructed reality, which cannot be negated, there is little conceptual 
space for a reality to exist in isolation from its discourse.  The reality of biomedicine also cannot 
exist in isolation from its discourse.  Again, reality relies on a space of commensurability between 
sociality, in this case culture, and medical science.                       
 
The biomedical realm has historically encompassed mental health, but mental health biomedical 
science cannot be understood separately from the social construction of reality.  For example, 
during my admission to Ward B (public), I was desperate to have social contact.  For me, social 
contact re-fuels me so that I have the courage to go on.  It helps me to stay strong.  However, 
Ward B (public)was highly stigmatised within the Town B community.  It limited my visitors 
due to the stigma and poor reputation it has.  I was shamed, gutted.  I was made to feel a social 







Labelling Theory and Measurement and the Silenced Manifesto 
 
“It should be noted that it is ironic to label what we state we should not label.”  
(Field notes January 5th, 2014) 
 
I have difficulty in being labelled.  To be called ‘handicapped’ by progressive health 
professionals today is disempowering, although it may well be true.  Who do I trust now?  ‘My 
own ‘questionable’ and ‘lacking’ perception of reality, social construction of reality or 
supposedly named positivist reality?  Or should I perhaps trust the scientific and rigorous 
cognitive functioning test performed on me by an experienced neuropsychologist?  Do I trust the 
cultural artefacts of the testing over my own perspective?  Which perspective reigns with the 
most power?  Should I trust my individuality over categorisation?  What does all this mean in 
the context of the social construction of reality, the reality formed through social dynamics, the 
neuro-psychological assessment, and the cultural artefact?  Does the artefact legitimise madness? 
  
I think that I have less capacity and capability in my cognition.  With the example of my 
emotional investment in psychometric testing, it makes me feel defeated, depressed, conquered 
and crushed.  Even with testing that is supposed to empower me by discovering my strengths, I 
am still defined as lacking.  I have let down my family, my friends and myself.  I feel great shame, 
it encompasses me still... I drown in it.  I know that it is silly of me to invest time in even thinking 
about the stigma that infects me.  I don’t seem to have a choice. 
 
The internalisation of the label develops into a self-fulfilling prophecy: if the individual is 




For example, if a teacher praises and encourages a student, the student is more likely to succeed 
(Scheff 1974).   
 
As discussed, measurement has become a tool, depicting a kaleidoscopic, dynamic and socio-
cultural production of knowledge.  The assessment process creates a space of knowledge 
production, a formation of political technology where the act of ‘measurement’, also narrative 
development, forms a type of discovery which has political and governmental significance.  The 
measurements produce knowledge: transforming the numbers into factoids (Lea 2008).  The 
factoids become more structured conceptually as the language and symbols of knowledge 
production.  As part of the language of scientific knowledge, these factoids/objects of knowledge 
become validations for governance, to ‘measure the unmeasurable’. (Lea 2008) Similarly, the 
Silenced Manifesto represents a concept where a hegemonic discourse stifles the heard, so its 
becomes a negotiation of ‘to hear the unhearable’.   
 
Psychometric measurements, embodied as factoids, are socio-political technologies which aid in 
the governmentality of modern power structures.  There are no completely reliable and valid 
measures to assess mental health patients, and there are certainly not reliable and exact measures 
to direct treatment.     
 
Broadly speaking, in this thesis, tools for measurement are classified as socially created defences 
and weaponry to justify mistreatment and misrepresentation and the disempowerment of people 
living with a major psychotic illness, and perhaps all people living with a mental illness.  There 
is a sacredness about measurement, about culture, about representation and meaning.  Each 
measurement utilises a tool of some sort.  These measurements are objectified to define and 





Having schizoaffective disorder immediately categorises you as a social misfit, deviant, 
subhuman, sub-citizen.  These underdogs are unable to experience full quality of life.  Some of 
this negative labelling can be blamed on, quite ironically, measurement.  Measurement is 
assumed to be liberating as it is presumed to define and provide answers to troubling questions.  
How am I de-humanised?  How is this defined?  What are the tools of diagnosis, the tools that 
measure sanity?  And what is the broader significance of these measurements?  How do the 
mental health professionals measure the seemly unmeasurable?   
 
In exploring the anthropology of evaluation and measurement, one must consider the 
anthropology of accountability (Lea 2008), including validation and justification.  Lea (2008: 
120) argues for the “persuasive power of the pie charts’’.  A pie chart is an artefact of evaluations, 
and an artefact of medical science – to me, evidence of tunnel vision and science bias.  What are 
the power dynamics involved in evaluation, measurement and accountability?  What are the 
social constructions of facts – ‘factoids’ (Lea 2008), and the cultural/statistical artefacts geared 
to justify reproduction of cultural institutions/phenomena, such as bureaucracies?  Then there are 
the phenomena of silenced reports on shelves, representational evidence of the Silenced 
Manifesto.   
 
Latour (1991: 241) states that today, those who are labelled as mentally ill are society’s 
stigmatised scapegoats, officially and in principle.  Historically, for example, both the medieval 
witch and the modern mentally ill patient have been the scapegoats of society.  Latour goes on 




the addict, the homosexual – all and many more are said to have a mental illness (Latour 1991: 
122-123).   
 
The labelling of downcast and social misfit came about as defined categories through a dominant 
culture which highly values economic, social and political classes.  For example, during times 
when I have been very unwell, I have been unable to work.  My economic class thus changed.  I 
received the disability pension.  I had become a dependent on the State.  I was not value-adding 
to the economy.  I felt great shame as I could not contribute.  I even felt shame in front of my 
family and friends.  They did not judge me – they felt sorry for me.  This perpetuated my shame.  
The cause of this, arguably, is the culture that perpetuates being subhuman, sub-citizen and/or a 
social misfit.  I was labelled, and I could not do anything about it.  As a young woman when I 
was diagnosed, it was through the culture of medical science that my identity was set, and this 
identity has been perpetuated via stigma. 
 
Social theory and the Silenced Manifesto 
 
Theory can help to make sense of this.  Theory enables us to make assumptions and predictions 
about the world in which we live.  Research and theories that follow have a great significance for 
[subhumans] that are embedded in our history under the gaze of Western imperialism and 
Western science.  Social science is based upon ideas, beliefs and theories about the social world 





People always live in some form of structure.  Subhumans and sub-citizens, as categories are a 
part of structure, as are colonialism and the rights of citizenship [or lack of] in ways that produced 
the underdog discourse, related to the underclass.  Goldberg (1993) shows how this process is 
being extended and renewed by categories dominant in present day social societies, for example 
the ‘West’; ‘underclass’; and the ‘primitive’.   
 
Poststructuralism is mentioned here as being closely aligned to postmodernism, but perhaps also 
reactive to it by negating the importance of all social theorising, not limiting social analysis just 
to multiple truths.  In reaction to exploring and negating, the nature of structuralism is known by 
deconstructing it.  There are no macro-universal truths, nor micro nor nano-truths.  Social power 
play is rife, which brings to light the nuances of the social in practice and the social in theory, if 
there is an actual difference between the two.  For a short time, Foucault claimed to be a post 
structuralist (Foucault in O’Farrell 2007)  
 
Poststructionalism can be understood as measurements, assessments and diagnostic tools that 
become cultural artefacts in the world of poststructuralist medical science and specifically 
poststructuralist psychiatry.  In this case, they form part of the vernacular of psychiatric language, 
from culture and structure.  The mental health workers use techniques of measurement, diagnosis 
and treatment, a structure of poststructuralist medical knowledge, to stake a claim on the way the 
mentally ill should live.  The mentally ill – Other – not being privy to the sanctity of 






(Post)colonialism and the Silenced Manifesto 
 
The discourse of solidarity and political reconstruction has retreated into the academy, where it 
is theorized as ‘(post)colonialism’.  Here we find the critical theorizing of scholars like Edward 
Said and Gayatri Spivak, both of whom construct analyses of the colonial Self and the colonized 
Other.  (Or ‘Us’ and ‘Other’ as I have been naming it.)  As Edward Said (in Smith 1999: 38) 
asked: “Who writes? For whom is the writing being done?  In what circumstances?”  
 
The only way I could retain some self-respect during my hospital admissions was to employ my 
skills as an anthropologist.  As did DiGiacomo (1987), I started to unpack what I was seeing 
around me, what I was experiencing and how people were relating to each other.  I observed 
negotiations of power, which defined the mentally ill as colonised (Smith 1999).  
 
“At some point there has to be dialogue across the boundaries of oppositions.” (Smith 1999: 40).  
As Smith (1999) argues, human nature, that is the essential characteristics of the person, is an 
overarching concern for Western philosophy even though the concepts of ‘human’ and ‘nature’ 
seem to be in opposition to each other.  The separation between mind and body, the investing of 
a human person with a sole psyche and consciousness, the distinction between sense and reason, 
definitions of human virtue and morality, are all cultural constructs.  While the workings of the 
mind may be associated in Western thinking, primarily with the human brain, the mind itself is 
a concept or an idea.   
 
The struggle to assert and claim humanity has been a consistent thread of anti-colonial discourses 




content to [let people suffer] with a benign refusal to attribute blame and locate responsibility 
accurately (Smith 1999: 27; 144).  There remains pervasive gaps between the colonisers and the 
(post)colonised.  There is the income gap, the education gap, the class gap, and the gap between 
privileged and deprived neighborhoods (Kowal 2006) 
 
Historically situated, the European powers had by the nineteenth century already established 
systems of rules and forms of social relations which governed interaction with the Indigenous 
people being colonised.  The same can be said of the mentally ill.  The principal of humanity was 
one way in which the mentally ill, or peoples seen as not fully human, enabled and justified 
various policies of social control (Smith 1999: 28).  You cannot look at colonised relationships 
without addressing the complex problem of power relations (Smith 1999: 23).   
 
Ethnographers turning into autoethnographers, came to realize that stories were complex, 
constitutive, meaningful phenomena that taught morals and ethics, introduced unique ways of 
thinking and feeling, and helped people make sense of themselves and others (Adams 2008; 
Bochner 2001; Bochner & Ellis 2002; Fisher 1984). Furthermore, there was an increasing need 
to resist colonialist and sterile research impulses of authoritatively entering a culture, exploiting 
cultural members, and then recklessly leaving to write about the culture for monetary and/or 
professional gain, while disregarding relational ties to cultural members (Conquergood 1991; 
Riedmann 1993; Ellis 2007).  
 
Ellis (2011) posits that autoethnography may be associated with a type called Indigenous or 
native ethnographies, where the autoethnography is developed from colonised or economically 




reaction of cultural guilt expressed by white Australians to Australia’s Indigenous citizens 
(Denzin and Lincoln 2005: 773).  Once at the service of the (White, masculine, heterosexual, 
middle/upper-classed, Christian, able-bodied) autoethnographer Indigenous/native 
ethnographers now work to construct their own personal and cultural stories; they no longer find 
(forced) subjugation excusable (see Denzin, Lincoln & Smith 2008).  The Indigenous social 
structures which Western anthropologists purport to study may in fact be artefacts of the colonial 
era (Layton 1997: 190).  And these cultural artefacts have histories within the colonial era. 
 
‘Archaeology’ was the term Foucault used during the 1960s to describe his approach to 
writing history. Archaeology is about examining the discursive traces and orders left by the 
past to write a 'history of the present'. In other words, archaeology is about looking at history 
as a way of understanding the processes that have led to what we are today (Foucault in 
O'Farrell 2007). 
 
Madness is associated with a break in historic structure, our historic hegemonic structure of 
White, masculine, heterosexual, middle/upper-classed, Christian, able-bodied perspective.  
All ideas have histories, and they have different types of histories, including social histories 
(Hacking 1999: 30).  Anything worth calling a construction has a history (Hacking 1999: 50).  
To understand the character of certain issues means to examine their history (Latour 1991: 
113).   
 
Over the last centuries, both the study and treatment of the mentally ill has been captured by the 




natural sciences and spread into the realms of the social sciences.  We can now claim that mental 
health was pathologised in its conception, borne from biomedicine.  More recently mental health 
has been socialised.  What is socialised and ostracised, the social sub-citizen, is also pathologised.  
DiGiacomo (1992) states that anthropologists fear clinicians will not take them seriously unless 
they accept the concept of biomedical diseases as the gold standard.  There is a hierarchy in 
mental health care, historically, classing the biomedical model above all else. 
 
Governance, Politics, Policy and the Silenced Manifesto  
 
“How is madness bureaucratised and made a part of social policy?  And how is madness 
governed if not by measurement and science?   The stigma of the mentally ill is protected 
and authorised by the government bureaucracy.”  
(Field notes 16th, 2017)       






Hanisch argued that the political is embodied in the personal, and vice versa (Hanisch 1969; 
1970; Richards 2008: 1724).  It is about giving a voice, empowering the silenced, the social 
outcasts, and recognising the cultural meaning and significance that the outcasts are confined to 
(Butler 2000).  Living with schizoaffective disorder, I feel conflicted.  I feel conflicted and 
confused as if my world is falling in around me.  It is about an assault of the mind as well as 
culture.  I question the culture that suffocates me as such, often without my input or true 
representation.  It is about recognising the importance of the foundations of knowledge in the 
broader system of politics and economics.  Such is the task of the Silenced Manifesto, removing 
the silenced reports off the shelves and putting mental health experience and discourse into the 
vernacular. The vernacular being the language of the powerful in mental health, that is simply 





Considering the ’manifesto’ part of the concept of the ‘Silenced Manifesto’, is the discourse that 
the hegemonic culture covertly/overtly uses, via its texts, to claim power over the marginalised 
in society.  For example, the discourse developed over Australian history and used by Australian 
governments to covertly have power over the mentally ill, and at the same time disempower the 
mentally ill, becomes the Silenced Manifesto.  Continuing, the manifesto becomes a cultural 
artefact, the sentiment of which is entrenched firmly in the tools of governance.  The use of 
language covertly and/or overtly entrenches the strategy of governance.  Its (mis)representation 
of the marginalised in government policy cements the imbalanced power relations between 
government and the mentally ill.  Unequal access to and influence on policy, especially the 
language of policy representing the true needs of the mentally ill, demonstrates a significant 
misappropriation of power.  Control over the government texts, that is the government’s cultural 
artefacts in the form of policies, demonstrates the power of State and its political use of language.  
Language becomes texts, texts become cultural discourses, discourses become enculturated 
manifesto, the manifesto covertly and overtly identified and empowered in governance and 
policy - the silenced manifesto breathes, it breaks through and comes to life.  The suppressed 
voices of the mentally ill are silenced and situated within the cultural discourse of governance.           
 
Latour (1991: 213) argues that the State owns everything, people included.  People are at once 
an investment and a product.  Which makes their identity...what?     
 
Governmentality as a strategy and rationale, Foucault claims, has dominated political power in 
Western countries since the eighteenth century (Lupton 2013: 115).  “For some scholars drawing 
upon Foucault’s writings, ‘dispositif’ is a term used to encompass the governing of the social 
body, configuring a heterogeneous assemblage of discursive, administrative, technical, legal, 




bringing together of these heterogeneous elements, or knowledge structures, which enhance and 
maintain the exercise of power within the social body” (Lupton 2013: 118).  According to Lupton 
(2013: 118-119), some suggest in the form of neo-liberalism, maintaining social order and 
governance relies on productive and dispersed forms of authority.  Citizens are cultivated to 
govern themselves and to focus on self-actualisation rather than emancipation. 
 
Measurement is empowered, seemly by scientists, to be a socio-cultural entity with its own 
agency.  It is empowered to define service delivery implementation as a form of political 
technology.  As well, measurement is seen as an object of governance; empowered to play a 
significant part in knowledge production and as an object of knowledge.  Foucault argues that 
the individual is not something that needs to be liberated, rather the individual is the closely 
monitored product of relations between power and knowledge (O'Farrell 2007).  Foucault uses 
the word to refer to the fact that it is not just the object of knowledge which is constructed but 
also the knower (O’Farrell 2005).  Knowledge is decreed acceptable if the governing body 
declares it as such.  Knowledge constructions are not produced in sterile and stoic vacuums.  
Human volatility is considered, as well as the significance of cultural constructs.   
 
Freedom is a cultural construct.  Foucault notes that he “believes solidly in human freedom”.  He 
also argues against nineteenth century existentialist views of an abstract freedom and a ‘free’ 
subject and says that freedom is a practice rather than a goal to be achieved.  Knowledge starts 
with rules and constraints, not freedom.  Freedom is also a condition for the exercise of power 
(Foucault in O’Farrell (2007).  
 
The medical factoids, as well as being objects of governance by the health professionals, have 




complex, and dynamic, socio-cultural production of knowledge.  Factoids become more 
structured conceptually as objects of knowledge.  These objects support governance.   The 
factoids thus can become objects that support the biomedical truth; the truth that is supported and 
validated by medical science, including psychiatry.  According to Foucault (2007), “the 
individual is not something that needs to be liberated rather, the individual is the closely 
monitored product of relations between power and knowledge”.  Foucault argues that power play 
exists in all interactions including the measurement process which is essentially a production of 
knowledge based on socio-cultural and political factoids.  (Foucault 2007).  For example, the 
mental health professionals, to varying degrees, retain a position of power over the mentally ill, 
perpetuated by a system of dependence.  To illustrate, despite my apparent independence and 
functionality, I am forced into a dynamic of dependence to get my medication.  And I have in the 
past have had to get this in a public place at a set time, with no regard to the fact that I might 
have a job and other things to do.  “Always, there is monitoring, measuring and medicating. 
Always.” (McMahon 2017: 26)   
 
Lea (2008) argues that white men, middle class, able bodied, and non LGBTIQA+ develop and 
empower bureaucracies and policy magic, enabling the inner sanctum of policy a life and value 
of their own. Policy is central to governance infrastructure, linking together the substance of 
socio-cultural, political and economic foundations.   Good medicine would be given status and 
legal protection by the State; it would be the task of the State to make sure that a true art of curing 
does exist (Foucault 1973: 20).  Medicine and the health care system in Australia are mostly 





The National Mental Health Strategy is a commitment by Australian governments to improve 
the lives of people living with a mental illness (Department of Health 2014).  National quality 
frameworks, part of the backbone of mental health policy, form objects of governance.  These 
policy objects of governance define objects of knowledge, which in turn and cyclically, produce 
objects of governance (Johnstone 2001; Jenkins 2002).  The bureaucracy decrees psychometric 
measurements as a necessary tool for knowledge production, an extension of the biomedical 
model and scientific measurement which defines and justifies national policy and governance 
(Lea 2008).   
  
“Today’s mental health institutions and hospitals are all about measuring and judging and 
surveillance.”  
(Field notes November 22nd, 2015)  
 
The mental health assessment tools and medical observations, cultural artefacts of modern 
psychiatry, are all about measuring and judging deviance.  Measurement tools are negotiated as 
tools of governance.  They are promoted and supplied with a price.  They are commodified.  
Policy is commodified.  Governmentality is commodified.  Psychiatric care is commodified.  
Wellness is commodified. The Silenced Manifesto, incorporating all these things, is also 
commodified.  There is a glass ceiling of oppression and subjugation when being commodified 







The Space of Commensurablity and the Silenced Manifesto 
 
Part of the role of the rehabilitation nurse in Ward B (public) was to find some space of 
commensurability between wellness and unwellness, to improve communication and 
understanding and preparedness, and thus to minimise the time spent in hospital.  Although this 
didn’t happen in my case.  Efforts for rehabilitation were a piece meal gesture, with little agency 
or effect.   In this instance the space of commensurablity can appear to be tokenistic or even false.    
 
The space of the Silenced Manifesto has historical roots.  Foucault’s concept of historical 
situatedness describes the factors that have been instrumental in the development of the space of 
commensurability, related to the paradigm of the Silenced Manifesto.  In his book, Madness and 
Civilisation (1961), Foucault studied the sub-citizens or deviants in society, including prisoners, 
homosexuals and the mentally ill.  Foucault here discussed the ways that our identities are 
historically produced and situated.   
 
As discussed in chapter three, in the Middles Ages the mentally ill were an accepted part of public 
life, but by 1650, the mentally ill were burnt as witches.  In the eighteenth century, the mentally 
ill were classed as abnormal and removed from society.  Then with George III’s delirious descent 
in 1788, satirists and cartoonists were given a golden opportunity.  Madness had become a sort 
of entertainment.  The mentally ill were re-categorised again, this time as entertainment, freaks.  
In the twentieth century, the mentally ill were medicalised, pathologised and became patients and 
experiments of medical science and institutionalisation.  So, the terms of what have defined 
mental illness and its association with deviancy have changed.  In modern times, according to 




relative to the recent legacy of medical science.  The silenced are gagged again.  The hegemonic 
culture perpetuates the discourse.  Yet this is the space where social change can happen; through 
a shared space where language and power can be negotiated. 
 
“Mental health, as a socio-cultural phenomenon, has developed over hundreds of years, 
with foundations in superstition and growing into medical science and positivism, and then 
becoming more relatable to the social sciences”.   
(Field notes May 11th, 2015) 
 
The concept of power negotiation has been a strong theme in this thesis.  Mental health services 
have long been influenced by landscapes of power.  We are also confronting geographics of 
power within the acute care experiences (Liggins, Kearns & Adams 2013: 108).  The landscape 
for those living with a mental illness, as decreed by Foucault (1973: 188-189), states that disease 
exists in space before it exists in sight.  The landscape of the disease is also immediately a causal 
space.   
 
As for the landscapes of power, as recently as 1860, it was not necessary to be mentally ill to be 
incarcerated in an American mental institution.  It was enough to be a married woman.   
“Married women...may be entered or detained in the hospital at the request of the husband of the 
woman or the guardian...without the evidence of insanity required with other cases” (Szasz 1970: 
15). 
 
To clarify, institutionalisation refers to the process of embedding some cultural conception (for 
example, a belief, a norm, social role, value or mode of behaviour) within the control of an 




the institution is a prison – structures for the confinement of socially undesirable persons, that is 
subhuman, sub-citizen and social misfits.  Foucault (1961; 1963) declares that in the eighteenth 
century, institutional spatialisation of disease makes its appearance.  There grows space for 
interrelations and power play between each micro and macro conception. 
 
Hacking (1999: 58) argues that categories of knowledge are used to empower relationships.  As 
a fundamental statement that Foucault generated and supported, power is intrinsically linked with 
knowledge.  Whoever has knowledge has power and vice versa.  Whoever has knowledge, then 
power, has the resources to disempower or empower themselves and Others.  When the 
discourses of power are in the hands of the underdog, the power distribution shifts, even if only 
briefly (Foucault 1961, 1975; Richard 2008: 1724).  To expand, being known about is interrelated 
to knowability.  According to Hobbes, [creating a language] which understands power to equal 
knowledge, there is an equation that is at the root of the entire modern (Latour 1991: 26).   
  
The Silenced Manifesto can here be noted as having created a commensurable cultural space 
from which a discourse of mental health, from all perspectives, including policy, can be defined.  
I want the mentally ill to have their voice heard and to create a discourse platform from which 
they/we can obtain strength.  In this context, I ask the questions: how can I break through the 
cultural divide, break through the disempowerment and misrepresentation bestowed on me 
because of culture?  How am I labelled and defined?  Who is granted a voice in this cultural 







The Silenced Manifesto and stigma  
  
Stigma comes from the Greek, to mark or brand.  Stigma refers to marks that publicly disgrace 
the person (Kleinman 1988: 158).  Goffman (1963: 2) notes that in more recent times, stigma has 
come to refer more to the disgrace then to the actual bodily mark.  “The normal and the 
stigmatised are not persons but rather perspectives” (Goffman: 1963: 138).  The changed 
meaning is an instance of the more general process of the psychologising of experience in the 
West, through which metaphors of distress and other human problems that were once bodily have 
become mental.  Even amongst those living with disease, there is a social hierarchy of health.  
Lack of social support and feelings of stigmatisation can hinder health care utilisation (Wohl et 
al 2011 in Spieldenner 2014).  Those first stigmatised were associated with their religious beliefs.  
Later, the association shifted. Meaning was then related as a person to be a slave, a criminal, or 
a traitor – deformed, ugly, blemished, ritually polluted and to be avoided.  The unwell are also 
associated as social misfits - especially in public places behaviour clashes with social norms.  It 
is questionable where the space of commensurability is, and who has the louder voice when 
conducting or considering a shared space with the stigmatised -  they become part of the Silenced 
Manifesto.   
 
The Silenced Manifesto and the stigmatised self  
 
My self-image is largely dominated by a belief that I am handicapped by my mental illness. The 
consequence of being labelled mentally ill includes such penalties of personal degradation, loss 




last, but not least, involuntary incarceration in a mental hospital, possibly for life (Szasz 1970: 
xxxi). 
 
Grant (2010: 581) argues that there are various types of self in relation to society, with various 
types of stigma.  Firstly, the cultural self informs and influences our experience of ourselves, 
Others and the world.  In a modern theoretical landscape, having many different ‘selves’ to draw 
on, in a constantly shifting interior landscape, the boundaries between self and Other, mediated 
by language, are often blurred. 
 
A type of social self, according to Grant (2010: 581) is the stigmatised, Othered self.  Goffman 
(1963) has contributed much to the discussion of stigma.  His book, Stigma: Notes on the 
Management of Spoiled Identity (1963), is summarised by examining those who are considered 
less than human, that is subhuman.  For example, the woman, the disfigured person, the blind, 
the homosexual, the mentally ill patient and the member of a racial or religious minority, all 
identities that can be considered areas of judgement, judged potentially as socially ‘abnormal’, 
and therefore in danger of being considered less than human, a subhuman.   
 
For the human predator in society, the rule is to stigmatise or be stigmatised (Latour 1991: 260).  
How and why are some people treated more humanely while others are met with silence, disgust 
and abuse (Adams, Jones & Ellis 2015: 14)? What about the silenced?  The silences in mental 
health governance and the mental health lived experience?  What are the often-silenced voices 
of the stigmatised saying (Liggins, Kearns & Adams 2013: 106)?  Here the Silenced Manifesto 





Discourse and the Silenced Manifesto  
 
The discourse mandating and officiating the colonising reality described here, and the 
perpetuating culture that situates and brings meaning to the plight of the mentally ill, creates the 
’manifesto’.  The manifesto can be described as today’s mental health discourse, borne from a 
histology in medical science, and developed in time to dominate those who are lacking, the 
mentally ill.  The manifesto is the offspring of governmentality, its economics and its culmination 
in the policies which feed the health bureaucracy, which is in turn a cultural artefact (Lea 2008).  
The development and nurturing of the health bureaucracy is fed by the validating measurements 
of psychiatry.   
 
There is both a covert and an overt relation between discourse and inclusion in histology and its 
supposed and declared empowering of the mentally ill (Foucault in Goldstein & Cascaito 1991).  
The policies, crafted by what one would expect from a manifesto, are grounded in language and 
the complexities of mental health semantics, the relationship between governance and 
economics, and a system of class that labels the mentally ill and their place within the structure 
of society.  Thus, the labels of sub-citizen and social misfit.  The term, the Silenced Manifesto, 
is used to describe the mentally ill, although it can be widely used in other arenas.  In this case, 
the Silenced Manifesto depicts the mentally ill as lacking.  However, the term is a whispered 
voice, whispering the covert disempowerment of the mentally ill.   
 
The written word, the texts, discourses, are representations of culture.  It doesn’t have to be 




products of the arts, the sciences, and any form of transfer of knowledge.  The manifesto is a 
representation of cultural significance, a fluid space, transferable from one to another.  It is 
fundamentally essential to all parts of socio-cultural significance.   
 
The Silenced Manifesto identifies and/or develops a discourse, a vernacular that represents the 
plight of the ‘disabled’ in some way, in this case my living with a major psychotic illness.   The 
notion of the silenced is included in that these often marginalised groups are not heard.  They are 
shackled, disempowered and disallowed in the vernacular.  They do not possess roles that are 
significant to the order of society.  They are smothered, suppressed, and shushed out of the culture 
– silenced and hidden.  
 
The Communist Manifesto and the Silenced Manifesto 
 
Who are the classes today? The intelligentsia, industrialist, the politician, the economist, the 
religious? (Foucault 1972).  The mentally ill being neither producer or consumer, have no class: 
idle, vagabond, unemployed, belonging only to confinement, a measure by which he[/she] is 
exiled and as it was abstract for society (Foucault 1961: 218-19).  Having no class creates a 
limited space of commensurability, communication and translatability.  As per the Silenced 
Manifesto, a non-class situation creates a glass ceiling, or similarly a straight jacket that confines 
and restrains and restricts the means of agency for those living with schizoaffective disorder.   
 
Who are the classes today?  The class struggle isn’t Marx’s invention.  In medieval Rome there 




bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society, has not done away with class 
antagonism. It has established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle.  
Australian society is more and more splitting into two great Australian camps: bourgeoisie and 
proletariat (Martin 2016; Ponzanesi 2014).  The worker exchanges his commodity, labour power, 
for an equivalent wage, so the boss says, to purchase what he needs to survive: light, food, roof, 
clothes (Martin 2016; Ponzanesi 2014).  Patriarchy is revived with madness in the bourgeois 
family (Foucault 1961: 240).  The Silenced Manifesto blocks the degree of movement between 
classes, both by confining the space to be heard, and also by confining the avenue for the 
discourse to be navigated, as per all power negotiations. 
 
It seems that tools and objects utilised in the mental health arena can be called commodities, and 
the processes in developing and using these commodities should be called commodification.  I 
was not given any ownership of the commodification of knowledge production, and hence I was 
not granted access to the power bestowed in such a production of knowledge.  Following on, and 
as Brenner (1974 in Kleinman 1980: 48) has demonstrated, mental illness is strongly influenced 
by our society via socioeconomic changes.   
 
Regarding the Silenced Manifesto, the process of commodification silences the voices of those 
living with a psychotic illness by commodifying the underdog, thereby limiting the space of 
commensurability into a relationship between economy and social misfit.  The main accolade of 
the underdog and economy is the labelling of class.  The labelling of commodity perpetuates the 
culture which places boundaries on the underdog.  The labelling silences the mentally ill by 





The economic wealth of mental health services is not solely based on measurements and 
numerals.  I hope that the psychometric results from assessments themselves are meaningless, 
due to their negative reporting and misrepresentation of myself.  Are they true?  Do they really 
represent me?  Socialisation, socio-cultural capital, the kaleidoscopic nature of human 
interaction, and the power dynamics bartered in the potent and cogent exchange, become the non-
numerical wealth.  Social relationships become economic wealth.  The socialised stories behind 
the numbers enrich the data.  Although the stories alone are not substantial for the discerning 
eyes of those with a positivist perspective.      
 
In the psychiatric wards, I did not have control over my own resources when admitted.  
Everything was taken from me; my own resources were manipulated by the medical staff.  As 
my admitting nurse in the Ward B (public) said to me, “You cannot have in your possession 
materials which place you at risk, that is at risk of self, others or reputation.”  At risk objects that 
were taken from me included chocolate.  I could not argue for threat of being sectioned.  Thus, 
the Silenced Manifesto.  My voice and word was and is imprisoned. 
 
Biehl (2005: 23) argues that from the perspective of one human life...deemed mad and 
intractable, one comes to understand how economic globalisation, State and medical reform, and 
the acceleration of claims to human rights and citizenship, coincide with and impinge on a local 
production of social death, albeit being silenced and textualised, as per the notion of the Silenced 
Manifesto.  The negotiation over the human and nonhuman forms part of a complex set of 
relations through which individuals are linked to each other and to the political body.  The Other’s 
dying makes it possible for one to belong to a family like institution, to a new population and 
subjective economy.  The ethnographic challenge is to find these empirical relations and linkages 





The Communist Manifesto stressed the social need to produce an interior space that coexists with 
the exterior practices of citizenship.  The manifesto, related to Foucauldian or Deleuzian 
language and logic, introduced the question of subjectivity as a matter of counter-governance: all 
spheres of government should influence the ways in which individuals and groups constitute 
themselves as subjects so that citizens may elude both established forms of knowledge and 
dominant forms of power (Biehl 2005: 137).  
 
Biehl (2005: 316) states, “That is not to say that mental disorders are basically a matter of social 
construction, but rather that such disorders do take form in the most personal junction between 
the subject, his or her biology, and the intersubjective and technical re-coding of ‘normal’ ways 
of being in local worlds.” “Indeed, it’s a mystery!”  (Biehl 2005: 236)  
 
Whatever the cause of my last relapse and hospitalisation my experience in the Ward C (private) 
was relatively pleasant, although expensive.  The main difference between the other two wards 
was capital.  In anthropological terms, for instance, the difference was cultural capital, 
ethnographic capital and discourse capital, to name a few.  Conversations about power support 
such capital/s.  Though it is not as simple as that.  Having the means to control the resources in 
your life enables your recovery.  Access to more resources is needed if one must consider 
recovering in a different culture with a different language.  Ward B (public) and Ward A (public) 
and Ward C (private) all have different cultures.  The Ward B (public) is somewhat colonialist.  
Ward A (public)is somewhat paternalist, but more supportive of rehabilitation.  Ward C (private) 
is somewhat empowering and focussed on rehabilitation.  These cultures, some may argue, fall 




Australian Mental Health system include: coordinating treatment and supports for people with 
severe and complex mental illness; improving Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander mental 
health and suicide prevention; and reducing stigma and discrimination (Australian Government, 
The Fifth National Mental Health and Suicide Prevention Plan, August 2017: 4).   
 
The Silenced Manifesto can be included here as a relation to the Communist Manifesto where a 
space of commensurability between the interior and exterior spheres of personhood are created.  
So, it is possible to create social power, empowering the marginalised and providing a platform 
to make themselves heard, to equip the silenced with the semantic tools to be understood, to make 
the personal political.  The text, embedded, creates a newfound ‘discourse’.  The newly heard 
and marginalised are heeded, a commensurable space is created, their consequent power is 
precipitated by the culture that it envelopes, and the marginalised, that is the colonised, now have 




My identity is not my own.  This sentiment is typical of people living with a psychotic disorder.  
Many, including me, are defined as dependents of the State, with prescribed agency or freedom, 
without the freedom to live as desired.  Is it possible for me to regain my freedom? For this to 
happen, a broader mind may be necessary, as some people living with major psychotic illnesses 





Considering all that I am, who am I?  Am I defined purely by my sociality?  To what extent is 
my identity influenced by my understanding of self?  My mental health journey is neither linear 
or predictable. Who am I?  Who am I regarding all the factors involved in personal and social 
construction?   
 
In this thesis, the subhuman, sub-citizen and social misfit are described as having been forced 
into a position of disempowerment, being disabled, disengaged, and detached because of the 
hegemonic government macro-narrative.  This macro-narrative dictates the historical 
construction of sub-citizen policy in Australia, where the dynamic political landscape is 
changing. There is the deconstruction of current self-determination/post self-determination 
policies, and the politics of implementing these (Kowal 2006).  
 
Since I was 23, I have been suffocated by my experiences of living with schizoaffective 
disorder.  Over time, I have swayed, and I have fought to and fro, back and forward, through 
each experience, remembering some, forgetting much.  My sense of self, my identity as a 
person, these fundamental, unique and distinctive facets of my self-concept, my agency in this 
regard is limited.  My fundamental and basic human right, to be free from unwarranted 
prejudice, has been robbed of me in many ways (OHCHR n.d).  
 
My quality of life has diminished permanently.  I have difficulty in being labelled.  To be called 
‘handicapped’ by progressive health professionals currently is disempowering, although 





There are many questions that have been explored in this autoethnography.  How has my 
disability affected my life?  Why is my story significant?  How does my autoethnographic 
methodology succeed with this topic?  How do my experiences contribute to an anthropology of 
mental health?  How has my psychosis and forthcoming thesis been enculturated and situated in 
space and history?  How does stigma work?  How do language and narratives encapsulate the 
meaning, identity and purpose of the underdog? How do politics and policies wield power over 
the marginalised, and strengthen and support such power?  How do measurement and labelling 
provide insight into the experience of living with schizoaffective disorder? How significant is 
the social creation of reality to this thesis?  What does the phenomena of (post)colonialism add 
to the analysis presented here?  What structure and function is there, and how is this concept 
fluid, flexible, waxing and waning, blown to and fro in the winds of influence and power?  And 
I ask, how are the silenced made silent, and how does discourse perpetuate the labelling of the 
silenced?         
 
All these questions can be answered in some way with the Silenced Manifesto.   
 
Considering, the PAI assessment absolutely disempowered me.  I had no power left to fight with, 
no power.  It was a battle of the wits, a battle of the minds, albeit between the knowledge of the 
sane and the knowledge of insane.  I had no chance at winning.  There is a presumption that the 
social misfit is stupid, lacking.  The assessing psychologist was sheltered from criticism because 
of the deified position that an esteemed mental health professional is bestowed.  There were many 
influences that swayed the psychologist’s assessment.  Power is swayed to the value of the 




related to the tangible individual, which equals fear, uncertainty and chaos.  Psychology as related 
to tangible science equals certainty and hegemony.   
 
I am silenced.  I am ignored.  I am hidden.  I do not share a commensurable space with the 
government and its politics and policies, the processes of labelling and measurement, and the 
means of silencing and cementing the underdog in discourse.  I do not have access to freedom.  
Indeed, I am excluded and imprisoned in many ways from society.  The Silenced Manifesto 
reappropriates and encapsulates all opportunities to exert, resist and influence power.  It creates 
and builds a foundation compassing the commensurable causal space, language and narratives, 
the production of knowledge, all governance and policy, the construction of reality, the 
processing of labelling and measurement, the paradigm of (post)colonialism, stigma and social 
theory.  
  
I would like to be known as someone who is independent, who controls the circumstances 
influencing her life, and has power to own my own knowledge.  Though actually, I am vulnerable.  
I have long periods of being unwell.  I always will.  It is difficult to live past that, knowing what 
may come.  I must do things like get income insurance and full health cover and to keep my 
affairs in order, that is when I can afford it, which to be honest, hasn’t happened now and will 
probably never happen.  In many ways, I am commodified.  
 
My experience of living with schizoaffective disorder is described by the Silenced Manifesto.  I 




excluded: by language; by power; by politics and policies; by inaccessibility of services; by 















In this concluding chapter I will extrapolate and compile seven conclusions from this thesis.  
These follow on and develop from the five questions/statements posited in the introduction 
chapter.   
 
I have learnt over the twenty plus years of living with a major psychotic illness, that people do 
not expect much from me.  My psychiatrist in Town B tried to make me work part time for years, 
and definitely not to have me study on top of that.  A nurse I spoke to recently during one of my 
monthly Clozapine clinic assessments, stated that she is astounded by what I do, by what I have 
achieved.  She describes me to her friends and colleagues as a ‘real achiever’, despite the ‘pain 




fights the labels of ‘disabled’ and ‘handicapped’ (terms used by health professionals I have seen), 
as if I am not capable of living an enjoyable and full life. 
 
The discipline of my intellectual (de)construction is anthropology, and stemming on from that, 
this ethnography is an autoethnography.  The day that anthropologists give up their attempt to 
ground meanings in politics and economics will be a sad day (Douglas 1992: ix).  As per my 
perspective, in this autoethnography, I have addressed with raw insight the issues of a culture of 
schizoaffective disorder.  In this case, the culture of mental health, exemplified by my experience 
of living with schizoaffective disorder.   
 
As Kowal (2006) states, anthropology is concerned with culture and discourse.  Mental health 
discourse has historically been defined by and developed and supported by the biomedical model.  
It is this dominating medical culture, the structured perpetuating narrative, connecting the doctor 
(the scientist) and the patient (the lacking), that cements the roles of the powerful doctor and the 
powerless patient in their allocated and respected constitutes.  A culture change dissipating the 
tower of strength of the scientific foundation has proven difficult to conquer.   
 
Western knowledges, philosophies and definitions of human nature are what Foucault has 
referred to as archives.   Some people might refer as a storehouse of historic artefacts, ideas, texts 
and/or images which are classified, preserved, ranged and represented back to the West.  Foucault 
also suggests that the archive reveals practice from which the West itself cannot necessarily 
describe because it operates within the rules and they take it for granted (Kleinman 1988: 43).  
Clinicians (and researchers too) need to unpack their own interpretive schemes, which are filled 





Autoethnography is a valued methodology with which I was able to realise the minutia and 
intricacies of what it is like to live with schizoaffective disorder.   I have examined and unearthed 
the culture of my world, and the world of culture.  This perceptiveness helps me to paint a picture 
and provide an in-depth analysis of the culture of the mental health experience.  It would be 
difficult to find a methodology other than autoethnography that could provide such depth of 
detail, richness, thick description (Geertz 1973) and insight into the detail of life experiences of 




When considering the cultural identities of subhumans, sub-citizens and social misfits, I cannot 
ignore the importance of labelling theory.  The essence of labelling theory is that individuals are 
crafted by society and given identity by society.  This is done via the labels that individuals are 
given by the society.  Some labels result in harmful effects, such as the perpetuation of deviance, 
and the creation of stigma.  This label is perpetuated by the society.  The negative effects of 
labelling, the naming and assumptions, are internalised by the individual so that they adopt the 
negative influence of the labelling.  Importantly, the individuals self-actualise and learn to accept 
and identify as a subhuman, sub-citizen, social misfit.  The internalisation of the label develops 
into a self-fulfilling prophecy: if the individual is indoctrinated so much by the powerful, they 
will actualise and become the label they are given.  For example, if a teacher praises and 





Regarding mental illness, labelling can lead to negative outcomes.  The more the person living 
with a mental illness believes and internalises the labelling of subhuman, sub-citizen, social 
misfit, the more they will believe they are devalued and lacking.  And so is the self-fulfilling 
prophecy.  The individual living with a mental illness internalises the language and culture and 
politics and psychology and economy, and the interpersonal relationships.  All these factors are 
given space, a possible commensurable space, to flourish.  In this commensurable space the labels 
have been cemented and developed and have been self-actualised.  And so is the self-fulfilling 
prophecy.  The culture that labels those living with a mental illness perpetuates and the 
individuals become part of the culture defined as the lacking (Scheff 1974). 
 
“The university and in a general way, all teaching systems, which appear simply to 
disseminate knowledge, are made to maintain a certain social class in power; and to exclude 
the instruments of power of another social class.” (Foucault & Chomsky 1974)  
 
A mental illness diagnosis can label you for life.  Once painted with the brush of mental illness, 




unmeasurable, there exists a crisis of representation (Said 1978).  Diagnosis can precipitate such 
a crisis of representation, in being the ‘esteemed’ scientific phenomenon of labelling and 
categorisation.  It relies on the ethnographic capital of measurement. 
 
It makes me sick to know that I am being known about, by others, who themselves perpetuate 
the labelling of those living with a major psychotic illness.  The main difference is that in my 
situation I have somewhat of an insightful ability to question the capability of those with power 
over me.   
 
Those who I am close to, most gently always ask me how I am going with my study, eager for 
me to complete.  Many find my symptoms to be annoying.  They do not realise that my memory 
and cognition problems are symptoms, albeit permanent, and not innately part of my personality.  
They are not conscious choices.  I have no power over these annoying aspects of my illness.  I 
feel like I am judged.  To live with me, I feel judged.  I live within the boundaries of a priori 
knowledge from others.  I am bounded by what is defined for me, not what is true to me.  Here, 
again I am defined by others.  Though, I should not be patronised because of it; again, treated as 
a child.  Living with a major psychotic illness, I am often treated as a child. 
 
Labelling is an activity that predisposes the fundamental subject of this thesis.  Put another way, 
the culture of mental health and its associated labelling precipitates the stigma of both the system 
and personal phenomena of living with a major psychotic illness.  In sociology, labelling theory 
is the view of deviance according to which being labelled as a ‘deviant’ leads a person to engage 
in deviant behaviour (The Chegg Study n.d.).  The mentally ill patient is viewed as a deviant, 





I obviously do not belong, especially not in this workplace, but also in study and in relationships.  
In fact, I don’t know of any area of my life that has not been plagued by my mental illness.  I 
have been labelled in every manner.  How can I break through the cultural divide, break through 
the disempowerment and misrepresentation bestowed on me because of culture?   
 
Szasz (1970: xvii) argues against the practice of psychiatry, saying that “the result is the 
dehumanising, oppression and persecution of the citizens branded mentally ill.”  One may also 
argue that the labelling of the mentally ill is precipitated in the functioning of culture.   The 
functioning of culture, with its foundations of values and meaning, plays into the need for culture 
to empower or disempower its subjects of participants, and whether this system/society supports 
them or inhibits them.   
 
2. Subhuman, sub-citizen, social misfit 
 
The subhuman, sub-citizen, and social misfit are lacking.  The subhuman, sub-citizen, and social 
misfit lack the power and agency to participate fully in society.  Biomedicine measures what is 
mostly the scientific ways the person is lacking.  In this instance, we are looking at my lived 
experience of having schizoaffective disorder.  The culture that affects me and perpetuates the 
existence of the subhuman, sub-citizen, and social misfit also limits the power that I may attain.   
 
From my experience, I am most emancipated when my own voice is heard and heeded.  In this 
analysis, one must ask, what are the implicit or explicit silences in this discourse? Whose noises 
are (dis)empowered? (Butler 1990). What culture precipitates the subhuman, sub-citizen and 




person living with schizoaffective disorder, me, has not the empowerment of being heard let 
alone the platform, or space, to speak from.  To follow, Foucault stated (in Zolatova 2010), 
“There is not one but many silences, and they are an integral part of the strategies that underlie 
and permeate discourses.” 
 
According to Marx and to a lesser extent Foucault, the workers do not own any of the modes of 
production or modes of information which will contribute to their quality of life (Poster 1992; 
Nussbaum & Sen 1993).  One may think that it is the workers who are at the bottom of the class 
struggle.  But it is those who do not even make it to the class of worker that concerns me. They 
belong to the figurative class of stigma.  They are subhumans and sub-citizens, who do not play 
an active role in society other than a dichotomous comparison between normalcy and whatever 
deviance is.  Being a social misfit and deranged means that you do not even participate in any 
economic equation, let alone be included in any sort of societal evaluation (Appignanesi 2012: 
99).  There seems to be no room for the subhuman, sub-citizen and social misfit, the anti-social, 
with what Foucault (1973: 74) called the revitalised ‘enlightened bourgeois’.  
 
Foucault (1967: 65) notes that in England, the hospital later called Bedlam, exhibited their 
“lunatics” for a penny every Sunday...madness itself... which put on a show.  The mentally ill 
created entertainment for the society.  They were an exhibit, commodifying and sensualising the 
stigmatised, disempowering the subhuman, the sub-citizen and socially marginalised.  In 
analysing the ‘space’ which encompasses and allows for major psychotic illnesses, there is an a 
priori, an already assumed knowledge, that the mentally ill person is disabled; lacking.  It is 
assumed that the person hasn’t the capacity to function intelligently, or to negotiate their own 





3. Culture  
 
Culture helps people to understand phenomena.  “All cultural classification systems have 
anomalies, things that do not fit, and ambiguities, things that may fit in more than one category” 
(Lupton 2013: 62, 67).  Moreover, “...cultural concepts concerning labelling, boundaries, 
classifications and categories, the violation of which confounds cultural values and 
expectations.... these polluting people are culturally positioned on the margins of 
society...Certain classes of people are singled out...requiring control to bring them back to 
conforming with moral values” (Lupton 2013: 74).  This is the way in which dominant groups 
have reacted against those who are deviant (Lupton 1999: 54; Lupton 2013: 61).  Of most 
importance is how this autoethnography and relevant literature depicts the dominant culture, that 
is how the dominant culture perpetuates the labelling of subhumans, sub-citizens, and social 
deviants.   
 
I argue that mental health is a social phenomenon, just as much as a scientific phenomenon.  
Outside the walls of positivist science lay the social foundations of the concept of mental health.  
Mental health facets include taking account of the kaleidoscopic nature of human interaction; 
socialisation from science; and how the power dynamics are bartered in the potent and cogent 
exchange of socio-cultural capital.  The constructs of knowledge become cultural artefacts.  And 
the uses of these tools form together to support a system of governmentality.  They work to 
validate to justify and make accountable the positions of the service implementers.   
 
From the perspective of an anthropological decree, considering socio-cultural capital, there is a 
reappropriation into the textualized version, ethnographic capital.  From this, the Silenced 




understanding the wealth presented in language and culture.   The Silenced Manifesto engulfs 
discourse capital.  It utilises the capital presented in text, in language and culture. 
 
Such discourse is also precipitated in stigma.  It is absolutely a socialised phenomenon (Kleinman 
1988), connected with culture and everything there is about how one person can affect another.  
Also, it builds into how a society affects an individual, and how an individual is barred by the 
social.  Historically the stigmatised are labelled as shameful and outcasts, not wanted or tolerated 
by the mentally well.  Kleinman refers to stigma as the socialised “shame of illness” (1988: 158).   
The shame is inextricably connected to culture and its applications in society.  One can connect 
and relate the social to its misrepresentations.   
 
Goffman states, “Social misrepresentation is to be distinguished from personal 
misrepresentation” (1963: 82).  Social misrepresentation and the related socially stigmatised are 
greater strangers to themselves (1963: 48).  The personally stigmatised live in terror of their 
mental health status being thrown in the face (1963: 109).  Such is the turbulent identity 




The power of measurements and consequent numbers and pie graphs are quite profound (Lea 
2008). 
 
Measurement is an outcome with the use of its tools, depicting a kaleidoscopic, dynamic and 




production, a formation of political technology where the act of measurement, also narrative 
development, forms a type of discovery which has political and governmental significance.  The 
measurements produce knowledge: transforming the numbers into factoids (Lea 2008).  The 
factoids become more structured conceptually as the language and symbols of knowledge 
production.  As part of the language of scientific knowledge, these factoids/objects of knowledge 
become validations for governance, to measure the unmeasurable. (Lea 2008) 
 
The power of measurements and consequent numbers and pie graphs are quite profound.  In the 
beginning I was wary and very sceptical but open to learning more about the possibilities of 
psycho-measurements.  In retrospect, I see that in adopting the neuropsychological tool, I was 
perhaps over-zealous, projecting too much hope into ‘measurement’, too eager to believe in the 
answers that I thought the measurement would bring.  The psychometric factoids, although hoped 
to bring good news for me, can demonstrably also generate bad news.  The measurements 
inadvertently create a schism of (dis)empowerment and labelling between those who use the tool 
on the ‘Other’, and the ‘Other’ themselves (McMahon 2013). 
 
Nevertheless, psychiatric science and its magical digits and quantitative methods cannot be 
ignored.  In trying to find a sound measurement tool; to bring to life the magical proof of numbers 
in diagnosis – psychiatry relies on measurement, statistics, pie graphs, and bar graphs.  These 
digits and graphs can be understood as cultural artefacts or factoids.  Statistics illustrate the 
kaleidoscopic phenomena of mental illness.  The illuminations of measurement facts enable the 





Measurements legitimising diagnosis seem to create a space of proximity where it is possible to 
negotiate and exchange between and within the socio-cultural structure, and this is embedded in 
the many persuasions of power control and comprehension from which they came.  This space 
for legitimising measurements is important as it provides some cognition, some proximity, for 
negotiation between cultural artefacts and factoids and scientific relics (Kowal 2006; Lea 2008). 
To make this space workable, there must be some proximity in the connection between what is 
the phenomena of the measured and the unmeasurable.  What is defined as within the realms of 
the measurable and the unmeasurable? That is, discovering an understanding between what is 
science and how this relates to non-science?  For example, looking at the cultural artefact, and if 
or how there is space for an understanding of science, and how and why it is significant.  Thus, 
some space is possibly available to measure the unmeasurable. 
 
5. Critical theory  
 
The main theory covered by this thesis is critical theory involving (post)colonialism.  Other 
theories briefly discussed in this thesis are structural-functionalism, Marxism, postmodernism 
and poststructuralism.  An important theorist used in this analysis is Michel Foucault (1926-





Critical theory is more emancipatory than the explanatory postmodernism and poststructuralism.  
As well, critical theory aims to understand the social construction of reality.  Other theories, apart 
from (post)colonialism, classified as critical theory are feminist theory, queer theory and possibly 
neo-Marxism.  Foucault argues, each of these theories work to empower the Other through 
analyses of the historical production of prejudice and their social-cultural-political a priori 
assumptions.  The awareness of present-day madness as a part of its theoretical basis in today’s 
modern social science, is accomplished by a certain analysis of modernity, which is situated from 
the start in the temporal, historical and social context (Foucault 1967: 201).   
 
The main theorist I have used to analyse my thesis is Michel Foucault. Studying his work, gave 
me a heightened perception and conception for a study such as this.  His insight helped me to 




and (post)colonial theory.  The labelling marked in this study can be explained via the 
negotiations of cultural artefacts, and how they are utilised to silence or amplify the voices of 
those consumed in the powerful cultural windmill of cultural infrastructure.  Again, the Silenced 
Manifesto is placed here, that is by giving a voice to the disempowered within the discourse of 




To explore the anthropology of (post)colonialism, and the culture that precipitates the labeling 
and definition of the mentally ill as social misfit and deranged, as lacking or in deficit, also 
precipitates and holds high the values of paternalism and colonialism.  Spivak explains how those 
confined are not fully human.   Those living with a major psychotic disorder are essentially 
bantered around between being colonised, decolonised and then re-colonised (Spivak 1990, 
1998; Smith 1999).  To extrapolate from Kowal’s argument (2006; 2008), the banter between the 
colonised and the colonisers in Indigenous health can be likened to the banter between the 
mentally ill and the mental health professionals and the politics engaged.    
 
For the most part, those who advocate and insist on canonical forms of doing and writing research 
are advocating a White, masculine, heterosexual, middle/upper-classed, Christian, able-bodied 
perspective.  Following these conventions, a researcher not only disregards other ways of 
knowing but also implies that other ways necessarily are unsatisfactory and invalid. 




rigid definitions of what constitutes meaningful and useful research.  As such, writing personal 
stories can also be therapeutic for participants and readers. 
 
Measurement may be likened to a tool of (post)colonialism (Smith 1999: 6, 23).  Many distinct 
populations, including the mentally ill, have experienced colonialism in various ways (Smith 
1999: 144).  Diagnosis and labelling are (post)colonialist actions (Smith 1999: 26).  Those 
labelled as mentally ill, or non-white, or female are historically not granted the status of fully 
human.  Some of us are not even considered partially human.  Ideas about what counted as human 
in association with the power to define people as human or not human were already encoded in 
imperialism and called colonial discourses (Smith 1999: 27).  As Audre Lorde stated, “[The] 
Master’s tools cannot bring down the master’s house” (Smith 1999). 
 
The practice of measuring the mentally unwell can be likened to (post)colonial practice (Smith 
1999).  How do the mental health professionals measure the seemly unmeasurable?  Some 
perspectives on these are addressed in my medical notes.  There are no completely reliable and 
valid measures to assess mental health participants, and there are certainly not reliable and exact 
measures to direct treatment.  Due to being so uncertain, I must question whether my illness is 
valid in its assessment and diagnosis.   
 
The concept of the Silenced Manifesto depicts a relationship between the colonised and 
coloniser.  This relationship is covert and surreptitious, and hidden from the public societal 
vernacular.  This is very much part of the relationship between those living with a major 




have negotiated power over the mentally ill, the colonised Other.  The Other are dependent on 
the coloniser.  Data begets knowledge which begets power, which begets knowledge, which 
begets data.  The coloniser’s agenda is to use tools of measurement, psychometric tools in this 
case, as political technologies and artefacts which are entwined and essential to governance.  Us 
work to further enable cultural artefacts to become commodified, another avenue where power 
can be won.  The Silenced Manifesto connects the Us and  
Other, strongly, firmly yet in privacy and silence.  The measurements developed from a 
technology of knowledge production to object of governance (O’Farrell 2005), may be used by 
Us to have power and colonise the Other.   
 
7. Silenced Manifesto  
 
The negotiations between the colonisers and the colonised may also be understood by engaging 
with the concept of the ‘Silenced Manifesto’.  The ‘silenced’, the colonised, are disempowered 
and stifled by the coloniser, be it through education, policy and politics, economics, and the 
power play precipitated in the (post)colonial culture and space between the coloniser and the 
colonised.  The colonised are governed by the manifesto discourse and mandates of the 





The Silenced Manifesto allows for a space, a (post)colonial space, constructed by the colonised.  
It is a space where there is a possible commensurability between the heard and the silenced.  A 
space that acknowledges the relationship between coloniser/colonised, and the production of 
coloniser resources, knowledge and power, that is conceding according to the colonisers 
manifesto.  The Silenced Manifesto allows for the development of such a space.  These advances 
coalesce as (post)colonial logic (Kowal 2006).   
 
I have negated a traditional detailed discourse analysis, but in turn have provided an insight into 
the culture of mental health, the labelling of the mentally ill and societal norms with the concept 
of the Silenced Manifesto.  The Silenced Manifesto positions the discussion in the (post)colonial 
space using (post)colonial logic (Kowal 2006) which can supply a more complex and profound 
analysis and perspective.  The manifesto perpetuates the cultures of politics, economics, 
histology and science.  I have included the concept of the Silenced Manifesto, to make more 





An Australian national health policy and program, the NDIS, holds the values of individual 
choice and control in high regard.  The NDIS, also used in mental health, mandates person 
centred and directed care, creating a discourse which develops a manifesto, which in turn fuels 
an arm of governance.  Along with the sustenance that the manifesto gains from governance, it 
secures solidarity and power from bureaucracy.  Bureaucracy as such becomes a cultural artefact, 
which further feeds into the vernacular and again, the drive of the manifesto.   
 
In this case, the power of the manifesto doesn’t always corroborate and substantiate the 
disempowered, that is those living with a psychotic illness.  The voice of the mentally ill are 
silenced by governance, its cultural artefacts for instance bureaucracy, and its discourse.  They 
do not speak the same language.  The voice of the mentally ill are overpowered and 




I have created an anthropological study of living with a mental illness.  Specifically, an 
autoethnography of living with schizoaffective disorder, looking at the way I have been labelled 
as a lesser human, with an understanding that labelling is part of the culture which encompasses 





It seems ironic that although I fight being labelled and stigmatised, I have developed habits of 
buying into the disempowerment bestowed on me.  Today, I negotiated with a nurse about my 
need to be admitted to a psychiatric ward – the Ward C (private) mentioned in chapter eight.  The 
psychiatrist was keen for me to be admitted so that my medications may be tweaked, two 
medications.  The first medication I am taking is of a high dose and needs to be reduced.  
Similarly, my psychiatrist states that my cognitive functioning would improve if I am taken off 
the second drug.  These medication changes I am told will have little cost or effect to my mental 
health.  The nurse stated that I will most probably be in hospital for two weeks.  
 
I spoke about this probable hospitalisation with a friend.  He suggested that I am allowing myself 
to be disempowered by the bio-medical model.  He stated that I should do what is therapeutic for 
me, possibly minimising the time spent in the hospital and more time in the more therapeutic 
environment as my community – with my friends and family.  This cannot be avoided.  But 
without realising it, I have disempowered myself.  Indeed, the culture that perpetuates everything 
bad as depicted in this thesis: the labelling, measuring, and stigma, is the same culture that has 
caught me up, in the name of bio-medicine and science, of which I am subject to.  Even though 
I fight against being part of the disempowering discourse, there is a strong sense in me that finds 
peace, solace and safety in being admitted to the Ward C (private).  
 
In my experience, I have been a pawn in the power game of mental health service delivery and 
have not always been able to negotiate my freedom.  If the overarching structure is the culture of 
a society, then I am a slave to our culture.  In this thesis, I have carefully explored the enigma of 




misfit.  Then I explored the culture that precipitates the labelling.  I hoped to explore this 
mysterious and unfathomable culture.  Like a true anthropologist, I was most interested in culture. 
 
Partly due to my own undoing, I feel conflicted.  I feel crushed.   Can’t I be a whole person?  
Although with what the noises say and what I hear others say, real or not, with all the pressure, I 
am now convinced I am disabled.  I am coming to believe that I am all the labels people are 
bestowing on me.  I am lacking.  I am stupid.  I am powerless.  I am silenced.  And I am blind - 
“There are eyes everywhere. No blind spots left. What shall we dream of when everything 
becomes visible? We'll dream of being blind” (Virilio 1977)   
 
How and why has living with schizoaffective disorder affected my life?  Perhaps because my 
diagnosis has de-railed what is important to me.  Living with schizoaffective disorder has 
disempowered me as my values are based on social justice - individual agency, virtue and 
equality for all.  My agency is now severely limited.  I can be detained if I am deemed to be 
unwell, or not in my right mind.  Whilst I can understand the hegemonic logic, it still does not 
feel decent or moral to me.  Under such a regime, I feel it is unjust, unequal, and even paternalistic 
in the governance of ‘caring’ for someone living with a major psychotic illness.  So, my life 
expectancy, quality of life, agency, and self-determination are all questionable, disputed, and 
dubious.  Whereas, my profound feelings of personal shame and inadequacy are intensely 
impenetrable for me.   
 
There must also be more room for a more thorough analysis of the data sourced from Foucault 




think there is only one practical consequence: we must create ourselves as a work of art.”  We 
must embrace the art of autoethnography.  One issue that needs exploring is Foucault’s historical 
situatedness.   
 
Avenues of analysis must be explored within the combination of culture and economics and 
politics and governance – and how these phenomena become commodities.  However, there must 
be more depth to the analysis than concluding that commodities and resources are the major 
causes for all ramifications and difficulties in the theory and practice of mental health.  
(Post)colonialism must be explored further.   
 
 I suppose in many ways my focus should be to communicate well the cultural issues involved 
in schizoaffective disorder, between the individual experience and the broader socio-cultural 
terrain, including the situatedness of ideas and experience.  Then the (post)colonial condition 
may be able to offer hope for peaceful coexistence in the post-colony (Kowal 2006). 
 
I am stupid! 
 
I am disabled! 
 
The mental health professionals use techniques of measurement, diagnosis and treatment to stake 
a claim on the way the mentally ill should live.  The mentally ill – Other – not always privy to 
the sanctity of medical knowledge, have little choice than to trust the deified mental health 




governmentality of power structures.  Note, however, that power structures negotiate, command 
and influence in whichever name you give the paradigm.   For example, the paradigm of 
(post)colonialism may be extrapolated here.  So much is riding on the use of measurement.  
Measurement therefore benefits service providers, or colonisers, to give power to and sanction 
the socio-cultural, political and economically produced entity.  Some may say that the purpose 
of measurement is its validation of (post)colonialism. 
 
I cannot separate my mental illness from my person, despite my every effort.  I am absolutely 
pathologised!  My measurements support this dependence.  I am handicapped.  I am 
disempowered.  I am named and determined by the colonisers.  The biomedical colonisers 
associate with the richness and power of the cultural artefacts, factoids.  Biomedical agents are 
colonisers, identified with the spectrum of what is mental health, such as governance and 
bureaucracy, and the various mental health professionals.  Yet I cry for help from the colonisers 
when I am unwell and desperate. 
 
I will always live with schizoaffective disorder.   
 
I would rather live a shorter life than live in the hell of insanity. 
 
The only reaction I must have is that I am absolutely gutted.  Thoroughly.  Completely. 
 













Agency: Within Sociology, self-determination or free will (Denzin & Lincoln 2015: 340). 
Alienation: As identified by Karl Marx, the condition of workers who feel estranged from 
themselves or society due to lack of power, control, fulfilment, and satisfaction.  Marx attributed 
this to capitalist society, where the means of production are privately owned (Denzin & Lincoln 
2015: 340). 
Autoethnography:  A young Anthropological methodology that focuses on the self (‘auto’) and 
ethnography’ the study of culture.  There is a sample size of one.  All interchanges and 
interrelations, including notes on power relations, are performed through the eyes of the 
researcher (Adams, Jones & Ellis 2015).    
Biomedicine: A conceptual body of illness that excludes psychology and social factors, while 
focusing on the scientific of biology scientific factors (Free Dictionary 2020). 
Bourgeoisie: In Marxist theory, the social class of people that owns the means of production 
(Denzin & Lincoln 2015: 340).  
Brain: The objective bodily organ that is in control of all cerebral functioning such as processing 




Bureaucracy: Defined by Max Weber as a system of organisation that is characterised by a 
hierarchy of rule-bound officials.  Bureaucracies are arguably socialised entities that create a 
structure of people.  According to Lea (2008), government bureaucracies are cultural 
manifestations which create their own facts, or ‘cultural artefacts’ to legitimate and validate their 
position.  For example, the work that bureaucrats do can arguably create and actually perpetuate 
and strengthen the meta policy of ‘Close the Gap’ rather than emancipating those the policy was 
designed for.  This can be called the ‘magic of bureaucracy’ (Simonton 2015: 340). 
Confinement: In Madness and Civilisation (1961) Foucault describes a movement across 
Europe in the seventeenth century which saw the establishment of institutions which locked up 
people who were deemed to be ‘unreasonable’.  This included not only mad people, but the 
unemployed, single mothers, defrocked priests, failed suicides, heretics, prostitutes, debauchees 
in short anyone who was deemed to be socially unproductive or disruptive.  He labels this 
movement the ‘Great Confinement’.  He continues his study of confinement in his history of the 
birth of the prison, Discipline and Punish (1982) (Foucault in Farrell, C. 2020).  
Crazy/craziness: A term made in jest for the mentally ill to introduce and provoke and request 
another level of understanding of what it is like living with a major psychotic disorder.  I use this 
term to invite poetic quip into the discussion.  The liberty of using poetic licence through humour, 
as permitted with the methodology of autoethnography, provides a more complex and 
multifaceted understanding of the experience of living with schizoaffective disorder.  Indeed, by 
using the term ‘crazy’, I am also labelling the mentally ill as with the terms sub-human, sub-
citizen and social misfit.  A premise of this autoethnography is that it is a reappropriation. 
Critical theory: Which includes queer theory and feminism, critical theory encompasses theories 




referred to as and colonisers) and empower the powerless (often referred to as colonised).  Critical 
theory is an emancipatory theory (Bronner 2011). 
Culture: The languages, customs, knowledge, beliefs and norms that combine to make up the 
way of society.  May also refer to the arts (such as music, theatre, literature and so on) (Geertz 
1973). 
Discourse: In general use, communication in speech or writing; in sociological use, a framework 
or system of ideas that provides a perspective on life and governs the way it can be discussed.  
Discourse imparts a meaning to events, and varies in different eras, geographical areas, and 
within social groups (Simonton 2015: 340-241).  Discourse is a rather slippery notion in 
Foucault’s work but at the most basic level he uses the term to refer to the material verbal traces 
left by history.  He also uses it to describe a certain ‘way of speaking’ (Foucault 1972). 
Discourse analysis:  Discourse analysis (DA) is a type of discourse analytical research that 
primarily studies the social power dynamics of culture through text and talk.  The power 
dynamics are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political 
context.  DA represents the analysis of the social structure (Dunn & Eble 2015).  
Economic determinism: A materialistic view of history which claims that economic forces 
cause all social phenomena and the evolution of human society (Simonton 2015: 341). 
Episteme: This term, which Foucault introduces in his book The Order of Things (1966), refers 
to the orderly ‘unconsciousness’ structures underlying the production of scientific knowledge in 
a particular time and place.  It is the ‘epistemological field’ which forms the conditions of 
possibility for knowledge in a given time and place.  It has often been compared to T.S. Kuhn’s 




Feminism:  A social movement that advocates the social, political and economic equality of the 
sexes.  Feminism is recognised as having had several ‘waves’, or eras, each with a different 
agenda of issues (Simonton 2015: 341). 
Foucauldian power:   
• Power is not a thing but a relation 
• Power is not simply repressive, but it is productive 
• Power is not simply a property of the State.  Power is not something that is exclusively 
localised in government and the State (which is not an universal essence). Rather, power 
is exercised throughout the social body. 
• Power operates at the most micro levels of social relations.  In fact, power is omnipresent 
at every level of the social body 
• The exercise of power is strategic and war-like.  (Foucault 1983) 
(Simonton 2015). 
Full citizen: For an individual to be able to participate fully, in sound mind and body, in the 
political and economic spheres of society, so that the individual may have control or influence 
over the resources that affect his/her own life.   
Full human: For an individual to be in full capacity of themselves, including of sound mind and 
body, to take control of the resources that affect his/her life.  This includes full capacity within 
an individual’s existential, cultural, social and spiritual context. 
Gaze: Foucault uses the word to refer to the fact that it is not just the object of knowledge, the 




the eighteenth century set much more on visibility – on looking and seeing and on visible 
symptoms  (Jennifer Reinhardt 2020).   
“If thou gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will also gaze into thee” (Nietzsche: 1886 “Beyond 
Good and Evil”).   
Governmentality:  Foucault originally used the term ‘governmentality’ to describe a particular 
way of administering populations in modern European history with the context of the rise of the 
idea of the State.  He later expanded his definition to encompass the techniques and procedures 
which are designed to govern the conduct of both individuals and populations at every level not 
just the administrative or political level.  In consideration of history and politics, measurement 
can go on to deliberate the issue of governmentality (Foucault in Farrell, C. 2020).   
History:  Foucault’s entire philosophy assumes that human knowledge and existence are situated 
and profoundly linked in history.  He argues that what is most human about man is his history.  
He discusses the notions of history, change and historical method at some length at various points 
in his career.  He uses history as a means of demonstrating that there is no such thing as historical 
necessity, that things could have been and could be otherwise  (Foucault 1961, 1963, 1969). 
Historical a priori: This is the order underlying any given culture at any given period of history.  
Foucault also uses the phrase the ‘positive unconscious of knowledge’ to refer to the same idea.  
The episteme which describes scientific forms of knowledge is a subset of this (Foucault in 
Farrell, C. 2020). 
History and historiography: Foucault’s entire philosophy assumes that human knowledge and 
existence are profoundly historical.  He argues that what is most human about man is his history.  
He discusses the notions of history, change and historical method at some length at various points 




Homo economicus: In relation to the individual’s structural and functional position within the 
economy (Chen 2019).  
Insanity: Doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results (Albert 
Einstein). 
Madness: The state of having a serious mental illness; extremely foolish behaviour; a state of 
wild or chaotic activity.  More of a historical term that developed over the last century and a half.  
A value-laden term, a cultural term with prejudice undertones for the mentally ill. 
Marxism: A structural theory of society...[where] social change arises out of conflict between 
social classes, that is, the owners of the means of production, and the exploited working classes 
(Simonton 2015: 342).  There is a strong correlation between Marxism and homo economicus, 
where the individual’s identity is bound by economics and the politico-cultural principles it is 
structured by.   Foucault is well known for his controversial statements in 1966 that “Marxism 
exists in nineteenth century thought like a fish in water: that is unable to breathe anywhere else” 
and that it was a mere “storm...in a children’s paddling pool” (Foucault’s The Order of Things 
1966: 262).  For a brief period of time after 1968 Foucault’s comments on Marxism as a form of 
political activity became more favourable.  He subsequently returned to his earlier views on the 
historical specificity of Marxism and to criticisms of the inflated claims made by Marxists in 
relation to Marxists in relation to Marx’s work.  As Simonton (2015: 29) states, “Modern society 
has two great classes: the industry-owning bourgeoisie and the proletariat”.  
Measurement: An act that explores, validates and seeks to gain reliability for an outcome.  In 
this context, the significance of measurement in psychiatry aims to qualify and quantify the 
validation and accountability of services. It is also a way of gauging the individual’s mental 
health status and changes that treatment may or may not have instigated.  In this discussion, 




Mental illness:  A mental illness is a health problem that significantly affects how a person 
thinks, behaves and interacts with other people. It is diagnosed according to standardised criteria.  
Mental illnesses are of different types and degrees of severity.  Some of the major types are: 
• anxiety  
• schizophrenia  
• schizoaffective disorder 
• bipolar mood disorder  
• personality disorder  
• eating disorders  
• depression  
• psycho-social disorder 
• post traumatic stress disorder. 
Mind: the philosophic and socialised subjective entity that encompasses all functions just like 
the brain.  This includes rationality, thoughts and processing of the senses.  The mind has a 
cultural entity where it is subject to judgements of values and norms. 
Othering/Us:  to view or treat (a person or group of people) as intrinsically different from and 
alien to oneself.  The difference is a power dynamic between ‘us’, the economical and political 
powerful, and the ‘other’, definably the disempowered, somewhat dependent on ‘us’.  In the 
instance of this thesis, the “othered” are the mentally ill, and “us” are those representatives of the 
cultural schema that perpetuates the view of ‘Otheredness’.  The ‘us’ in this case are primarily 
the mental health professionals (Said 1978). 
Politics: the structure which encompasses the systems, laws, culture, discourse, internal and 




power in a government.  The work or jobs of people within the political sphere are included, such 
as elected officials, who are part of a government.  Also, the opinions that an individual or group 
has about what should be done by governments.  Finally, politics is about person's political 
thoughts and opinions (Merriam Webster 2020).  
Positivism: Within sociology, the idea pioneered by Auguste Comte, that it is possible to observe 
social life in a measurable, verifiable and scientific way to establish truth about society.  This 
belief gave rise to the ‘positivist’ opinion that science could build a better world  (Simonton 
2015: 342). 
(Post)colonialism: Colonial existence which entails the taking over of the governance of the 
State, whereby the citizens are subjugated and disempowered under the powerful existing 
hegemony (Said 1978).  The concept and process of mental illness service delivery can be likened 
to colonialism (Smith 1999).  (Post)colonialism implies an end to colonialism.  As Aboriginal 
activist Bobbi Sykes has asked “What? Post colonialism?  Have they left?”  (Smith 1999: 25)  
Postmodernism:  A perspective that denies there can be a defining “truth” about anything, 
instead suggesting that a text, person or society can be deconstructed according to many different 
‘truths’.  By its nature, postmodern social theory rejects being defined and is difficult to define 
Appignanesi,et al (2005). 
Poststructuralism:  Closely aligned to postmodernism, but perhaps also reactive to it by 
negating the importance of all social theorising, not limiting social analysis just to multiple truths.  
In reaction to exploring and negating, the nature of structuralism is known by deconstructing it.  
There are no macro-universal truths, nor micro nor nano-truths.  Social power play is rife, which 




difference between the two.  For a short time, Foucault claimed to be a post structuralist (Foucault 
in O’Farrell 2007). 
Power – knowledge: One of the most important features of Foucault’s view is that mechanisms 
of power produce different types of knowledge which collate information of people’s activities 
and existence.  The knowledge gathered in this way further reinforces exercises of power.  
Foucault refutes the idea that he makes the claim ‘knowledge is power’ and says that he is 
interested in studying the complex relations between power and knowledge without saying they 
are the same thing (Foucault in O’Farrell 2007).  
 Psychiatry - a specialist form of bio-medicine.  A scientific bio-medical model of the workings 
of the brain.  Treatment prescribed by psychiatrists tends to be bio-chemical, with inclusion of 
talking therapies and allied health.   
Psychologist –the psychologist works with the functioning of the mind/brain, commonly those 
with psycho-social disorders.  In Australia, to become a psychologist it is customary to hold a 
Masters degree in a related subject to psychology.  Also, a psychologist often claims to be 
scientific stemming from the bio-medical model which relies heavily on behaviour change and 
development through talking therapies, and in conglomeration with other allied health 
professionals, for a more holistic treatment.  Sometimes psychologists working closely with 
psychiatrists, other times they do not work so closely. (The Australian  
Psychological Society 2020).   
Psychosis – thoughts, feelings, behaviours that distort reality. 




Rigour – a term to indicate that the issues raised by the concepts of validity and reliability are 
important in qualitative research.  The onus is on the researcher to deal with their participants 
with integrity, honesty and fairness (Liamputtong & Ezzy: 1999: 38, 43). 
Queer theory: A cultural theory that challenging binary notions of sexuality and instead suggests 
that sexualities are in part cultural constructs influenced by time and space (Simonton 2015: 343). 
Science:  The observation, identification, description, experimental investigation, and theoretical 
explanation of phenomena (Free Dictionary 2020). 
Sectioning: involuntary admission when it is likely for the individual to cause harm of self-harm 
to the others because of the illness or be of mental or physical deterioration (The Australian 
Human Rights Commission 1992).  
Self: the evaluation by oneself of one's worth as an individual in distinction from one's 
interpersonal or social roles (Simonton 2015: 343).   
Silenced Manifesto:  I have founded, established, created and built the concept of the Silenced 
Manifesto.   
Social misfit/deviant: a behaviour or type aof person deemed ‘rule breaking’ in terms of the 
norms of a particular society or social group (Kleinman 1980). A social misfit is a person who 
does not fit into society.  There is no room for them.  They do not adhere to the public values and 
behaviour of the socially kept and powerful.  They are rejected and not tolerated.  Their behaviour 
is labelled as anti-social.  They are outcasts of society.  It is not uncommon that people living 
with a mental illness, with their anti-social behaviour are homeless – and thus rather public.  
Those who do not want to have their space infiltrated by anti-social behaviour do not want to see 




commonly the social misfits are admitted to psychiatric wards.  They are silenced and hidden by 
the mental health system.  Where else are they to go?       
Social Structure:  The social institutions and relationships that form the framework of a society 
(Simonton 2015: 343). 
 Society:  the structure and functioning that brings a group together making a meaningful group 
of individuals.  “Society is not a mere sum of individuals.  Rather, the system formed by their 
association represents a specific reality which has its own characteristics” (Simonton 2015: 37).   
State: Foucault argues that the State is a codification of relations of power at all level across the 
social body.  It is a concept which provides a “scheme of intelligibility of whole group of already 
established institutions and realities”.  Further, “the State is a practice not a thing”.  Foucault 
emphasises that the State is not the primary sources of power (Foucault 2004: 282). 
Stigma:  A mark of disgrace or an undesirable characteristic, physical or social, that disqualifies 
an individual from being fully accepted by society.  The marginalising of individuals in society, 
because they evoke negative responses from others, have been attributed (Goffman 1963). 
Structuralism:  The idea that we must understand – such as a text, human mind or society – by 
examining the elements, or pattern of relationships, in its structure (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982). 
Sub-citizen:  Sub-citizens, very similar to sub-humans, who do not participate fully as citizens 
of the state, for example, sub-citizens do not fully contribute to society politically or 
economically.  The notion of sub-citizen is in relation to the state or nation.   
Sub-human: Sub-humans are defined as those not granted full human status in society in that 
they are deemed to lack the capacity to participate in society.  They display behaviour that is 




Systems:  The socio-cultural, political, economic, religious and/or environmental structures all 
connected by language in some sense of the word.   
Theory:  Framework, or ‘lens’ through which to understand phenomena. 
Us/Othering:  to view or treat (a person or group of people) as intrinsically different from and 
alien to oneself.  The difference is a power dynamic between “us”, the economic and political 
powerful, and the ‘other’, definably the disempowered, somewhat dependent on ‘us’.  In the 
instance of this thesis, the ‘othered’ are the mentally ill, and ‘us’ are those representatives of the 
cultural schema that perpetuates the view of ‘otheredness’.  The ‘us’ in this case are primarily 
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